UK case law
Yannick Sheehan, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2025] EWHC ADMIN 1617 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2025
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Full judgment
1. MR JUSTICE SWEETING: The claimant sought a writ of habeas corpus on 3 June because he asserted that his detention was unlawful. The stated basis for his detention arose from a deportation order; he contended that this order was a nullity, because he is, and always has been, an Irish national. Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 , the provision under which the deportation order was made, expressly prohibits the making of such an order against Irish citizens.
2. The defendant initially resisted the application on the basis that the claimant had failed to show that he is an Irish national or was entitled to Irish nationality under Irish law. However, in the course of the hearing, the defendant has now conceded that the claimant is, in fact, an Irish citizen and that he should be released.
3. The claimant was born on 9 May 1990 in Vichy, France. His mother was Regime Odette Simone Rehel, a French national; his father was Derek Anthony Thomas St John Sheehan, born in Limerick, Ireland on 23 June 1948. The claimant had a general understanding that he had rights to Irish citizenship through his relationship to his father and that he has citizenship of both Ireland and France. Prior to his current period of imprisonment, the claimant had been accepted by the Department for Work and Pensions (the DWP) as eligible to receive Universal Credit, on the basis that the Department had accepted that he was an Irish citizen by descent from his father. Disclosure from the DWP confirms that the claimant was previously in receipt of Universal Credit, based on his being British or Irish or both, having previously been refused when he presented as French.
4. Records from the defendant's files dating back to 2018 indicate that the claimant had stated that he was an Irish national to the probation service and prison service and that South Wales police had contacted the defendant to check his status, being informed that he had stated he was an Irish national.
5. On 29 May 2024, the claimant was convicted of drug-supply offences and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. His conditional release date, being the end of the custodial part of his sentence, was 29 May of this year.
6. On 27 June 2024, the claimant signed a deportation disclaimer, agreeing to his deportation to France. On 6 July 2024, the claimant was moved to His Majesty's Prison Huntercombe. The defendant's notes from his induction record "possible Irish national is going to provide birth certificate". On the same day, a stage one notice of liability to automatic deportation under section 32 of the 2007 Act was served on the claimant, premised on him being a French national. He was advised that he had 28 days to respond with reasons why he should not be deported.
7. On 22 July 2024, the claimant wrote to the defendant stating that errors had been made in the stage one notice and that, "I am French Irish by birth and I have produced a birth certificate, but the Home Office is asking me to get a passport, so I need more time to get it ready. I am not sure how long it will take, but I need more time to sort it out".
8. On 24 September 2024, a signed deportation order was issued against the claimant under section 32 of the 2007 Act . The accompanying letter stated it was made due to him signing the disclaimer on 27 June, notwithstanding his comments of 6 July and the letter of 22 July indicating that he did not wish to be deported.
9. The deportation order was served on 25 September. The defendant's internal notes recorded that the claimant "did not take the news well, refused to engage and signed confirmation of conveyance" and "he states that he is Irish but explained he will have to prove that".
10. In October 2024, prison staff at HMP Huntercombe corresponded with staff at the Irish Embassy in London to assist the claimant in relation to obtaining proof of his Irish citizenship. On 14 October 2024, an email from the Irish Embassy to a staff member at the prison stated: "Thank you for providing more information. I can confirm that Yannick Sheehan is an Irish citizen based on the birth of his father, Derek Antony Thomas Sinjin Sheehan".
11. The email explained that being born to an Irish-born parent pre-2005, confers an automatic entitlement to citizenship with birth certificates merely serving as proof.
12. On 23 October 2024, the claimant presented this email to the defendant's officials at the prison. The defendant's internal note of this event states: "Prisoner seen today. He produced an email which purports to be evidence of Irish citizenship. I would recommend this is verified via our Ireland lead in RL” ['RL' means 'returns liaison'].
13. On 31 October 2024, the defendant's officials appear to have emailed the Irish Embassy in London querying whether the claimant was an Irish citizen based on his father's birth. The response on 1 November from a consular attaché at the Irish Embassy stated that, if one of the claimant's parents was born in Ireland before 1 January 2005, then he would be entitled to Irish citizenship, but he would need to exercise the right, which he could do by applying for an Irish passport. It further stated that possessing a copy of the birth certificate listing an Irish-born parent does not in itself make one an Irish citizen. This interpretation contradicted the earlier advice from Mr Shane Kelly at the Embassy and, as it proved, was incorrect.
14. On 31 March 2025, the claimant's current solicitors, Turpin Miller, began acting for him. On 1 April 2025, a pre-action protocol letter was sent to the defendant. It set out the claimant's position, that he was an Irish citizen by descent from birth, relying on the emails from the Irish Embassy in October 2024 and information on the Irish Government's website. For my part, I have looked at the website and it is tolerably clear that the claimant's contentions were supported by what can be seen on official websites.
15. It was submitted that, because the claimant is and always has been an Irish citizen, the defendant had no power to make the deportation order under section 32 of the 2007 Act , as that provision prohibits orders against Irish citizens. The claimant also referred to the United Kingdom Government's policy of only deporting Irish citizens in exceptional circumstances under the Immigration Act 1971 .
16. On 11 April 2025, the defendant ordered the claimant's detention under paragraph 2.3 of schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 , effective from his conditional release date on 29 May.
