Mahesh Mistry & Anor v Barbara Denise Corrado

(1) MAHESH MISTRY (2) JAYMATI MISTRY Applicants - and - BARBARA DENISE CORRADO Respondent Property Addresses: (1) 89 Pasture Road, HA0 3JW (2) 91 Pasture Road, HA0 3JW Title Numbers: (1) MX5006 (2) MX3740 __________________________________ SUBSTANTIVE DECISION __________________________________ Background to the Application

1. This is a determined boundary application.

2. The Applicants are the owners of 89 Pasture Road HA0 3JW (No 89). No 89 is registered at HM Land Registry (“HMLR”) under title number MX5006. The Applicants have been registered proprietors of No 89 since 28 January 1986.

3. The Respondent is one of the joint owners of 91 Pasture Road HA0 3JW (No 91). No 91 is registered at HMLR under title number MX3740. She has been registered as one of the joint proprietors of No 91 since 31 December 1975.

4. The Applicants applied to HMLR on 24 March 2023 under section 60 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and rules 118 and 119 of the Land Registration Rules 2003 for determination of the boundary between No 89 and No 91. The Respondent objected on 22 September 2023 to the Applicants’ application on the grounds that the boundary shown in their application plan is in the wrong position.

5. The arrangement of the properties in the context of the surrounding streets can be seen in figure 1. This is taken from one of the OS plans reproduced in the hearing bundle. The location and numbering of the properties on the image was not especially clear on that plan, so I have drawn rough lines (green for the No 91 plot and red for the No 89 plot) to make it clearer. This plan and the lines I have added are not accurate and are not intended to show the line of any boundary. It is intended only to illustrate the orientation of the properties in relation to each other and the surrounding area. Figure 1 – not to scale – not accurate and purely for illustrative purposes

6. Figure 1 shows that the plot of No 91 is a fan shape extending around a corner of the street at the junction of Pasture Road and Paxton Road. No 89 and No 91 are each semi-detached houses.

7. By the date of the hearing the application was based on the following plan shown in Figure 2: Figure 2 – the New Application Plan – not to scale and purely for illustrative purposes

8. The application was made by way of the standard DB form enclosing a plan dated 30 June 2022 and signed by the Applicant’s expert surveyor, David Cooper, on 30 May 2023. That plan was the basis of the application which was referred to this Tribunal. During the course of discussions between the parties’ respective experts, they agreed that some of the measurements marked on the original application plan were inaccurate. They agreed a corrected set of measurements and Mr Cooper marked those on a new version of the plan (“the New Application Plan”) dated and signed on 16 January 2025. It is the New Application Plan which is shown at Figure 2 above.

9. It is important to make clear that it is only the measurements on the New Application Plan which are agreed between the experts. The Respondent’s expert does not agree that the proposed boundary line shown on the New Application Plan is the true boundary line. He agrees only that the New Application Plan is an accurate representation of the boundary line proposed by the Applicants.

10. I shall treat the New Application Plan as the basis of the Applicants’ application for the purposes of this decision. The only difference between it and the original application plan is the corrected measurements. There is no change in the length, angle or direction of the proposed boundary (or physical features shown). There is no change in the relationship between the proposed boundary line and the physical features marked on the plan. In my view, it would not comprise a different boundary application or a variation to the existing boundary application. It is the same boundary application proposing the same boundary, but the representation of that proposed boundary line is more accurately shown on the New Application Plan.

11. If that is not the correct approach, then this is a case in which it would be appropriate for me to determine the location of the boundary (following the dictum in Lowe v William Davis Ltd [2018] UKUT 206) as a finding of fact between the parties, even if the line I determine is not identical with the measurements on the original application plan.

12. In other words, I will treat this application as being an application to determine the boundary along the New Application Line. Site Visit

13. I visited the site on the day before the hearing commenced, together with the parties and their representatives. The Applicants and their representatives and the Respondent and her expert witness had the opportunity to draw to my attention those features of the land which they each wanted me to look at. I was able to form a view myself of the overall layout and context of the area in dispute. The Hearing and the Evidence

14. The Applicants were represented by Ms Nicola Muir of Counsel, at the hearing. The Respondent represented herself.

15. The Second Applicant gave oral evidence and Michael O’Donnell gave evidence for the Applicants. David Cooper gave oral evidence as the Applicants’ expert witness.

