The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office v Samyung Enc Co Limited

Andrew Twigger K.C. : Introduction

1. This is my judgment in respect of two applications made by the Claimant (“ UKHO ”): i) An application made on 11 June 2025 for an order that, unless the Defendant (“ Samyung ”) complies with various previous orders relating to disclosure by 13 February 2026, its Points of Defence are to be struck out, and judgment entered for UKHO in the sum of £61,716,516.09 plus interest and costs. Further or alternatively, UKHO seeks summary judgment on its Amended Points of Claim. I will refer to this as the “ UO/SJ Application ” (i.e. Unless Order / Summary Judgment). ii) An application made on 15 July 2025 relating to alternative service, which I will call the “ AS Application ”. This was originally sought to enable the UO/SJ Application to be served on Samyung. For reasons I will explain, an alternative service order is no longer required in relation to the UO/SJ Application, but because of the difficulties which arose in relation to serving that Application, UKHO now seeks a prospective order that (in summary), if Samyung ceases to be legally represented and fails to provide an address for service within the jurisdiction, UKHO will be permitted to serve documents by various alternative means.

2. These applications were supported by a number of statements made by Ms Emily Roberts, a partner of Burges Salmon, and two statements explaining the calculation of UKHO’s damages made by Mr Thomas Mellor, the Head of Technical Partnering at UKHO. UKHO was represented at the hearing by Mr Jaani Riordan of counsel.

3. For reasons I will explain, Samyung did not attend the hearing of the applications and was not represented, although solicitors from Hill Dickinson (who are on the record as representing Samyung) were present in Court as observers throughout. As will become apparent, Samyung was well aware of the hearing and is in breach of a number of orders relating to disclosure. Moreover, any further delay to the hearing of the UO/SJ Application would have seriously disrupted the trial which is currently listed for 10 days floating from 2 June 2026. For those reasons, I considered that it was appropriate to proceed in Samyung’s absence, pursuant to CPR 23.11.

4. At the conclusion of the hearing, I announced my decision that an unless order would be made to the effect that, unless Samyung complied with the disclosure orders by 13 February 2026, its Points of Defence are to be struck out. I reserved my judgment, however, both (i) so that I could put my reasons for granting the unless order in writing and (ii) because I wished to reflect further on the other issues, including in particular whether it should be a consequence of Samyung’s Points of Defence being struck out that judgment should be entered in the sum sought by UKHO (or any sum). I announced my decision in relation to the unless order at the hearing so that it could be conveyed to Samyung by the representatives of Hill Dickinson present in court, and by UKHO. I would not expect the short delay in the production of this written judgment to provide an excuse to Samyung for any further non-compliance.

5. Following the hearing, UKHO has helpfully provided me with revised versions of the orders it is seeking, to reflect various matters discussed during the hearing. Background

6. It is necessary to describe the background in a little detail in order to understand how the applications came to be made and why they are only being heard now.

7. UKHO is an executive agency and trading fund of the Ministry of Defence, established by the Secretary of State for Defence on 1 April 1996 pursuant to the Hydrographic Office Trading Fund Order 1996/773. Its principal activities comprise the creation, publication and licensing of hydrographic and marine geospatial data and related products and services. This includes the publication of Electronic Navigational Charts (“ENCs”), which are maps showing depth, bathymetry, coastline and other vectors for the purposes of maritime navigation. The UKHO’s flagship data product is the Admiralty Vector Chart Service (“AVCS”). The AVCS data is comprised of encrypted ENCs with global coverage, including vector data for over 4,000 ports worldwide and 17,000 navigation charts. The AVCS data is licensed to end users via various distributors on the terms of an End User Licence Agreement (“EULA”).

8. The Defendant (“Samyung”) is incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Korea, with its head office in Busan. It is a manufacturer of marine communication and navigation systems. Through UKHO’s distributors, Samyung entered into three licences in 2014, 2016 and 2019, each on the terms of the EULA. Each licence was granted for use on a single vessel. In breach of the EULA terms, Samyung copied the AVCS Data it had received from UKHO pursuant to the licences onto its own systems, decrypted them and converted the constituent ENCs into Samyung’s own proprietary “S+Map” data format. It then uploaded those S+Map files onto a range of Samyung devices and sold those devices to the public in numerous locations around the world. It also made certain S+Map data files containing ENCs converted from AVCS data available for download from its distributors’ websites.

9. On 8 November 2022 Sir Paul Morgan struck out various paragraphs of Samyung’s Defence and granted summary judgment to UKHO as to Samyung’s liability for breaches of the three licence agreements. There is no transcript of Sir Paul Morgan’s extempore judgment, but Mr Riordan told me that (in briefest outline) the paragraphs of the Defence were struck out because they were bare denials contrary to CPR 16.5(2) and that summary judgment was entered as to liability because Samyung had admitted misuse of the relevant data, so there was no realistic prospect of its Defence succeeding. Samyung was also refused permission to rely on a draft Amended Defence, for similar reasons.

10. Amongst other consequential matters, Sir Paul Morgan’s order directed an Inquiry as to the quantum of the damages due to UKHO for breach of contract (“ the Inquiry ”). UKHO’s claims for infringement of copyright and database rights were stayed until further order. Samyung was also ordered to serve a witness statement providing Island v Tring disclosure of information necessary to enable UKHO to plead its case on quantum (see Island Records Ltd v Tring International Plc [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1256 ). In particular, Samyung was required to give headline sales information for the Samyung devices, including the number of devices sold, the quantity of ENCs and AVCS data provided with each device, and the number of downloads of S+Map data files.

11. Samyung failed to provide the witness statement by the deadline stipulated in Sir Paul Morgan’s order but eventually provided a statement from a Mr Koo, Samyung’s General Manager of Sales. UKHO considered that the information provided was unclear and unsatisfactory. After prolonged correspondence, Mr Koo provided a second statement on 23 November 2023 (although the certified translation was not provided until 12 December 2023). Ms Roberts explained in detail in her second witness statement why UKHO considered that Mr Koo’s second statement was also unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, rather than delay further, UKHO decided to press on with the Inquiry and on 22 January 2024 it served Points of Claim. The Points of Claim expressly record UKHO’s lack of confidence that Samyung has disclosed the full extent of its breaches of contract. In particular, UKHO doubts whether Samyung has disclosed the true number of devices which were sold with pre-loaded S+Map data files, or the number of downloads of S+Map files onto Samyung devices.

12. Samyung served Points of Defence on 22 April 2024. UKHO served Points of Reply on 25 June 2024 and Amended Points of Claim on 20 December 2024. Samyung served Amended Points of Defence on 27 December 2024.

13. A Costs and Case Management Conference took place before Master Pester on 29 January 2025 (“ the CCMC ”). This was more than two years following Sir Paul Morgan’s order entering judgment on liability. Whilst I understand that UKHO would blame Samyung for much of that delay, Mr Riordan did not address me on the events of that period in any detail, and I shall assume that no criticism can be made of Samyung’s conduct up to the time of the CCMC. Nevertheless, the claim concerns events going back many years and the delay increases the desirability of a trial taking place as soon as possible. Moreover, the extended debate concerning the reliability of Mr Koo’s evidence highlights the importance of proper disclosure being given by Samyung. If Mr Koo’s statements regarding the extent of Samyung’s misuse of the AVCS data are accurate, it is obviously in Samyung’s interests to provide disclosure of the documents which establish that.

14. At the CCMC, Master Pester ordered a trial with a time estimate of 10 days to take place within a window ending in June 2026. As I have mentioned, the trial has subsequently been listed to start in a five-day window starting on 2 June 2026.

15. The Master also gave directions leading to trial in the usual way. In relation to disclosure, paragraph 9 of the CCMC order provided for both parties to give Extended Disclosure by 7 May 2025, in accordance with the list of issues for disclosure in section 1 of the Disclosure Review Document approved by the Court.

16. Samyung had, however, failed properly to complete section 2 of the DRD relating to the scope of its search. Mr Riordan, who had represented UKHO at the CCMC, told me that counsel for Samyung had accepted at that hearing that Samyung was obliged to provide the relevant information. Accordingly, paragraph 10 of Master Pester’s order required Samyung to serve, in outline, (i) a list of repositories, (ii) keyword search proposals for its search-based disclosure, (iii) a statement listing individuals involved in various aspects Samyung’s development and distribution of S+Map files, and (iv) confirmation of the status of the emails of a Mr Keith Park and others, including whether they had been destroyed. Mr Park was the key individual employed by Samyung who became involved in discussions with UKHO about its claim. I will refer to the information required by this paragraph of the CCMC order as the “ Paragraph 10 Information ”.