17. On 15 April, the defendant responded to the letter before claim asserting that the claimant was not an Irish national and was only entitled to become one if he exercised his entitlement, by applying for an Irish passport, relying on 1 November 2024 email from the Irish Embassy. The defendant acknowledged that, if the claimant were an Irish citizen, he would be exempt from deportation under the 2007 Act and it was unlikely to be lawful to deport him under the 1971 Act due to the defendant's policy.
18. On 22 April 2025, a supplementary letter before claim was sent enclosing the correspondence between prison staff and the Irish Embassy reiterating that the claimant was already an Irish citizen and noting that the DWP appeared to have accepted this based on his previous Universal Credit receipt. It also noted that, even if only entitled to Irish citizenship, deportation would be pointless as he could re-enter the UK easily.
19. On 7 May 2025, the claimant's solicitors chased a response and provided a copy of the claimant's father's Irish birth registration entry, having received it from the prison staff at HMP Huntercombe. The defendant later stated that this document was a poor and incomplete photocopy and near illegible.
20. On 9 May 2025, the defendant sought clarification from the Irish authorities. The response on 19 May 2025 stated that the Embassy could not provide legal advice, that submitting a passport application does not make one a citizen – that is to say one must already be a citizen to apply – and ordinarily a birth certificate alone for someone born outside Ireland is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the minister for the purpose of issuing a passport. It also clarified that Mr Shane Kenny's earlier email of 14 October may have been taken out of context, if only the confirming sentence was relied on.
21. On 23 May 2025, the claimant applied for judicial review, challenging the decision to detain him on 29 May. An application for urgent consideration and interim relief was made at the same time. Lang J ordered the expedition of the claim, stayed deportation and directed a permission and interim relief hearing as soon as possible after 29 May.
22. On 28 May, the defendant filed summary grounds of defence still querying the authenticity and eligibility of the document said to be the claimant's father's birth certificate.
23. On 29 May, the claimant's criminal sentence expired, and he was detained by the defendant under immigration powers. On the same day, the claimant's solicitors provided an expert report from Ms Shauna Gillon, concluding that the claimant was an Irish citizen since birth and that the consular attaché's view that he was only “entitled” to citizenship was inconsistent with both the facts and Irish law.
24. The defendant's representative acknowledged receipt but stated that no change in position was anticipated in the short time available and the authenticity of the claimant's father's birth record was not conceded.
25. The earliest possible available date for the expedited hearing ordered by Lang J was 31 July 2025.
26. On 30 May, the claimant applied to rely on Ms Gillon's report and to convert the scheduled hearing into a rolled-up hearing. Given the earliest date by which the application could be heard and the fact that, on his own case, the claimant should have been released and that there was no power to detain him, on 3 June 2025, this year, the claimant applied for a writ of habeas corpus . A notice was given to the defendant of this intention. On 2 June, the defendant 's representative questioned the change in urgency, given the application of 30 May had anticipated a July hearing. The claimant's solicitor responded that there was no change in urgency; the July date was the earliest offered by the court for a judicial review hearing, whereas habeas corpus applications, as is the case, have much greater urgency.
27. The defendant's submissions, in response to the habeas corpus application dated 4 June, accepted that habeas corpus was available to determine the power to detain, but whether the claimant is an Irish citizen was a precedent fact for the court to determine and that, if the claimant was an Irish national, the application should be granted as the deportation order and detention power would fall away.
28. The defendant's remaining resistance was based on the assertion that the claimant had not provided sufficient evidence of Irish citizenship, raising doubts about the credibility of the claimant and the authenticity and quality of the documents. However, at the hearing today, counsel for the defendant confirmed that, having considered the evidence, which is the evidence that has been before the defendant now on a number of occasions, the defendant accepts that the claimant is an Irish citizen and that he should be released.
29. What has changed is that there have been witness statements detailing where the birth certificates came from and how they were received by the claimant's solicitor.
30. The writ of habeas corpus is an ancient prerogative writ fundamentally concerned with the liberty of the individual. An application for the writ takes virtually absolute priority over other court business. Where the right to detain is dependent on a precedent fact, the detention may be challenged by way of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In such cases, the detaining authority must prove the existence of the precedent facts to the required standard.
31. The defendant's written submissions argued that the claimant had not provided sufficient evidence of Irish citizenship, raising concerns about credibility and documentation. The defendant's position based on Irish Embassy correspondence was, for the reasons I have set out, that the claimant was merely entitled to become an Irish citizen by applying for a passport but was not yet Irish. That has proved to be an incorrect statement of the law and, indeed, an incorrect analysis of the facts in this case.
32. Against the background I have set out, in my view, the defendant had ample notice that an issue as to the claimant's Irish nationality had been raised and, indeed, that the claimant had been assisted in raising it by prison staff. The defendant appears to have relied upon what was said by the consular authorities, despite the apparent inconsistency between statements on one occasion and another, and, notwithstanding that it was made clear that the consular officials could not, in fact, give legal advice. It was for the Secretary of State to satisfy herself, in the circumstances, that the claimant could continue to be detained when his prison sentence had been served. An investigation of the position could have been carried out at an earlier stage, which would have obviated the necessity for these proceedings which have resulted in the conclusion, which was always likely, that the claimant's detention under deportation powers was unlawful.
33. The claimant has, therefore, succeeded entirely in his application as a result of the defendant's concession. The general rule is that costs follow the event. The defendant resisted the application until the hearing, requiring the claimant to prepare and attend before me. The defendant's initial position that the claimant was not shown to be an Irish citizen has been disproved by her own concession, I can see no reason to depart from the usual rule. I, therefore, order the defendant to pay the claimant's costs of this application to be assessed if not agreed. __________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]