16. The Respondent gave oral evidence at the hearing together with her expert surveyor, Kevin Hainsworth. The Process to Determine the Boundary

17. A boundary comes into existence when there are two areas of land in different ownership. The boundary is the notional line between them as defined by law. At any given moment in time, part or all of the boundary may or may not be marked by any features or structures on the physical land itself.

18. The starting point to define any boundary is to interpret (if possible) the document(s) which created the boundary.

19. In this case, as in most cases, the boundary first came into existence when a larger plot of land in single ownership was divided into two plots in different ownerships. Therefore, the conveyance which first effected that division is the document which created and defined the boundary. In this case, the land was first divided by a conveyance dated 16 May 1934 by which the Wembley (C & W) Land Company Limited (“the Developer”) transferred No 91 to Mr F H Jeanes. No 91 was defined in that deed as “the land shown and edged with red on the accompanying plan and known as No. 91 Pasture Road”. The plan attached shows the plot of No 91 edged in red. No 91 is shown as a broadly triangular plot with one curved side. Handwritten measurements are marked on the plan for each of the three sides: a) The length of the broadly straight boundary with No 89 is 104’4” b) The length of the broadly straight rear boundary of No 91 is 127’3” c) The length of the long curved frontage of No 91 is 115’10”

20. At the point of the execution of that deed, a boundary was created between No 91 and what would later become the separate title of No 89. Determining the exact location of that boundary was made easier after the first conveyance of No 89 by the Developer.

21. On 2 July 1934 the Developer transferred No 89 to Irene Convisser. No 89 was defined in that deed as “the land shown and edged with red on the accompanying plan and known as 89 Pasture Road”. The plan attached shows the plot of No 89 edged in red. No 89 is shown as an irregular four sided shape with broadly straight sides. Handwritten measurements are marked on the plan for each of the four sides: a) The length of the boundary with No 91 is 104’4” – this coincides with the measurement of the same boundary in the No 91 conveyance of May 1934. b) The length of the rear boundary of No 89 is 48’3” c) The length of the boundary between No 89 and No 87 is 120’6” d) The length of the frontage of No 89 is 54’0”.

22. These conveyances both define the plots being conveyed by reference to (i) the address by which the property will be known and (ii) a line drawn on a plan attached to the deed. The plans are not expressed to be for identification purposes only. They are intended to define the plots and therefore, by extension, the boundaries between them. All of the boundaries are marked with the lengths of each boundary in feet and inches, as recorded above. The starting point is therefore to give meaning, as much as possible, to the measurements on those plans. Because that is what legally defines the boundary. The Issues.

23. During the course of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent said a number of times that this dispute is very simple. She is right. It is. There are essentially two separate disputes about different sections of the boundary: the “Front Section” and the “Rear Section”. In respect of each section, the issues are indeed straightforward.

24. The Front Section is the section of the proposed determined boundary from: • the foremost brick pier at the frontage of the properties (Point A) to • the northwest corner of No 89’s garage (Point H).

25. The Front Section is represented on the New Application Plan (figure 2 above) as the proposed line from point A to point H.

26. The Rear Section is the section of the proposed determined boundary from: • the northwest corner of No 89’s garage (Point H) to • the south west corner of a blockwork wall in the area of the boundary between the two properties (Point C).

27. The Rear Section is represented on the New Application Plan (figure 2 above) as the proposed line from point H to point C. The Front Section Dispute

28. It is common ground that until recently there was a white blockwork wall (“the Front Wall”) along a line in the area of the Front Section of the boundary. It is common ground that the Front Wall was removed by the Respondent leaving only the brick pier at point A. The line of most of the former Front Wall is still visible in the ground. That was clear during the course of my site visit. That line showed that the Front Wall followed the line from A to H.

29. It is also common ground that the Respondent built the Front Wall in 1994.

30. A section of land which serves as the driveway of No 89 is immediately adjacent to the front section of the line of the Front Wall. Along the line where the driveway meets the line of the Front Wall, there is a line of concrete a few inches wide which looks different from the rest of the concrete which forms the surface of the rest of No 89’s driveway. The parties have called this the “Concrete Infill”.