17. Samyung was ordered to serve the Paragraph 10 Information by 19 February 2025. The order then contemplated a process pursuant to which, in the light of the Paragraph 10 Information provided, the parties would either agree the scope of the search to be carried out by Samyung, or the Court would give further directions about it. The CCMC order was served on Hill Dickinson by email on 31 January 2025 and I was shown Hill Dickinson’s response, confirming receipt.

18. In an email to Burges Salmon on 18 February 2025 Hill Dickinson said they were making an application to come off the record. The reasons given were that Samyung had been suspended from trading on KOSDAQ (the Korean Stock Exchange) due to allegations of embezzlement by a former CEO, that it would be filing for “ default ” and that Samyung had asked Hill Dickinson to cease all work on the matter. Although Hill Dickinson had asked Samyung to complete a Notice of Change, it had not done so, thereby necessitating the application to come off the record.

19. Hill Dickinson’s email of 18 February 2025 attached the application to come off the record and supporting documents, which included an email of 12 February 2025 from Mr Park to Hill Dickinson saying, amongst other things, “ our senior management will file default and they can not afford any of [sic] legal service at this time. ” Also included was an email from Hill Dickinson to Samyung providing “ guidance ” on the impact of the decision to terminate Hill Dickinson’s services. Mr Riordan pointed out that Hill Dickinson appeared consciously to have waived privilege in this guidance. At any rate no objection has been taken by Samyung to UKHO referring to the guidance in, for example, Ms Roberts’s third statement of 11 June 2025.

20. Hill Dickinson’s guidance referred to advice it had previously given on 10 October 2024, which set out three options for Samyung. First, a negotiated settlement could be sought. Secondly, Samyung could proceed to trial, which would be expensive, but would “ hopefully ” result in a lower damages award. Thirdly, Samyung could stop participating in proceedings. In relation to that option, the advice continued: “ This will minimise Samyung’s on-going costs of defending the claim but is risky. Those risks include, UKHO obtaining a judgment against Samyung in a greater amount than if the claim was defended, the enforceability of that judgment in South Korea, the potential ramifications for Samyung’s business of an enforceable judgment and Samyung’s ability to pay. If Samyung were to consider withdrawing from defending the claim, then before that decision was made, we would recommend that they obtain legal advice as to the ramifications of an enforceable judgment for their business, including whether those business risks can be best managed through rehabilitation proceedings, such that the claim against Samyung must stop/ any judgment obtained cannot be enforced. ”

21. Rehabilitation proceedings are a form of “turnaround” or “rescue” process under the Korean Debtor Rehabilitation & Bankruptcy Act. The process involves a restructuring of debts pursuant to a plan approved by creditors and the court. The possibility of using such proceedings to attempt to bring a halt to the Inquiry was plainly on Samyung’s radar by the end of 2024, if not earlier.

22. Perhaps unsurprisingly in this context, the Paragraph 10 Information was not served on 19 February 2025. On 28 February 2025 UKHO applied for an order requiring Samyung to serve the Paragraph 10 Information by 14 March 2025. On 3 March 2025 Deputy Master Arkush made that order on the papers and expressly gave UKHO permission to apply for an unless order in the event of non-compliance (thereby alerting Samyung to a potential consequence of failure to comply). The order was made without any representations being made by Samyung, no doubt because Hill Dickinson had applied to come off the record. Nevertheless, Hill Dickinson remained on the record just long enough for Deputy Master Arkush’s order to be served on them (and therefore on Samyung) during the morning of 4 March 2025.

23. It was also on 4 March 2025 that Master Pester granted Hill Dickinson’s application to come off the record. On 7 March 2025 Burges Salmon wrote to Hill Dickinson asking, amongst other things, whether they could provide a UK address for service on Samyung. In that connection, CPR 6.23(3) requires a party to provide an address for service within the UK when there is no solicitor acting and the party neither resides nor carries on business at a UK address. CPR 42.2 requires a party who has conducted a claim by a solicitor, but who intends to act in person, to file and serve a notice of change of representation. Paragraph 2.4 of the Practice Direction to CPR Part 42 provides that such a notice must contain “ an address for service that is within the United Kingdom. ”

24. Samyung did not file and serve a notice of change, it did not provide an address for service within the UK, it did not respond to Burges Salmon’s letter of 7 March 2025, and it did not provide the Paragraph 10 Information by 14 March 2025. Rather, on 20 March 2025, it applied to the Busan Rehabilitation Court in Korea for commencement of rehabilitation proceedings. UKHO did not become aware of Samyung’s application to the Korean court until later. As I will come on to explain, Mr Suh Dong-Hoon was subsequently appointed as Samyung’s “Administrator” pursuant to the rehabilitation proceedings, and it will be necessary to refer to an affidavit he later swore on 18 July 2025 for the purposes of a hearing before ICC Judge Prentis (the “ Administrator’s Affidavit ”).

25. On 17 April 2025 UKHO applied for an unless order in the terms explained below. That application was sent to Samyung by email, using the email addresses of three employees of Samyung (including Mr Park). Those email addresses were the ones identified on Hill Dickinson’s certificate of service of their application to come of the record, in which they were described as the addresses of the “ personnel from whom and by which method all instructions in this matter have been provided to Hill Dickinson. ”

26. On 28 April 2025 Master Pester made an unless order (“ the First Unless Order ”). In summary, this required Samyung to provide the Paragraph 10 Information by 8 May 2025. If it failed to do so, the sanction imposed was that, instead of a process leading to agreement as to the scope of the search, Samyung would be obliged to carry out search-based Extended Disclosure using the search parameters for repositories, custodians, date range and keywords identified in the order. Those search parameters had been identified by UKHO, doing its best with the knowledge it had and publicly available information.

27. There is an oddity about the First Unless Order because the date by which Extended Disclosure was to be given by Samyung in these circumstances appears to be 7 May 2025, pursuant to paragraph 9 of the original CCMC Order, yet this was the day before the sanction was automatically imposed which had the effect of determining the scope of that disclosure. Nevertheless, the First Unless Order plainly contemplated that Extended Disclosure would be provided and Samyung has never suggested that it did not understand that. The Administrator’s Affidavit seems to indicate that he understood that Samyung had until 30 June 2025 to provide the Extended Disclosure (although that is, in fact, the date given in the First Unless Order for disclosure to be given by UKHO).

28. In any event, if Samyung failed to comply, the order expressly gave UKHO permission to apply for further sanctions to be imposed, including “ an application to strike out the Points of Defence or grant summary judgment on the Points of Claim. ” Again, this must have had the effect of drawing the potential consequences of non-compliance to Samyung’s attention. The First Unless Order also required Samyung to provide, at the same time as giving Extended Disclosure, a confirmatory witness statement giving details about the disclosure exercise and other information including the potential destruction of emails and other relevant documents. Amongst other provisions contained in the First Unless Order, it granted UKHO liberty to apply for further disclosure in the light of any documents ultimately disclosed and granted permission to UKHO to serve the order on the three email addresses referred to above. It was duly served by email to those three addresses on 1 May 2025.

29. Samyung did not provide the Paragraph 10 Information by 8 May 2025, nor did it provide any Extended Disclosure by 7 May 2025 (or by 30 June 2025, or at all). On 9 May 2025 UKHO sent Samyung a letter warning it of UKHO’s intention to make the UO/SJ Application. That letter was sent to the same three email addresses, but on this occasion, one of them resulted in an automated “email delivery failure” message.

30. On 22 May 2025 the Korean Rehabilitation Court ordered the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings in relation to Samyung and, as I have said, appointed Mr Suh as Administrator. In the Administrator’s Affidavit, he confirmed that an administrator has power to conduct all of a debtor’s business and manage all of its property, subject to the supervision of the Rehabilitation Court. In my judgment, the knowledge and actions of the Administrator during the period of his appointment must be regarded as the knowledge and actions of Samyung for present purposes.

31. Having received no response to its letter of 9 May 2025, on 11 June 2025 UKHO issued the UO/SJ Application. The application was sent by email to the same three addresses as before, but this time all three of them resulted in an automated “email delivery failure” message. The application was, however, also sent to a fourth email address for a Mr Hahm, published on Samyung’s website, and the Administrator’s Affidavit confirms that Mr Hahm received this email, although it said that Mr Hahm was not fluent in English. Furthermore, the UO/SJ Application was sent by international courier on 12 June 2025 to the postal addresses given on Samyung’s website for its head office and its factory, as well as being sent by email to Samyung’s South Korean lawyers and its South Korean auditors. The Administrator’s Affidavit confirms that he did receive the application sent by post on 16 June 2025. He also confirmed that he speaks and reads English (and, indeed, the Administrator’s Affidavit was made in English).

