Revolut Ltd · DRN-6216856

The complaint Mr and Mrs F complain that Revolut Ltd has declined to reimburse payments made relating to a scam. What happened In November 2025 Mrs F received a call from a scammer impersonating Revolut, they persuaded her that a third party had gained access to her account. The scammer discussed payments with Mrs F that she could see in her banking app, and she was convinced she needed to take steps to reverse the larger one. She became suspicious when the scammer asked her to authorise a further payment reversal when the money hadn’t been returned yet from when she had done this. Mr and Mrs F are disputing two card payments and says these were unauthorised. Revolut declined to reimburse Mr and Mrs F on the basis that it didn’t think the payments were out of character for the account and it didn’t have valid grounds for a chargeback. They also said Mrs F had confirmed the larger payment in her banking app as part of a stronger authentication process known as 3DS. When Mr and Mrs F referred their complaint to our service, the investigator upheld it in part. They thought the first payment for £174.98 was unauthorised as the scammer appears to have made than without Mrs F’s involvement and so they recommended Revolut reimburse it. But they thought Revolut could treat the second payment for £3,500 as authorised on the basis that she had confirmed it in her banking app before it was processed. The investigator concluded that they wouldn’t have expected Revolut to do more to prevent or recover that payment in the circumstances. Mr and Mrs F didn’t agree, she said she wasn’t informed that Revolut wouldn’t initiate calls and that since the scam Revolut appears to have introduced a feature whereby the user can see in their banking app that they aren’t on a call with it – she thinks this recognises a gap in its security system when the fraud occurred and it should reimburse her. The investigator explained they didn’t think Revolut was liable on this basis. Revolut has since confirmed to our service that it accepts the investigators recommended redress. Mr and Mrs F asked for the complaint to be considered by an ombudsman and so it has been passed to me to decide. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I’ve reached the same conclusion as the investigator for similar reasons. And I think a fair way to settle this complaint is for Revolut to reimburse the disputed payment of £174.98 plus interest. I’ll explain why I don’t think Revolut needs to reimburse the £3,500 disputed payment.

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Can Revolut fairly treat the payments as authorised? Under the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs) – the starting point is that Mr and Mrs F are liable for authorised payments and Revolut is liable for unauthorised payments. Where a payment is authorised, that will often be because the customer has made the payment themselves. But there are other circumstances where a payment should fairly be considered authorised, such as where the customer has given permission for someone else to make a payment on their behalf or they’ve told their payment service provider they want a payment to go ahead. It’s common ground that Mrs F was the victim of a scam and that she didn’t use her card information to make the two disputed online payments. It also appears to be accepted that Mrs F didn’t give the scammer her card information, and that they were likely able to obtain it from elsewhere. As Revolut has now agreed to reimburse the first payment of £174.98, I won’t go into this in detail – but for clarity I agree that as Mrs F appears to have had no involvement in that payment that she didn’t authorise it. Revolut has provided evidence to show that the disputed card payment for £3,500 to a money remitter was correctly authenticated which included a stronger authentication process whereby the payment was approved in Mrs F’s banking app. I understand that while the scammer likely used Mrs F’s card details to make the online payment, Mrs F does recall verifying the payment in her banking app believing she was reversing it. Revolut says Mrs F would have been sent a notification saying “Tap to verify an online payment with your card” including the amount and merchant. And that the screen Mrs F completed said: “Confirm your online payment” and included the payment information (the merchant’s name and payment amount). The page provided the option to “confirm” or “reject” the payment. Revolut has also provided an example of how the screen looked at the time. It doesn’t appear to be in dispute that Mrs F selected “confirm” which is consistent with the evidence. I understand that Mrs F was tricked into taking these steps, and that she didn’t realise at the time that she would be losing this money. But I consider Revolut asked her in a clear way if she consented to the disputed payment, and she confirmed it. So, I think it was reasonable for Revolut to rely on this as confirmation that Mrs F did consent to the payment. It follows that I think Revolut has acted fairly in treating the payment as authorised. Did Revolut miss an opportunity to prevent Mrs F’s loss? In broad terms, the starting position at law is that an Electronic Money Institution (“EMI”) such as Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the PSRs and the terms and conditions of the customer’s account. But, taking into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements, and what I consider to be good industry practice, Revolut ought to have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and made additional checks before processing payments in some circumstances I have reviewed Mr and Mrs F’s account statements. Having considered when the disputed payments were made, their value and who they were made to, I’m not persuaded Revolut ought to have found them suspicious or out of character for the account, such that it ought to

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have made enquiries of Mr or Mrs F before processing them. This is because there is a history of higher value payments and card payments on the account, and these were for relatively low amounts in terms of the payments Revolut processes each day, and so neither would have appeared high risk. Mrs F says Revolut ought to have reduced the risk to her by letting her know it didn’t make this sort of call, and that this would’ve helped her been more prepared and aware of the risk. Mrs F has pointed out that Revolut has since put in place a feature to help its customers know they aren’t on the phone to it. I understand her point, but I don’t think Revolut had a specific obligation to do this, Revolut is primarily an app based provider that does have the ability to make calls. Any steps it takes to improve its services to alert customers to scams doesn’t mean it would have been expected in the past. For the reasons explained, I don’t think Revolut should have done more to prevent the payments. Could Revolut have done anything else to recover Mr and Mrs F’s money? Revolut wouldn’t have been able to stop either card payment once it had already been processed. This was the case even if though it showed as pending. As the disputed payments were online card payments, a recovery option that would have been available to Revolut would have been through the chargeback scheme. For clarity, card payments are not “push payments” and aren’t covered by reimbursement schemes for authorised push payment scams. The chargeback process is run by the card scheme provider to resolve payment disputes between customers and merchants – subject to the rules they set. As the scheme is voluntary and limited in scope, Revolut wouldn’t be expected to raise a claim that it thought had no prospect of success. Focusing on the £3,500 payment as this is the one I’m not making an award for, Revolut said it didn’t have grounds for a valid chargeback due to the way it was authenticated and the likelihood that the services paid for were provided (just not for the benefit of Mr and Mrs F). I think this was a reasonable conclusion in the circumstances. It follows that I wouldn’t have expected Revolut to continue to pursue the matter in the circumstances as it wouldn’t have had a reasonable prospect of success. My final decision My final decision is that Revolut Ltd should: 1. Reimburse £174.98 to Mr and Mrs F. 2. Pay Mr and Mrs F simple interest on the amount in point 1, from the date of the payment to the date of settlement. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs F and Mr F to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. Stephanie Mitchell Ombudsman

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