31. The Applicants’ driveway sits on higher ground than that part of No 91 which is immediately adjacent to the Applicants’ driveway. The surface of the Concrete Infill is level with the surface of the rest of the Applicants’ driveway. The northernmost edge of the Concrete Infill therefore forms a visible physical border between the higher ground of No 89 and the lower ground of No 91. That is just a visual observation on my part. It does not mean that the legal boundary necessarily follows that line.

32. In essence, the dispute about the front section of the boundary consists of a single issue: who owns the Concrete Infill?

33. The Applicants’ case is that the former Front Wall marked the true line of the Front Section of the boundary. Their case is therefore that the Concrete Infill is within the curtilage of No 89, is part of their driveway and is within their ownership. That is the basis of their application that the line A-H should be determined as the Front Section of the boundary.

34. The Respondent’s case is that the Concrete Infill is within her title to No 91. Her case is that the Front Wall was not along the boundary line, but was a few inches within her property, set back from the true boundary. That is the basis of her case that the line A-H should NOT be determined as the Front Section of the boundary. In other words, according to the Respondent, the front part of the boundary should be in such a position that the concrete infill is incorporated within No 91.

35. Other than asserting that the Front Section of the boundary should be in a place which acknowledges that the Concrete Infill is within her ownership, the Respondent does not claim a specific line for the boundary. She has not invited me to determine the boundary along an alternative line; she simply objects to the boundary being determined along the line sought by the Applicants. That is a perfectly legitimate position for the Respondent to take. I say that here to make clear that my purpose in this decision is only to assess whether or not the boundary should determined along the line sought by the Applicants in the New Application Plan. I am not considering any alternative line for the boundary.

36. The Respondent’s evidence is that: a) The former Front Wall; and b) All other previous boundary-type structures have sat on the No 91 side of the Concrete Infill continuously from before 1975 until 2021, thereby incorporating (or giving the visual impression of incorporating) the concrete infill within the driveway of the No 89. The significance of 1975 is that this was the year in which the Respondent purchased No 91. The Respondent’s evidence is that there was a fence along that line in 1975 when she purchased No 91.

37. Although the Applicants are not able to give evidence of the physical structures as far back as 1975, the Respondent’s evidence as outlined in my previous paragraph broadly accords with their case. It also accords, as far as I can see, with various types of historical photographs and plans I have seen over the period between 1975 and 2021.

38. The Respondent’s evidence therefore is that there has been a boundary structure of some kind along the line proposed by the Applicants from the time when she purchased No 91 in 1975 until she removed almost all of the former Front Wall in 2021. Since 1975, there has never been a boundary structure in the Front Section of the boundary along any other line.

39. The Applicants rely on that evidence (which is effectively common ground) to invite the Tribunal to infer that boundary structures have only ever been along that line of the Front Section of the boundary since the properties were first partitioned in 1934.

40. The Respondent’s case consists of her theory of what, she says, must have happened prior to 1975, the date of her purchase of No 91. Her theory is how she seeks to explain why there has been a boundary structure along line A to H for almost all of the last 50 years (at least): a) The first part of the Respondent’s theory is that, at some point prior to 1975, there was a fence along a line which accorded with the Respondent’s case – in other words, a line which encompassed the area of the Concrete Infill within the curtilage of No 91. b) The second part of the Respondent’s theory is that at some point prior to 1975, someone (presumably a previous owner/occupier of No 89) removed that fence and installed one along the line A-H, thereby effectively moving the boundary structure from the line favoured by the Respondent to the line now proposed by the Applicants. c) The third part of the Respondent’s theory seeks to explain why there is a pronounced height difference between the northern edge of the Concrete Infill and the part of No 91 immediately adjacent to it. It would have been very odd if there was such a height difference at a time when the area of the Concrete Infill was enclosed within the curtilage of No 91. The third part of the Respondent’s theory answers this potential challenge by asserting that (prior to 1975) the same previous owner/occupier of No 89 created the Concrete Infill in order effectively to grab a strip of No 91 and make it part of No 89’s driveway. This was done, according to the Respondent, by laying down rubble (which the Respondent calls “rogue foundations”) and pouring a concrete surface on top. In other words, the Respondent says that prior to this acting of moving the boundary structure, the area of the Concrete Infill was on the same level as the adjacent part of No 91, but after the boundary structure was moved the Concrete Infill was created thereby raising the level of that strip.