32. Paragraph 1.1 of the letter enclosing the UO/SJ Application stated “ As a result of your persistent failure to comply with Court Orders in the Inquiry, culminating in your breach of paragraph 9(a) of the CCMC Order of 29 January 2025 by failing to provide Extended Disclosure, UKHO has applied to the Court for your Points of Defence to be struck out and for summary judgment to be entered in its favour. ” Even without reading the enclosed documents, a reasonable reader of that letter would have appreciated that there was a risk of judgment being entered against Samyung because Extended Disclosure had not been provided. The Administrator’s Affidavit shows that he did, indeed, understand that that was what UKHO was contending. The letter also asked Samyung to confirm whether it intended to contest the UO/SJ Application and attend the hearing of that application.

33. On 19 June 2025 Mr Hahm sent an email to Burges Salmon informing them of the rehabilitation proceedings. On 20 June 2025 Burges Salmon sent an email to Mr Hahm asking for confirmation that the UO/SJ Application had been received and attaching the Notice of Hearing of the application, which was listed for one day on 24, 25 or 28 July 2025. The email warned that a failure to attend the hearing may result in judgment being entered in UKHO’s favour and a significant damages award being made against Samyung.

34. On 23 June 2025 Burges Salmon were copied in on an email from a Mr Simon Hong, who was the Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) of Samyung, appointed by the Korean court. He said that Samyung would contest the UO/SJ Application and attend the hearing in London (which appears to be a response to the request for confirmation of those matters in Burges Salmon’s letter enclosing the application). He also listed three “ main contacts ” at Samyung “ for this legal matter ”, who were Mr Hong, Mr Hahm and a Mr Hahn. Email addresses were given for all three. The next day, however, Mr Hong sent an email asking Burges Salmon to disregard his email of 23 June 2025. I have seen a suggestion in the later correspondence that Samyung contends that Burges Salmon were copied in on the email of 23 June 2025 by mistake, but Samyung has filed no evidence to that effect nor made any application to prevent UKHO referring to the email.

35. On 30 June 2025 UKHO submitted a proof of claim in the Korean rehabilitation process seeking a principal sum of $86 million, interest of $59 million and costs of £1,438,000. These figures were based on UKHO’s primary pleaded case in the Inquiry. I understand this step was necessary as a matter of Korean law, to prevent UKHO’s claim being extinguished.

36. On 3 July 2025 Mr Hong sent a further email to Burges Salmon, confirming that the UO/SJ Application had been received and saying that, whilst it had taken the new management appointed by the Korean Court some time to understand the nature of the litigation and its history, “ we now understand the rough history of the case ”. He then contended that “ your letter dated June 12 (which we actually received about a week later) and the attached documents were not properly served under the Hague Service Convention and international standards. Samyung does not have legal counsel in UK now. ”

37. On 15 July 2025 UKHO made the AS Application, to remove any doubt about whether the UO/SJ Application had been properly served.

38. On 16 July 2025 Hill Dickinson wrote to Burges Salmon saying that they had now been retained by the Administrator, although they claimed to be “ without instruction to represent [Samyung].” They said they would be making an urgent application to the Insolvency and Companies Court for recognition of the rehabilitation proceedings, meaning recognition as a Foreign Main Proceeding in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as set out in Schedule 1 to the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations (S.I. 2006 No. 1030). The Administrator’s Affidavit was sworn in support of that application, which was made on 22 July 2025 to ICC Judge Prentis. He made an order granting recognition but varying the automatic stay imposed by the Regulations on (amongst other things) legal proceedings, so that the stay would expire on 24 October 2025 or further order.

39. ICC Judge Prentis recorded in his extempore judgment that the Administrator had recognised that claim made in the Inquiry might be best adjudicated on by the English court, but that he had only recently been appointed and wanted some time “ to understand the claim take advice on it; and obviously part of that advice would be the likelihood of the court acceding to any request by the company for relief for serial non-compliance with the court’s directions. ” ICC Judge Prentis said that, in his view, it would be preferable for the Inquiry to proceed to a trial at which the Administrator was able to make submissions, so that he should have time to take advice. For that reason, he considered that the stay should be limited and that, if the Administrator wanted it to continue thereafter, he must justify that position on the return date. As ICC Judge Barber later put it, the purpose of the stay was to give the Administrator “ breathing space ” to consider UKHO’s proof of claim and his position in the Inquiry.

40. As a result of the stay ordered by ICC Judge Prentis, the hearing of the UO/SJ Application on 25 July 2025 was vacated.

41. On 1 September 2025 Hill Dickinson filed a notice of change of legal representative, confirming that they had again been instructed by Samyung in relation to the Inquiry. The email sending the notice of change to Burges Salmon said that Hill Dickinson would accept service of “ proceedings ” in the Inquiry.

42. On 5 September 2025 the Administrator filed a “ Claims Table ” at the Korean rehabilitation court which assigned UKHO’s claim to the “ contested ” category, effectively rejecting UKHO’s claim in full. The reason given was that the claim is subject to English litigation (in other words, the Inquiry). As a result, on 10 October 2025 UKHO filed in the Korean Court what are described as “ Claim Allowance ” proceedings. As explained in ICC Judge Barber’s judgment (referred to below), these are a simplified and expedited procedure for determining contested claims, effectively appealing against the Administrator’s rejection of UKHO’s proof. They apparently involve a few short hearings without oral witness evidence. Appeals are, however, possible to the Korean rehabilitation court, then to the High Court and then to the Supreme Court. At each level the matter is heard afresh. The entire process can take between 2.5 and 4.5 years.

43. In the meantime, the parties corresponded about the whether the stay on the Inquiry should be extended. On 8 October 2025 Hill Dickinson wrote a long letter intended to explain why the UO/SJ Application should not prevent the stay from being extended but should instead be dismissed on a number of grounds. These included an argument that the application was premised on “ a handful of discrete disclosure points in paragraph 10 of ” the CCMC Order which “ can be dealt with in the disclosure process Samyung is currently dealing with and Samyung believes it can answer them, subject to any stay, by 30 November 2025. ” The letter continued by saying that “ these matters have not been or are not critical to the progress of the case, which is stayed in any event. ” I do not consider that Samyung’s breaches of the CCMC Order and the First Unless Order can properly be trivialised in this manner, but I note that the letter contained a clear representation that Samyung was currently dealing with the disclosure process on 8 October 2025. Hill Dickinson contended that the unless order sought is “ wildly disproportionate ”, but that was based on an obviously erroneous assertion that UKHO’s “ alternative case is about c.£4 million only. ” Moreover, Hill Dickinson vigorously maintained the ambitious argument that the application should have been served in accordance with the Hague Service Convention.

44. On 10 October 2025 the Administrator applied to extend the stay granted by ICC Judge Prentis until at least 27 February 2026, on the basis that he considered it most appropriate for UKHO’s claim to be resolved within the Korean proceedings and that the Inquiry would unduly disrupt those proceedings. After a delay resulting from a lack of Court time, that application was heard by ICC Judge Barber on 19 November 2025. She had the benefit of submissions from leading counsel for Samyung (assisted by a junior) and junior counsel for UKHO, as well as detailed expert evidence of Korean law from the Administrator and UKHO.

45. At the conclusion of the hearing, ICC Judge Barber rejected the application to extend the stay and, in her reserved judgment dated 11 December 2025, she said she had “ come to the firm conclusion that the stay should be lifted to allow the IP Claim to proceed to judgment. ” At the risk of oversimplifying her detailed analysis, I would summarise her reasons as follows: i) The Inquiry involves complicated and specialist questions of English law which are better suited to resolution in an English court, rather than in the Korean Claims Allowance process, which would involve several rounds of expert evidence of English law; ii) The Inquiry was not only the best, but also the quickest means of resolving the quantum dispute – it had reached a relatively advanced stage, liability having been established in 2022, with a trial being listed in June 2026 and any appeal being by way of review, whereas the Claims Allowance process was at a very early stage and even if there were only one appeal, it would be a rehearing which could take until September 2027 to be resolved; iii) The Inquiry would not disrupt the rehabilitation process, since (on the evidence) the proposed sale of the company would proceed regardless of any proceedings to fix the quantum of UKHO’s claim in England or Korea; iv) Although the Inquiry would be likely to involve greater expense than the Claims Allowance process, it was possible that the Inquiry would be resolved relatively cheaply by the UO/SJ Application and, if not, it was open to Samyung to take advice about which arguments to pursue with a view to reducing its costs; v) There are good prospects that the Korean court will recognise an English ruling on quantum, whether after trial or by way of summary judgment, and treat it as prevailing evidence to find that the claim exists in the amount stated in the judgment.

