Paul Carlier v The Information Commissioner & Anor

13. As will be seen from the Tribunal’s decision this was a difficult case to decide when considering whether the Appellant’s request was vexatious. We said:-

40. The Tribunal has found this a finely balanced case. We take on board all that the FCA has said about the burden that the Appellant’s frequent engagement with it over a period of years has placed upon the resources that the FCA. The requests which are the subject of this appeal are unnecessarily lengthy and convoluted as the FCA says. We are concerned about some of his tone and language when his avowed aim is simply seeking information. There is evidence of persistence in the face of explanations provided by the FCA and limits on what information the FCA can provide.

14. We also said that the Tribunal’s decision to allow the appeal was made with “some hesitation…” and that it was a decision made only by “a narrow margin…”.

15. The first stage of the Willow Court test is to consider whether there is a reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of. Applying an objective test, in my view it would be impossible to say that the FCA or the Commissioner acted unreasonably in defending these proceedings by maintaining the position that the request was vexatious.

16. There were valid reasons for arguing that the request was vexatious (as explained in the Tribunal’s decision) largely based on the burdensomeness of the requests on the FCA and it was not unreasonable for the FCA or the Commissioner to defend the appeal, albeit unsuccessfully.

17. The fact that the Appellant’s underlying dispute with the FCA continues (based on new evidence or otherwise) is not something which affects this decision. A ny application for costs is limited to considering a party’s conduct as part of the appeal proceedings as set out at rule 10(1)(b) of the Tribunal Rules.

18. As I have found that the FCA and the Commissioner did not act unreasonably in defending the proceedings, I do not need to continue to consider whether a costs order should be made or the terms of any order. As the case does not come within the categories in rule 10(1)(b) of the Rules, there is no general discretion for the Tribunal to award costs on any other basis. Postscript

19. The above reasoning was written on 7 August 2024. However, I am told that because of an administrative oversight the decision was not issued. That has given me the opportunity to consider further representations made by the Appellant.

20. Firstly, the Appellant sought to supplement his costs application in documents attached to an email dated 7 August 2025 (not seen by me before the reasons above were formulated), which made reference to actions of the FCA and the Commissioner after the decision in this case was promulgated.

21. Secondly, there is an email dated 17 January 2025 which attached part of a formal whistle-blower disclosure document sent to the Commissioner dated 9 January 2025, along with other documents.

22. It does not seem to me that any of these subsequent matters change my findings above that the FCA and the Commissioner were not unreasonable in defending this appeal (albeit unsuccessfully), on the ground that the requests were vexatious, largely based on a claim of burdensomeness of the requests.

23. Therefore, no order for costs is made against the FCA or the Commissioner and the application is dismissed.

24. I also note that the Appellant has made a claim for contempt of court against the FCA, supplemented by his emails of 7 August 2024 and 17 January 2025. It seems to me that that application should be referred to the Registrar and, if appropriate, case management directions given. Stephen Cragg KC Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Date: 24 January 2025.