41. During the hearing, the Respondent was invited to provide evidence of the elements of her theory. She made the following points in support of her theory: a) Her primary position is her claim that it is obvious from looking at the physical features on the ground today. She drew attention particularly to the fact that the Concrete Infill is different in appearance and construction from the rest of No 89’s driveway. She submits that the only explanation for this is that it was taken by trespass. She claims that the material used (the “rogue foundations”) to build it up to the higher level of the rest of No 89’s driveway is further evidence that the concrete driveway originally was part of the property on the lower level, namely No 91. At the site visit, she pointed out rubble which is visible under the surface of the Concrete Infill. This is visible from the side of the Concrete Infill, when standing on No 91 and looking at the side of the step up, now that the former Front Wall is absent. b) The Respondent also invited me to infer the correctness of her theory from the position of the dropped kerb in front of No 89’s driveway. I was unable to see (both on site and with the benefit of various photographs in the hearing bundle) how the position of the dropped kerb could be said to prove her theory. From the position of the dropped kerb and its distance from the frontage of the properties, it is simply not possible to determine where the northern edge of the No 89 driveway is said to be. Historical photographs of the dropped kerb were taken at an angle such that it is impossible to tell with the naked eye which feature (if any) at the frontage of the properties lines up with which part of the dropped kerb.

42. In my judgment, there are many alternative explanations for the different appearance and construction of the Concrete Infill. For example, during the site visit the Applicants invited me to look at the driveways of some of the other houses in the immediate surrounding area. It was possible to see that some of them have flower beds running along the side of the driveway. Some of them have features similar to the Concrete Infill. The Applicants invited me to infer that all these properties (including No 89) were built with flower beds in that position and that the owners of some of the properties (including No 89) had chosen to extend the width of their driveway by filling in the flower beds with hard core material and creating an additional concrete strip. I make no finding as to the truth of this speculation on the part of the Applicants, but it highlights one of many possible alternative explanations for the different appearance and composition of the Concrete Infill. Ultimately, the Respondent has not demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that the Concrete Infill was created by a trespasser making a land grab on some unspecified date before 1975.

43. In other words, none of the physical features (whether on the ground or in historical photographs) are evidence that an unspecified person on some unspecified date prior to 1975 moved the boundary structure, laid down rubble foundations and poured a concrete surface.

44. An additional feature of the Respondent’s case was her response when she was asked about the first time she had noticed that the Concrete Infill was on the wrong side of the boundary structure. During her oral evidence, she claimed to have noticed the issue when she first viewed the property before offering to buy it. She then said that she had not raised it with her conveyancing solicitors, nor had she raised it with the sellers. She says this was because she had fallen in love with the house and did not want to create any problems. Even after the purchase, she had the opportunity to discuss the issue with her predecessors in title or with her new neighbours or with others in the locality to find out how the alleged trespass had come about. But she did not. She said that this was because she could not afford the legal fees at the time to handle a dispute.

45. In my judgment, her evidence lacked credibility on this last point, for the following reasons: a) Some of it makes no logical sense: for example, that she noticed the alleged pre-1975 trespass in 1975 but failed to discuss it with anyone until 1994 (or perhaps not until 2021). It is also almost impossible to understand why she herself had the white blockwork Front Wall built in 1994 (along the line of the existing wooden fence) if, as she now claims, she believed that it was not the line of the boundary. Her attempted explanations were unconvincing. b) Some of it consisted of contradictions: for example, as well as claiming that the “trespass” has been obvious to her since 1975, she also gave evidence that she had not raised it before 1994 because the appearance of the concrete had not sufficiently aged to be noticeable until 1994.

46. As a result, I will treat the Respondent’s evidence with caution and I will accept it only when it is corroborated by a more reliable source of evidence or where it gives rise to common ground between the parties.

47. In addition, it is notable that none of the various experts involved in this case seem to support the Respondent’s position, including the many experts she has instructed. It is notable that none of the expert surveyors have found reliable physical evidence or documentary records which support the Respondent’s theory as set out above.