46. It is apparent from ICC Judge Barber’s judgment that at the end of 2024 Samyung’s assets were around £29 million and the claims of the unsecured creditors apart from UKHO totalled around US$28 million. An “ Examiner’s Report ” which ICC Judge Barber described as “ recently issued ” stated a total equity (excluding UKHO’s claim) of around £17.5 million, based on adjusted assets of about £35.1 million. UKHO’s claim in the rehabilitation totalled around US$ 145 million. In ICC Judge Barber’s words, “[UKHO’s] claim therefore dwarfed [Samyung’s] assets. The determination of the claim could have a significant impact on the repayment ratio for other creditors. ” It follows, in my judgment, that the outcome of UKHO’s claim was a matter of critical importance for Samyung. It was a matter of life and death for the company. I infer that Samyung’s management (whether the board or the Administrator) could not simply have forgotten about the Inquiry, or thought that it was insignificant. They would have had it firmly in mind when taking decisions.

47. Mr Riordan drew my attention to a section of the transcript of the hearing before ICC Judge Barber in which Samyung’s leading counsel submitted that “ it would take about two months for disclosure. ” When the Judge queried whether disclosure would ever happen, since that was dependent on Samyung engaging in the process, counsel replied “ On that, Judge, my solicitors are now fully instructed on this matter, so the intention is to take full part. ” Taken together with Hill Dickinson’s representation in their letter of 8 October 2025 that Samyung was already dealing with disclosure at that stage, this seems to me to contemplate that Samyung would be in a position to give disclosure by mid-December 2025.

48. In her sixth statement Ms Roberts points out that Samyung’s costs of the recognition proceedings, according to its cost statements, were £266,813. Samyung does not appear to have had any difficulty paying its lawyers for tasks it wanted to be performed. UKHO was awarded costs of £107,327, but I was told that £43,000 of that sum has still not been paid.

49. In the meantime, although this was not disclosed to UKHO until later, on 19 November 2025 (the day on which ICC Judge Barber heard the Administrator’s application to continue the stay) the Korean Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by shareholders of Samyung who had challenged the validity of the original decision by Samyung’s board to apply for rehabilitation. Later correspondence from Hill Dickinson suggests that, as a result of the Administrator having initially filed an appeal to the Supreme Court, this did not immediately result in a termination of the rehabilitation proceedings, or of the authority of the Administrator and CRO.

50. In correspondence following the lifting of the stay, on 25 November 2025 Hill Dickinson proposed directions leading to the hearing of the UO/SJ Application in February 2026. The timetable contemplated evidence from Samyung and “ any application for relief from sanction ” being served by 31 December 2025. The letter then addressed Samyung’s breaches of its disclosure obligations saying, “ Samyung are aware of the steps that are required to be made under the CCMC [sic] , and can confirm that, due to the rehabilitation of the company, work has been undertaken on a cost-effective basis towards remedying the breaches of this. ”

51. The letter continued by proposing a timetable for disclosure. This seems to have contemplated the Paragraph 10 Information being provided with a view to agreeing the scope of the search to be carried out, as if the First Unless Order had not taken effect, perhaps on the basis that Samyung intended to seek relief from the sanction imposed by that order, despite the length of time which had passed since the order was made. The date by which Hill Dickinson proposed that the scope of the search should be determined was 19 December 2025. On that footing, the timetable they suggested led to search-based Extended Disclosure being given by 16 January 2026, so four weeks later (despite the Christmas holiday intervening).

52. On 27 November 2025 Hill Dickinson again “ confirmed that steps have been undertaken with regards to disclosure ” and on 5 December 2025 they said, “ Samyung would like to utilise the available time between now and the hearing [of the UO/SJ Application] to rectify the deficiencies ” although they sought UKHO’s “ collaboration ” with regard to the agreement of search terms. That letter also accepted that the UO/SJ Application had been validly served on Samyung via Hill Dickinson, although they contended that the effective date of service was not until 19 November 2025, when the stay was lifted (despite having said on 1 September 2025 that they were authorised to accept service of proceedings in the Inquiry).

53. On 12 December 2025 Hill Dickinson were still proposing a timetable for the hearing of the UO/SJ Application which included Samyung serving evidence in answer and any related applications, “ such as for relief from sanctions, ” by 23 December 2025.

54. When 23 December 2025 arrived, however, no Paragraph 10 Information had been provided, no disclosure had been given, no application for relief from sanctions had been made and no evidence in opposition to the UO/SJ Application had been served. Instead, Hill Dickinson sent an email saying that: “ …the Administrator, Mr Suh and the CRO, Mr Hong, have been removed from their roles within the Rehabilitation as the Rehabilitation has ceased. Samyung have made a further application for Rehabilitation Proceedings, and we await a further update on this from Samyung including confirmation of the new Administrator and CRO … As such, we notify you that we are currently without instruction within the UKHO Proceedings. ”

55. It appears from later correspondence from Hill Dickinson that what happened was that the Administrator had withdrawn his appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal’s decision that the rehabilitation process was invalid. That had resulted in the rehabilitation proceedings being cancelled and the appointment of the Administrator and the CRO being terminated on 18 December 2025.

56. The very next day (19 December 2025) Samyung made a new application for rehabilitation proceedings. That resulted in two orders being made by the Busan Rehabilitation Court on 22 December 2025, which Samyung’s board contend has the effect of prohibiting them from continuing to provide instructions to Hill Dickinson. In her seventh witness statement, Ms Roberts summarises evidence of Korean law based on communications between Burges Salmon and an associate in the Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency team of Yulchon LLC, a commercial law firm in Korea. That evidence is to the effect that the Korean orders did not restrict Samyung’s management from instructing lawyers in relation to the applications being made in the Inquiry, nor did they restrict litigation by legal representatives or make such litigation subject to the authorisation of the Korean Court. That seems to be consistent with the English translation of the two orders which I have been shown, but I do not consider it necessary to decide the effect of the orders under Korean law.

57. On 19 January 2026 Hill Dickinson wrote to Burges Salmon to provide an “ update on the changes to the management of Samyung … arising from the cancellation of the Rehabilitation Proceedings. ” Amongst other things, this said that a Judge of the Busan Rehabilitation Court had carried out an inspection of Samyung on 16 January 2026 and that a decision whether new rehabilitation proceedings would be constituted was expected shortly. It was not, however, expected that Mr Suh or Mr Hong would be reappointed as Administrator or CRO respectively. Hill Dickinson maintained that the orders of the Korean court meant that it was not possible for the current management to instruct solicitors and counsel. They requested that the hearing of the UO/SJ Application be postponed for six weeks to a date not before 4 March 2026. This request for an adjournment was made on the Monday of the week in which the hearing was listed to be heard in a three-day window from the Wednesday (21 January 2026).

58. On 20 January 2026 UKHO offered to adjourn the hearing on various conditions, including that Samyung should remedy its breaches of its disclosure obligations by 13 February 2026. That offer was declined in an email from Hill Dickinson on 21 January 2026. The email said that Hill Dickinson understood that the new application for rehabilitation may be decided on 23 January 2026, so that, although Samyung was “ back in the position which prevailed between 20 March 2025 and 22 May 2025, ” this time “ the resolution of the question as to whether it should be placed into rehabilitation appears likely to be resolved in the next couple of days. ” Agreement to an adjournment of six to eight weeks was, therefore, requested “ on the understanding that the position of Samyung will be decided by the Busan Rehabilitation Court in relatively short order. ”

59. Later on 21 January 2026 Hill Dickinson wrote to the court saying that Samyung was unable to give instructions in relation to the hearing or at all, including instructions to seek an adjournment. Nevertheless, the Court was invited to grant a “ postponement ” of the UO/SJ Application for six to eight weeks.

60. I refused to postpone the hearing on this basis and directed that, if Samyung wished to make an application for an adjournment, it should issue an application in the usual way and pursue it at the hearing. No such application was issued and, as I have already explained, Samyung was not represented at the hearing. The UO/SJ Application

61. CPR 3.1(3) provides that the court can make an order subject to conditions and can specify the consequences of failure to comply with the order or a condition.

62. CPR 3.4 includes the following provisions: “(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order… (3) When the court strikes out a statement of case it may make any consequential order it considers appropriate… … (5) Paragraph (2) does not limit any other power of the court to strike out a statement of case.”

