Financial Ombudsman Service decision

NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY · DRN-6254520

Authorised Push Payment (APP) ScamComplaint upheldRedress £134
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The verbatim text of this Financial Ombudsman Service decision. Sourced directly from the FOS published decisions register. Consumer names are reduced to initials by FOS at point of publication. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original decision.

Full decision

The complaint Miss B is unhappy NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY (“NatWest”) won’t reimburse money she lost to a scam. What happened Miss B fell victim to what is commonly known as a job or task scam. She was required to complete tasks on an online platform in order to receive commission. As part of the scam, she was required to make deposits to the platform. The sums she was required to deposit became increasingly large. Miss B was eventually told she would need to pay money to release her commission. After she made further payments and still didn’t receive her money, she reported the matter as a scam. The payments took place between February and April 2025 and were made initially to third parties and subsequently to a cryptocurrency platform. She asked NatWest to reimburse her loss, but it declined. Miss B referred the matter to our service. One of our investigators upheld her complaint in part. They thought that NatWest should reimburse those payments which were covered by the Faster Payments Scheme Reimbursement Rules (“the Reimbursement Rules”), but that NatWest didn’t have any responsibility for the other payments as they would not have appeared suspicious or unusual. Miss B welcomed the investigator’s findings in relation to the payments covered by the Reimbursement Rules, but thought that the other payments should be reimbursed too. She pointed to the fact that her account entered into an unarranged overdraft as a result of one of the disputed payments and she’d missed repayments on a personal loan with the bank. She argued that this should have given NatWest additional cause for concern. She also said that she contacted the bank about her financial difficulties during the period the scam took place and it missed opportunities to uncover what was happening. As no agreement could be reached the complaint was passed to me for a final decision. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. I’m sorry to hear about what’s happened to Miss B – I understand how upsetting it can be to lose money as a result of a scam. However, the starting position in law is that customers are responsible for payments they make themselves. That position is modified by the Reimbursement Rules – which make payment service providers (like NatWest) responsible for eligible payments made as part of an authorised push payment scam to an account which isn’t under the consumer’s control. Only three payments in dispute satisfy that criteria. Of the other payments, one was a card

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payment (and therefore not a “push” payment), the others were made to an account Miss B controlled. Therefore the rules only apply to the first three payments Miss B made. Our investigator recommended that NatWest reimburse those payments (taking into account the small number of returns received by Miss B) without the deduction of the Reimbursement Rules’ allowable excess. Both parties agreed to this, so I don’t need to consider it further. The remaining dispute is about whether NatWest should have picked up on the activity on Miss B’s accounts as being unusual or suspicious. NatWest says it would have provided a warning when Miss B set up each new payee – but it can’t show which option she chose and none of the available options related to the type of scam Miss B was falling victim to. Most of the payments Miss B made were relatively (and somewhat unusually for the type of scam) spread out and the highest in value was £780. While I’d expect NatWest to attach some additional risk to payments to cryptocurrency providers, I don’t think either the amounts of the payments or their pattern would give NatWest any reason to believe that Miss B was at risk of financial harm from fraud. Miss B argues that NatWest should have scrutinised the transactions further on the basis that the way she was managing her finances indicated that she was in financial difficulties. I can see that her accounts did show some signs of this – including the use of an unarranged overdraft and some missed payments on a personal loan. I agree that the use of an unarranged overdraft to make a payment to a cryptocurrency firm made the payment slightly more unusual but, given the other factors I’ve mentioned, I’m still not persuaded that the payment was so risky that NatWest ought to have warned Miss B before it was made. I also don’t think that I can fairly say that the fact Miss B had missed payments on her loan would give NatWest reason to believe that she was at risk of financial harm from fraud. Miss B also argues that had NatWest properly scrutinised her financial position, the scam would have come to light and her loss would have been prevented. But I’m not sure that the level of scrutiny that Miss B suggests NatWest should have carried out is reasonable – it’s not for it to tell her how to spend her money or demand that any income be used to pay off existing debts. And I wouldn’t ordinarily expect NatWest to discuss scam risks with Miss B if she called to report a missed payment. Finally, I can’t see that NatWest would have been able to recover the other payments as they were converted into cryptocurrency and sent to the fraudster. I know this will be disappointing for Miss B and that she’s been through a difficult time, but I think that NatWest is only responsible for reimbursing the first three payments she made. Once the small credits she received have been apportioned pro rata across Miss B’s loss, I calculate the loss from the first three payments to be £134.19. NatWest has agreed to reimburse this amount without the deduction of any excess. It has also agreed to pay interest from 11 June 2025 – the date it received Miss B’s fraud claim. My final decision I uphold in part this complaint about NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY and instruct it to pay Miss B: - The amount that NatWest has agreed to refund in relation to the first three disputed

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payments - £134.19 - 8% simple interest per year on that amount from 11 June 2025 to the date of the settlement, less any tax lawfully deductible. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Miss B to accept or reject my decision before 23 April 2026. Rich Drury Ombudsman

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