48. I therefore find as fact that: a) The white blockwork Front Wall followed all or most of the line A to H. b) It was built in 1994 by the Respondent along the same line as the previous wooden fence. c) That there has been a boundary-type structure along that line since 1975

49. I infer from those facts, and from taking all of the other evidence and arguments into account, that there is no reason to believe that there was ever a boundary structure in the area of the Front Section of the boundary in any difference place or along any different line.

50. On the issue of the Front Section of the boundary, the most important measurements on the 1934 deed plans are those shown for the frontage of No 89 (54’) and the frontage of No 91 (115’10”).

51. Each of the two plots is an irregular shape. The plans are not marked with angles or any way of independently calculating the curved frontage of No 91. The plans also do not show any physical features as reference points on the ground, other than the shape of the houses then built. This means that it is not possible, by reference to the plans alone, to map the exact line of the boundary onto the land itself. Some extrinsic evidence and observation are necessary.

52. In this case, that additional evidence comes (at least partly) in the form of expert surveyors instructed by each side. There are a number of reports in the hearing bundle by a variety of surveyors instructed by either side. But only two expert surveyors gave evidence at the hearing: a) For the Applicants, David Cooper MRICS b) For the Respondent, Kevin Hainsworth MRICS

53. Each of them gave oral evidence and were cross examined. Before the hearing, the two experts met, discussed the case and produced a joint report. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the joint report deal with the frontage measurements. Paragraph 19 reads as follows: “It is agreed that a frontage measurement of 54' 0" (a dimension indicated on the 1934 conveyance plan) from the line dividing 87 and 89 Pasture Road (the Applicant's property) is coincident with the frontage of the Applicant's property, as measured from the southerly side of the still-existing foremost brick pier. This would indicate, taken on its own, that the foremost brick pier is in a position which accords with the 1934 conveyance plan.”

54. The experts both agreed that the structure dividing No 89 from No 87 on the other side (a non-disputed boundary) was sufficiently permanent, longstanding and consistent with other physical features so as to be a reliable point from which to measure the 54’.

55. To be clear, the joint opinion of the experts therefore leads to the conclusion that the agreed measurement on the ground of the 54’ marked on the plan would result in the Concrete Infill being included in No 89’s title, contrary to the Respondent’s case.

56. However, paragraph 20 of the experts’ joint statement says as follows: “It is agreed that the 91 Pasture Road frontage measurement of 115' 10" (a dimension indicated on the 1934 conveyance plan) falls short of the actual physical frontage by approximately 2 feet. The physical frontage of 91 Pasture Road (the Respondent's property) is approximately 117'10". KH [the Respondent’s expert] concludes from this difference that the annotated dimensions on the 1934 conveyance plans are not a reliable indicator of the dimensions of the as-built plots.”

57. This means that the experts have been unable to reproduce on the ground the 115’10” shown on the 1934 deed plan as the frontage of No 91. In fact No 91, as they have measured it, has a frontage which is at least 117’10” long. The Respondent (through her expert) invited me to infer from that that the measurements on the 1934 deed plans are all unreliable and that I should not rely upon any of them, including the 54’ frontage of No 89.

58. I disagree. The interpretation of markings on plans in deeds is not an all-or-nothing exercise, such that one inaccuracy or anomaly requires the Tribunal to abandon all other markings or measurements. In any event, there are possible reasons why the No 91 measurement is more difficult to match up than the No 89 frontage measurement. No 89 is a four-sided shape, each side of which is represented on the deed plans by a straight line. No 89 is on a straight section of road and 54’ is a small frontage relative to that of No 91. No 91’s frontage is a sweeping curve which bows around the corner of two streets. It stretches along a much larger distance. There are choices to be made about how to measure such a distance. Difference choices and different equipment may have been used in 1934. In my judgment, it is self-evidently more likely that there would be an anomaly in measuring a 115’10” curve than in measuring a 54’ straight line. Finally, it is worth noting that the 115’10” shown on the deed plan cannot be matched with the physical features so as to include the Concrete Infill in No 91.

59. In my judgment therefore it is possible, and necessary, to give effect to the 54’ frontage measurement of No 89. I find that it represents on the ground the line described jointly by the experts in paragraph 19 of their joint report (quoted above).