63. The UO/SJ Application seeks an order pursuant to three separate limbs of this rule, namely CPR 3.4(2)(b), CPR 3.4(2)(c) and pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction under CPR 3.4(5). I understood Mr Riordan to accept, however, that it is only necessary for present purposes to consider the application under CPR 3.4(2)(c), for failure to comply with a court order.

64. I note the separation in CPR 3.4(3) between the striking out of a case and the consequences of it being struck out. In my judgment, it is necessary to consider, as a first step, whether the sanction of striking out Samyung’s Amended Points of Defence is an appropriate one for failing to provide disclosure, in the light of its history of breaching disclosure orders in this case. If so, the next step is to consider whether such a strike out should lead to the consequence of judgment being entered in the sum sought by UKHO, or to some other consequence. Is striking out an appropriate sanction?

65. So far as striking out is concerned, in Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas [2007] EWCA Civ 463 , Moore-Bick LJ said at [34]-[36] that, because a sanction in an unless order takes effect without the need for any further order in the event of non-compliance: “ …before making conditional orders, particularly orders for the striking out of statements of case or the dismissal of claims or counterclaims, the judge should consider carefully whether the sanction being imposed is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. Of course, it is impossible to foresee the nature and effect of every possible breach and the party in default can always apply for relief, but a conditional order striking out a statement of case or dismissing the claim or counterclaim is one of the most powerful weapons in the court’s case management armoury and should not be deployed unless its consequences can be justified. I find it difficult to imagine circumstances in which such an order could properly be made for what were described in Keen Phillips v Field as ‘good housekeeping purposes’. ”

66. In Walsham Chalet Park Ltd v Tallington Lakes Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1607 ; [2015] CP Rep 15 Richards LJ said at [44] that the three stage approach applicable to the grant of relief from sanctions derived from Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 ; [2014] 1 WLR 3926 has a direct bearing on the issue of whether to impose the striking out of a case as a sanction for non-compliance. He pointed out, however, that in a strike-out application it is the proportionality of the sanction itself which is in issue, rather than whether relief should be granted.

67. In Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd [No 2] [2014] 1 WLR 4495 the Supreme Court considered an order that unless one of the parties personally signed a statement, certified by a statement of truth, verifying certain matters in relation to disclosure, his defence would be struck out. When the party failed to comply, a further order had been made for judgment to be entered in the sum of $6 million. One of the arguments raised on appeal was that this was disproportionate. In that context, in a passage relied on by Mr Riordan, Lord Neuberger said at [23]: “ The importance of litigants obeying orders of court is self-evident. Once a court order is disobeyed, the imposition of a sanction is almost always inevitable if court orders are to continue to enjoy the respect which they ought to have. And, if persistence in the disobedience would lead to an unfair trial, it seems, at least in the absence of special circumstances, hard to quarrel with a sanction which prevents the party in breach from presenting (in the case of a claimant) or resisting (in the case of a defendant) the claim. And, if the disobedience continues notwithstanding the imposition of a sanction, the enforcement of the sanction is almost inevitable, essentially for the same reasons. Of course, in a particular case, the court may be persuaded by special factors to reconsider the original order, or the imposition or enforcement of the sanction. ”

68. I observe in passing that at [16] Lord Neuberger attributed to Norris J at first instance the comment about striking out being one of the most powerful weapons in the court’s case management armoury, but it seems clear that Norris J was himself quoting from the judgment of Moore-Bick LJ in Marcan Shipping cited above.

69. In Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Sinclair [2015] 4 Costs LR 707 Richards LJ said that “ strike-out is … a sanction of last resort ” (echoing Lord Clarke in Global Torch ). Richards LJ pointed out that one of the reasons the unless order was upheld in Global Torch was that there had been a sequence of orders which gave every opportunity for compliance before the ultimate sanction of strike-out was imposed. He said that he would not expect the court to move straight from a stay to a strike-out (in the case before him) unless there had been a continuing default and a further opportunity, by way of a specific unless order, for the relevant party to remedy that default. Separate consideration needed to be given to whether a strike-out was a proportionate sanction.

70. Applying those principles to the facts of this case, the first question (pursuant to the Denton approach) is whether Samyung’s breaches are significant or serious. I am satisfied that they are both significant and serious for three reasons: i) In the first place, there are multiple breaches of orders, one of which was an unless order. Samyung is in breach of the obligation to provide the Paragraph 10 Information in the CCMC Order; it is in breach of the further deadline for the provision of that information contained paragraph 1 of Deputy Master Arkush’s order of 3 March 2025; it is in breach of paragraph 1 of the First Unless Order; and it is in breach of the obligation to provide Extended Disclosure in paragraph 9 of the CCMC Order, the parameters of which were set as a result of the automatic operation of the sanction in the First Unless Order. ii) Secondly, the breaches are serious because they have remained unremedied for so long, without any application being made for relief from sanctions (despite Hill Dickinson having suggested that one would be made) and without any clear explanation of what has been done to progress the disclosure exercise, or when disclosure might be provided. iii) The third (and most important) reason why the breaches are serious is because of their consequences for UKHO’s case and the interests of justice. It is not only that Samyung’s breaches of its disclosure obligations are putting the trial date in jeopardy, although that is serious enough. The breaches also undermine the possibility of there being a fair trial at all. It has been established that Samyung has committed many breaches of contract over an extended period of time. Yet the effect of its failure to provide disclosure means that UKHO lacks sufficient documentary material to reveal the full scope of the loss it has suffered as a result of Samyung’s wrongful actions. The critical evidence is solely within the control of Samyung, but it is refusing to comply with orders to provide that evidence. Hill Dickinson were, in my judgment, wrong to dismiss these breaches as not critical to the progress of the case in their letter of 8 October 2025. They are, in my judgment, exceptionally serious.

71. The next matter to consider in line with the Denton approach is whether there is good reason for the breach. The first point to make in this regard is that Samyung has not put any evidence before the court with a view to explaining the breach. Moreover, it is hard to find any clear explanation for the failure to comply with the orders for disclosure amongst the many letters written by Hill Dickinson. On the contrary, in my judgment, that correspondence and the other evidence summarised above justifies the inference which Mr Riordan invited me to draw, which is that Samyung’s non-compliance with the orders is not the result of oversight or forces beyond its control, but that it has chosen not to comply.

72. I draw that inference based on the entire history summarised above, but the key reasons for drawing it are as follows: i) The Paragraph 10 Information ought not to be particularly onerous to provide. Yet there was no attempt to provide it, either in compliance with the deadlines in the relevant orders or thereafter, nor any convincing explanation about why it had not been provided. In October 2025 Hill Dickinson said that the Paragraph 10 Information amounted to “ a handful of discrete disclosure points ” which could be answered, subject to the lifting of the stay, by 30 November 2025. Yet after the stay was lifted the information was still not forthcoming. In the absence of any explanation, the inference must be that Samyung chose not to provide it. ii) So far as the Extended Disclosure itself is concerned, I am prepared to assume in Samyung’s favour that its management may have been in some difficulty during the period between its suspension from trading on KOSDAQ in February 2025 until the appointment of the Administrator in May 2025. Even during that period, however, its failure to provide a notice of change and an address for service in the UK diminishes the level of indulgence the court might otherwise be prepared to accord Samyung. iii) In any case, by 18 July 2025 at the latest, when the Administrator’s Affidavit was sworn, he was in a position to act and had fully appreciated that the UO/SJ Application was based on (amongst other things) Samyung’s failure to provide Extended Disclosure (although he seems to have understood that the date for Samyung’s compliance had been 30 June 2025). Submissions were made on his behalf to ICC Judge Prentis that a stay was required so that he could consider (amongst other things) making an application for relief from sanctions. When the time allowed for that consideration came to an end, however, his decision was not to apply for relief from sanctions, but to apply for the stay to be extended on the basis that it was most appropriate for UKHO’s claim to be resolved within the Korean rehabilitation proceedings. It follows that the Administrator (and therefore Samyung) had decided not to provide the Extended Disclosure. iv) There would, of course, be nothing necessarily improper about such a decision if it were dependent on the stay being maintained. But the only rational explanation for Samyung’s conduct once the stay was lifted is that the intention not to provide the disclosure continued. Despite Hill Dickinson having said on 8 October 2025 (before the stay was lifted) that Samyung was currently dealing with a “ disclosure process ”, the later correspondence involved a protracted negotiation with Burges Salmon about timing in relation to the provision of the Paragraph 10 Information, disclosure, an application for relief from sanctions, the listing of the UO/SJ Application and the service of evidence in relation to it. There was no basis for such procrastination. Samyung needed to get on and at least make the application for relief, which was self-evidently urgent. Delay could only make things worse. v) Whether or not the orders of the Busan Rehabilitation Court on 22 December 2025 truly had the effect of prohibiting Samyung from providing further instructions to Hill Dickinson thereafter, there is no explanation (let alone a good one) as to why the Administrator withdrew his appeal of the decision that the rehabilitation process was invalid when he did, or why Samyung then made a new application for rehabilitation proceedings the very next day. A hearing was imminent at which UKHO intended to apply for an order which could result in judgment being entered against Samyung for an amount which meant the difference between life and death for the company. So, unless Samyung was trying to avoid providing the disclosure, it is baffling for Samyung to have taken a step which (it says) rendered it incapable of issuing an application for relief from sanctions or engaging with the hearing. This is especially so when (I infer from Hill Dickinson’s correspondence) such evidence was in an advanced state of preparation. vi) The UO/SJ Application was adjourned on a previous occasion when rehabilitation was applied for and it is, in my judgment, likely that Samyung hoped for the same outcome by saying, shortly before the re-listed hearing, that it was suddenly unable even to give instructions to apply for an adjournment. vii) Samyung’s conduct is entirely consistent with it having chosen the third option considered in Hill Dickinson’s “ guidance ”, to the effect that the risks arising from the Inquiry “ can be best managed through rehabilitation proceedings, such that the claim against Samyung must stop/ any judgment obtained cannot be enforced. ” The logical inference is that Samyung has chosen not to provide the disclosure as part of a strategy to have the Inquiry postponed or stopped altogether.

73. For those reasons, I conclude that there is no good reason for the breach.

74. The third stage of the Denton approach is to consider all the circumstances of the case to enable the court to deal justly with the application. In the context of an application for an unless order, this includes, in particular, consideration of whether the sanction sought to be imposed is proportionate. The sanction of striking out Points of Defence is especially severe, so it should not be imposed without good justification. I am satisfied, however, that there is a strong case for the imposition of striking out as a sanction for Samyung’s continuing failure to comply with the court’s orders.

75. My reasons are as follows: i) The orders for disclosure have been disobeyed without a proper explanation, and the disobedience has been persistent over an extended period of time. The CCMC Order was made nearly a year ago. There were two subsequent orders, the latter of which was an unless order and expressly warned that an application for strike out might be made if there was non-compliance. The only reason the UO/SJ Application hearing was not heard in July 2025 is that Samyung obtained a stay on the basis that it needed time to consider an application for relief from sanctions which it has still not made, nearly six months later. ii) Even allowing for any difficulty during the period between its suspension from trading on KOSDAQ in February 2025 until the appointment of the Administrator in May 2025, Samyung has had ample opportunity to comply with the obligation to provide disclosure. ICC Judge Barber was told that disclosure would take about two months, compared with the period of over seven months since the appointment of the Administrator. The stay did not prevent Samyung working on the disclosure exercise, particularly given that its purpose was to enable the Administrator to consider the prospects of success of an application for relief from sanctions, which would have been improved by Samyung being ready to provide the disclosure. iii) Numerous steps relating to witness statements and expert reports need to be completed before a trial currently listed at the beginning of June 2026. It will be challenging to complete those steps as it is, but any further delay in Samyung’s provision of its disclosure beyond 13 February 2026 is almost certain to cause serious difficulties in the preparation for trial. An adjournment of the trial would be unfair to UKHO and to other litigants. iv) As explained above, disclosure by Samyung is essential to a fair trial of the Inquiry. Without the disclosure, UKHO is unable to test the assertions by Mr Koo by reference to the contemporaneous documents, which it is entitled to do. v) Moreover, for the reasons I have already given, I consider that Samyung has chosen not to comply. An obvious motive for that choice is the possibility that disclosure will show that Samyung’s breaches of contract have caused greater losses than it has previously admitted. It would be contrary to the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly to permit Samyung to continue to contest UKHO’s claim in these circumstances. vi) Accordingly, it is appropriate and proportionate for the sanction for failure to provide the disclosure to be one which prevents Samyung from continuing to advance any defence to the claim. vii) Moreover, Samyung’s conduct to date demonstrates that only the most severe consequences stand any chance of prompting it to comply with the court’s orders. Striking out may be one of the most powerful weapons in the court’s case management armoury, but, in the circumstances of this case, it is the only weapon which stands a chance of hitting the target. viii) There are no special factors to justify any different order, especially in circumstances where Samyung has failed to engage with the UO/SJ Application and this hearing.

76. It is also relevant to the assessment of the overall justice of the case that the order sought by UKHO contains two safeguards. First, the sanction only bites if the Extended Disclosure is not given by 13 February 2026, which is 21 days after the hearing at which I made clear that the unless order would be imposed with that deadline. Samyung still has, therefore, an opportunity to comply and thereby avoid the sanction. Secondly, the order contains liberty to Samyung to apply to vary or set aside the order within 21 days of the order being served upon it (any such application to be supported by evidence and on notice to UKHO). The order also provides for a hearing to be listed after 4 March 2026 on an expedited basis (the “ Expedited Hearing ”) for any such application to be heard, as well as any further applications by UKHO and to resolve any dispute which may arise regarding, for example, whether there has been full compliance.

77. I consider these safeguards give Samyung sufficient time either to comply, or else to make an appropriate application. Hill Dickinson indicated that they had begun work on a disclosure exercise as long ago as 8 October 2025, and they proposed directions on 25 November 2025 leading to Extended Disclosure being given by 16 January 2026. I see no reason, in those circumstances, why Samyung could not provide disclosure by 13 February 2026, if it wishes to comply. Moreover, in so far as Samyung was truly unable to provide instructions at the time of the hearing before me, Hill Dickinson said on 21 January 2026 that the Korean court’s decision about whether to commence a new rehabilitation process was expected by the day of that hearing (23 January 2026), or thereabouts. At the very least, therefore, there should be no difficulty about a newly appointed Administrator instructing Hill Dickinson (who are familiar with the issues) to make an application within 21 days of service of the order. This provides what Mr Riordan described as an “off-ramp”, if Samyung is prepared to engage in the process and offers good reasons for being unable to provide the Extended Disclosure sooner.

78. For these reasons, I consider that it is appropriate and proportionate to make an order under CPR 3.4(2)(c) that (in summary), unless the Extended Disclosure contemplated by the CCMC Order (as modified by the sanction imposed by the First Unless Order) and the confirmatory statement required by paragraph 1 of the First Unless Order are provided by 13 February 2026, Samyung’s Points of Defence will be struck out for failure to comply with court orders. Should judgment be entered in the sums sought by UKHO?

79. The next question is whether the consequence of Samyung’s Points of Defence being struck out should be the automatic entry of judgment in the sum claimed by UKHO. That sum is £61,716,516.09, together with interest of £28,858,502.96 plus an interim payment on account of costs (which I consider below).

80. I have already mentioned that CPR 3.4(3) provides that, when the court strikes out a statement of case, it may make any consequential order it considers appropriate. That provision is supplemented by paragraph 4.2 of practice direction 3A, which states that “ Where a judge at a hearing strikes out all or part of a party’s statement of case he may enter such judgment for the other party as that party appears entitled to. ” These powers do not, on their face, contain any limitation on entering judgment in a money sum.

81. At the hearing I was, however, concerned about whether these powers are as wide as at first appears. This was because, once a defence is struck out, what the court might be said to be doing if it orders a sum of money to be paid, is entering a default judgment. Such a judgment would normally only be entered, however, if a claim is for a “ specified amount of money ” (see CPR 12.4 and CPR 3.5, which enables judgment to be entered after failure to comply with an unless order and was the provision used in the Global Torch case to obtain a judgment for $6 million). If the condition for a “ specified amount of money ” is not satisfied, the normal order is for an amount of money to be decided by the court, which would require there to be a trial of some kind.

82. It may not be straightforward for UKHO to argue that the sum which it seeks is a “ specified sum of money ” rather than “ an amount of money to be decided by the court ” since, almost by definition, what UKHO is seeking by means of this Inquiry is an amount of money to be decided by the court. At any rate, Mr Riordan did not seek to persuade me that UKHO is seeking a specified sum of money.

83. Instead Mr Riordan submitted that, in fact, the power available under CPR 3.4(3) is as wide as it is expressed to be, and that it is not necessary for a claimant to be seeking a specified sum of money (in the default judgment sense) before the court can enter judgment in a money sum as a consequence of ordering a defence to be struck out. In support of that submission, he referred me to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Workman v Forrester [2017] EWCA Civ 73 .

84. In that case the claimants brought a claim, the details of which do not matter, but which they accepted was “ novel. ” They obtained a freezing order which included the usual provision requiring the defendant to give disclosure of his assets. The defendant failed to serve an acknowledgement of service and the claimants obtained a default judgment for an amount which the court would decide. By the time the CMC took place in that assessment of damages on 21 December 2012, the defendant had still not complied with the order for disclosure of assets. In those circumstances, the claimants sought, and obtained from the District Judge, an order that, unless the defendant provided the disclosure by 11 January 2013, he “ be debarred from defending the quantum of the Claimants’ claims and judgment be entered in the sum of £1,503,579.50 plus interest, together with costs. ” The sum included in the order was the mid-point between the figure advanced by the claimants and that advanced by the defendant. The defendant did not comply with the disclosure order but subsequently applied to set the judgment aside. That application was refused, and an appeal to the High Court was dismissed.

85. A single Lord Justice gave permission for a second appeal on the issue of whether the District Judge had been “ entitled … to order that in default of compliance judgment be entered for a quantified sum in relation to a claim for unliquidated damages without having heard evidence of loss. ” The Court of Appeal held that he was so entitled. McCombe LJ, who gave the reasoned judgment with which Sharp and Thirlwall LJJ agreed, cited authorities which establish that, when the court orders damages to be assessed, the claimant must prove his loss or damage by evidence and damages cannot be awarded in default. In line with that principle, the District Judge could have made an unless order providing that, in the event of continued default, the defendant should be debarred from defending the damages assessment, but leaving it to the claimants still to prove their quantum claim by evidence. McCombe LJ held, however, that the District Judge did not err in principle by instead making an order for a particular sum.

86. Importantly, McCombe LJ said at [40] that “ There had been a persistent failure by the [defendant] to comply with the disclosure order. That was an order that was relevant not simply to the policing of the freezing order, but also to the live issue as to the quantification of the [claimants’] claim … The [defendant’s] flagrant contempt in failing to comply with the court’s order had the potential to frustrate the damages assessment and could not be ignored. ” As Mr Riordan pointed out, these considerations are equally applicable to Samyung’s breaches of its disclosure obligations.

87. McCombe LJ continued at [43]-[44] saying: “ …There is nothing in the rules, or in the decided cases, to limit the power to specify the consequences of failure to comply with an “unless order” which prevents the making of an order in the terms of the order made here. Precisely how the District Judge sought to achieve compliance by the [defendant] with the court’s order was a matter for his discretion. While it is clear that a judgment for damages to be assessed in the ordinary course requires the claimant to prove his damage and that there are procedural provisions to enable that process to be carried through, that does not mean that a defendant may not be deprived of the benefit of that process if he chooses to conduct himself, as this [defendant] did, in a manner calculated to frustrate the conduct of the proceedings to his own advantage. ”

88. At [49] McCombe LJ said that it made no difference that some of the heads of damage claimed were admittedly novel. The defendant could not complain if he ignored the court’s orders and frustrated the proper conduct of the proceedings.

89. This is clear authority that the court can make an order of the kind sought by UKHO. It has a discretion to do so in order to encourage compliance by Samyung with its orders, especially in circumstances where Samyung’s continued non-compliance with its disclosure obligations will frustrate the ongoing conduct of the proceedings. I asked Mr Riordan whether a judgment following trial might be preferable for UKHO for enforcement purposes, but he told me on instructions that UKHO wished to seek an unless order with a sanction for non-compliance involving judgment being entered in the sum sought. That is an understandable position.

90. In my judgment, if Samyung does not provide disclosure in this case, there would be an artificiality about requiring UKHO to prove its case at trial. UKHO would be seeking to prove its loss without access to important components of the calculation to be made, such as the true number of devices which Samyung sold with pre-loaded S+Map data files, or the number of downloads of S+Map files. UKHO can put forward a calculation of loss, but that can only be based on Mr Koo’s evidence, which it will have had no opportunity to test. The trial could only result in the sum awarded being the sum calculated on this unsatisfactory basis, or less. That would be so, even if Samyung has, in fact, committed more breaches of contract, and caused more loss, than it has been willing to reveal. It seems to me that such a trial would be unfair on UKHO, so that Samyung’s conduct can truly be said to be frustrating these proceedings and their just resolution. Furthermore, I consider that the entry of judgment in a money sum adds additional force to the sanction of striking out, and might prompt Samyung finally to provide the disclosure which has been ordered.

91. For those reasons, I will exercise my discretion to award judgment in the sums for principal and interest sought by UKHO (although I will consider costs separately below). Those are undoubtedly large sums, totalling around £90 million. But that is simply because of the nature of UKHO’s claim. A sanction is not disproportionate merely because the size of the payment involved is large in absolute terms. If it is appropriate to enter judgment in a sum of money as a sanction for non-compliance with the court’s orders, that sum of money should reflect a sum which the court considers, doing the best it can on the information available, reflects what the claim can reasonably be said to be worth. If there are multiple breaches of contract over an extended period of time, it is not surprising that the sum involved is a large one. Likewise, if the breaches occurred over a long period, as in this case, it is not surprising that there is a large sum for interest.

92. I have read the witness statements of Mr Mellor which explain in detail the calculations of these sums. The calculation is a good deal more sophisticated than the one in Workman v Forrester . There is no element of the calculations which could be described as obviously unreasonable; on the contrary, on multiple occasions when there is a choice of assumptions to be made, Mr Mellor has chosen the assumption which is most favourable to Samyung. Just as it did not matter in Workman v Forrester that the claim was novel, it does not seem to me to matter that there may be parts of the methodology which Samyung might seek to challenge at trial. Samyung cannot complain that it has not had the opportunity to make those arguments if it ignores the court’s orders and frustrates the fair trial of the Inquiry. Summary Judgment

93. Although the UO/SJ Application sought summary judgment in relation to the claim as a whole, as an alternative or in addition to an unless order, in his skeleton argument for the hearing Mr Riordan only sought summary judgment in respect of two aspects of the claim. By the conclusion of the hearing, he simply sought an adjournment of the entire summary judgment aspect of the application to the Expedited Hearing. In those circumstances, I will grant that adjournment. Alternative Service

94. As explained above, the AS Application was originally made because there was an issue about whether the UO/SJ Application had been properly served. Hill Dickinson subsequently accepted, on Samyung’s behalf, that it has been properly served. The order can, therefore, record that there has been good service of the UO/SJ Application.

95. What UKHO now seeks, however, is (in summary) an order pursuant to CPR 6.27 that service can be effected in various ways (such as email on named addresses, or by post), if Samyung ceases to be legally represented in these proceedings and Samyung fails within 7 days to provide an address for service within the UK. There is no need for alternative service at present, because Hill Dickinson remain on the record and able to accept service.

96. It is relatively common to make an order for alternative service which applies to documents which may need to be served in the future. I am not aware, however, of an order having previously been made for alternative service which will only apply in circumstances which might never arise. There does not seem to me to be any reason why, in principle, such an order should not be made. CPR 6.15(1), which is incorporated by reference into CPR 6.27, permits an order for alternative service “ where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise ” it. It may be that circumstances in which there would be a good reason to authorise alternative service in a hypothetical scenario would rarely arise, but this case seems to me to be a good example of such a case.

97. As I have explained, when Hill Dickinson came off the record in February 2025, Samyung refused to provide an address for service in the UK, in breach of CPR 6.23(3), CPR 42.2 and paragraph 2.4 of the practice direction to CPR Part 42. Then, when UKHO sought to serve the UO/SJ Application, Samyung argued that service was invalid because it had not been carried out in accordance with the Hague Convention, a process which would have been likely to take months. Even when Hill Dickinson came back on the record, they argued that service on them was not valid until after expiry of the stay.

98. Although Hill Dickinson remain on the record at the time of this judgment, they wrote to Burges Salmon on 23 December 2025 saying that they were “ without instructions ” as a result of the new application for rehabilitation proceedings and wrote to the court on 21 January 2026 saying that Samyung was unable to give instructions, even to seek an adjournment. In my judgment, UKHO’s apprehension that Hill Dickinson will again be dis-instructed and that Samyung again fails to provide an address for service in the UK is justified. If that happens it is bound to lead to delay whilst UKHO applies for alternative service and faces argument with Samyung about the Hague Convention. That may well put the trial date in serious jeopardy.

99. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there is a good reason prospectively to authorise alternative service in order to avoid Samyung derailing the trial. The evidence I have seen indicates that the various alternative methods of service proposed by UKHO (which I discussed with Mr Riordan during the hearing) can reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to Samyung’s attention, including in the event that a new Administrator is appointed by the Korean Rehabilitation Court. Costs

100. Although costs would normally be dealt with following judgment, there is some urgency about drawing up the orders in this matter, so Mr Riordan made submissions on the basis of assumptions about what I might order and invited me to decide the costs now. That appeared reasonable, given that, in the circumstances of this case, there can be no submissions from Samyung.

101. UKHO seeks three categories of costs: i) First, it seeks the costs of the UO/SJ Application in any event, on the basis that it has been successful in obtaining the unless order; ii) Secondly, it seeks a payment on account of the costs of the Inquiry as a whole, to take effect if Samyung does not comply with the unless order with the result that its defence is struck out and judgment is entered in the sums referred to above; iii) Thirdly, it seeks the costs of the AS Application in any event, again on the basis that it has been successful. Costs of the UO/SJ Application

102. In relation to the costs of the UO/SJ Application, UKHO has provided me with a Statement of Costs totalling £113,637.73. I was told that where costs included on this statement were incurred in relation to items which relate both to the UO/SJ Application and the AS Application (such as fees for attendance at the hearing dealing with both), they have been apportioned so that 90% of the cost is allocated to the former application and 10% to the latter. That appears to me to be reasonable.

103. On that basis, UKHO seeks an order for £102,273.96, which is 90% of the total. This is on the basis that the hourly rates claimed are relatively low and below the guideline rates (which is true), the overall sum claimed is comparatively modest for an application of this kind, especially bearing mind the abortive hearing in July 2025, and that costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis.

104. I am satisfied that Samyung’s conduct and the circumstances of the case are such as to take the situation “ out of the norm ” in a way which justifies an order for indemnity costs. All the reasons given above to explain why it is appropriate to grant an unless order show that Samyung’s conduct was unreasonable to a high degree. I highlight in particular the inference I have drawn that Samyung has chosen not to comply with the court’s orders in relation to disclosure.

105. I have more difficulty, however, with the submission that UKHO should be awarded 90% of its costs, even on the indemnity basis.

106. In the first place, Mr Riordan accepted at the hearing that, if the summary judgment aspect of the UO/SJ Application were adjourned to the Expedited Hearing (as I have directed), some element of the costs shown on the Statement of Costs would need to be deducted to take account of this (with the remaining costs reserved to the March Hearing). He proposed a deduction of 10%, on the basis of a rough comparison between the number of paragraphs of the witness statements dealing with summary judgment and the total number of paragraphs. A similar exercise in relation to the paragraphs of Mr Riordan’s skeleton argument produces a similar figure.

107. It seems to me, however, that if UKHO pursues its summary judgment application, even if only in part, that is likely to require substantial argument and, in particular, far more detailed consideration of Mr Mellor’s statements than has been necessary for my decision about the unless order. Although his statements were helpful to me, I consider the majority of the costs attributable to them are properly allocated to the summary judgment aspect of the application. Moreover, whilst the section of Mr Riordan’s skeleton dealing with those aspects of the summary judgment application which he was intending to pursue at that stage is short, it raises some reasonably complex legal issues which would have required detailed argument. Assuming (as I think I must) that Mr Riordan spent time preparing to make those arguments to me and discussing them with his team, a 10% deduction seems on the low side. Doing the best I can, I propose to deduct 20% from the costs sought to reflect the fact that the summary judgment aspect of the application has not yet been pursued. Taking 80% of the total claimed of £113,637.73 gives £90,910.18.

108. I consider UKHO’s suggestion of taking 90% of that resulting figure to reflect deductions which might be made on detailed assessment to be somewhat ambitious, even for costs assessed on the indemnity basis. Particularly in circumstances where I have not had the benefit of submissions from Samyung in relation to the Statement of Costs, I consider 80% better reflects the level of costs which are recoverable. That gives a figure of £72,728.14, which I will round up to £73,000. Costs of the Inquiry

109. UKHO submits that, if Samyung does not comply with the unless order so that its defence is struck out and judgment is entered for the sums referred to above, UKHO will be the successful party in relation to the Inquiry as a whole, and that it is therefore entitled to an order that Samyung should pay its costs on the standard basis. I agree (and note that paragraph 2(e) of the draft order provided by UKHO omits to state that the costs are payable on the standard basis). UKHO accordingly seeks a payment on account of those costs, particularly bearing in mind that, in the scenario where judgment is entered following non-compliance by Samyung, it is unlikely that there will ever be a detailed assessment.

110. The starting point in relation to the costs of the Inquiry is UKHO’s updated Precedent H. Mr Riordan took me through the incurred costs shown on the Precedent H, together with the addition of a missing figure in the ADR/Settlement row. I was told that these costs do not include any of the sums sought in relation to the UO/SJ Application, referred to above. The total of all those costs is £325,501.59.

111. To that, UKHO adds the costs referable to the application for the First Unless Order. That order provided that UKHO’s costs were to be paid by Samyung in any event, but they were not summarily assessed at that stage. UKHO’s Statement of Costs in relation to that application gives a total of £10,557.81. Again, I was told that these costs are not already included in the Precedent H referred to above. When they are added to the costs shown in Precedent H, the grand total is £336,059.40. UKHO submits that the payment on account should be 70% of the total, being £235,241.58.

112. I have considered the sums shown in the Precedent H and the Statement of Costs for the application for the First Unless Order. Given the size of the claim and the history which I have summarised above, they all appear to be reasonably incurred, reasonable in amount and proportionate to the matters in issue. The hourly rates claimed are below the guideline rates and UKHO’s legal representatives have plainly had to spend a considerable number of hours formulating and progressing the claim and dealing with Samyung’s unreasonable conduct. I consider it likely that UKHO would recover at least £235,000 on a detailed assessment and that this is, therefore, a reasonable sum to order to be paid on account. Costs of the AS Application

113. In relation to the costs of the UO/SJ Application, UKHO has provided me with a Statement of Costs totalling £13,248.09. I am asked to summarily assess these costs on the standard basis in the full amount claimed. Whilst I agree that UKHO is the successful party and entitled to its costs, and that the sum claimed is relatively modest in the overall scheme of things, I am not prepared to make an order for 100% of the sum claimed, especially on the standard basis and without the benefit of submissions from Samyung. Doing the best I can, I summarily assess these costs in the sum of £11,000. Conclusion

114. For the reasons I have given, I will make orders to give effect to the following decisions: i) Samyung must provide Extended Disclosure pursuant to paragraph 9 of the CCMC Order, as modified by paragraph 4 of the First Unless Order (and including the confirmatory witness statement required by paragraph 1 of that order), by 13 February 2026; ii) If Samyung does not comply with that obligation to provide Extended Disclosure by 13 February 2026, its Points of Defence will be struck out, judgment will be entered for UKHO in the sum claimed, being £61,716,516.09, together with interest of £28,858,502.96, and Samyung will also be ordered to pay UKHO’s costs of the Inquiry and to pay £235,000 on account of those costs. Samyung must pay the sums referred to in this paragraph by 6 March 2026; iii) If Samyung fully complies with its obligation to provide Extended Disclosure by 13 February 2026, the directions to trial are to be the modified directions in the draft order provided to me by UKHO, which I approve; iv) Samyung has liberty to apply to vary or set aside this order within 21 days of it being served on Samyung; v) There will be a hearing listed on an expedited basis (which I have described above as the Expedited Hearing) to deal with matters arising, including any application pursuant to the liberty to apply referred to in the previous sub-paragraph. I understand that, since the hearing, the Expedited Hearing has been listed in a three day window from 18 March 2026; vi) The summary judgment aspect of the UO/SJ Application is to be adjourned to the Expedited Hearing; vii) If Samyung ceases to be legally represented in these proceedings and fails to provide UKHO’s solicitors with an address for service within the UK, UKHO will have permission to serve all documents in these proceedings by the alternative means listed in the draft order with which I have been provided; viii) In any event, Samyung must pay UKHO’s costs of the UO/SJ Application in the sum of £73,000 and of the AS Application in the sum of £11,000.

115. The above explanation of the orders I will make are intended to be expressed in reader-friendly shorthand for the appropriately detailed provisions in the draft orders provided to me by UKHO. I hope I have sufficiently dealt with matters to enable those draft orders to be amended to reflect my decisions. Where matters are included in those draft orders to which I have not referred above, I do not consider them to be controversial and I approve them. I would be grateful if Mr Riordan would prepare revised orders for my final approval.