60. Taking this together with my findings about the history of physical boundary structures in the Front Section, I find that the Front Section of the boundary between No 89 and No 91 follows the line A to H on the New Application Plan. The Rear Section Dispute

61. In relation to the Rear Section of the boundary, the Applicants’ application is for the boundary to be determined along the line between points H to C on the New Application Plan.

62. The basis of the Applicants’ application on this part of the boundary is straightforward. The Applicants assert as a matter of fact that this line H to C was the subject of a boundary agreement between the parties.

63. Ms Muir for the Applicants submitted that if the Tribunal finds that there is a boundary agreement, then the matter ends there. There is no need for the Tribunal to make a finding about the original paper boundary as defined by the 1934 deeds and any other extrinsic evidence. The line agreed by the boundary agreement supersedes whatever the original defined boundary was (if different).

64. In my judgment, Ms Muir is correct. Her submission is a matter of well-established law. See for example Nielson v Poole (1969) 20 P & CR 909 and Bean v Katz [2016] UKUT 168 (TCC) . Whether or not there is a boundary agreement is a question of fact for the Tribunal, applying the facts to the common law of contract. There is no need for any special formalities.

65. The Applicants’ case for the boundary agreement is that: a) In 1994 a dispute arose between the Applicants and the Respondent concerning, amongst other things, the Rear Section of the boundary. The fact of a dispute is evidenced by a letter dated 17 August 1994 written to the Respondent by her own builders, Franklin Design and Build. The letter is headed “re: Boundary Wall Dispute” and starts by confirming her instructions to them to comment on a report which “concerns an alleged encroachment of your boundary wall onto the neighbour’s land”. It is clear from reading the detail in the rest of this letter that it is talking about a dispute concerning the Rear Section of the boundary and that the neighbour in question is the Applicants. b) The dispute arose because the Respondent had built a white blockwork wall along the line H to C and the Applicants had objected, claiming (in 1994) that the wall was in the wrong place to be a boundary wall. c) The Second Applicant’s evidence was that the Applicants in 1994 decided to concede that the blockwork wall in the Rear Section where the Respondent had built it could remain in its place and that the south face of that blockwork wall would represent the boundary (on the basis that the wall itself, built by the Respondent, sits on the Respondent’s land). A letter from the Applicants’ then solicitors, Conway & Co, communicated this decision to the Respondent. d) The blockwork wall at the Rear Section then remained in the same position for at least a further 27 years – from 1994 to 2021, when this dispute arose.

66. Ms Muir drew my attention to the following passage in Burns v Morton [1999] EWCA Civ 1514 : “True it is, as the judge pointed out, that there was no direct evidence from Mr and Mrs Noble. Accordingly, the judge had to draw inferences from the facts that he had. He had to consider whether he had evidence from which he could properly imply an agreement between the parties to the effect that the boundary between the two properties should be in the position when the wall was built in 1979. The wall, by the time the judge gave his judgment in this case, had been there for some 20 years. It had, clearly, by that time been accepted by the owner of the adjoining property as being the true boundary to the property . The judge found, and in my judgment rightly found, that when the wall was built by Mr Morton it was indeed intended to demarcate the boundary between the two properties, and was accepted by both owners as the boundary from then onwards.” (my emphasis added)

67. In essence therefore the Tribunal can, if necessary, infer the agreement from relevant conduct by the parties and relevant conduct can include how the parties behaved after the date of the alleged agreement. That relevant post-agreement conduct can include simply allowing the boundary structure to stand unchallenged for a long period. In this case, there is (i) evidence of words giving rise to a boundary agreement, (ii) evidence of actions by the parties giving effect to the alleged agreement and (iii) evidence of behaviour thereafter consistent with the existence of the boundary agreement.

68. The Respondent denies that there was any agreement about the boundary in 1994. She asserts that the blockwork wall at the rear is simply a wall built well within her land.

69. I have considered the evidence and the documents and the photographs. I accept the evidence of the Second Applicant concerning the boundary agreement because: a) The Second Applicant was a credible witness b) The evidence was consistent with the contemporaneous documents in the bundle and c) The evidence was consistent with the subsequent behaviour of the parties, namely that the wall remained in situ without dispute for 27 years.

70. I reject the Respondent’s denial of the agreement because (as I have already found0 the Respondent was not a reliable witness and there is no other evidence to corroborate her position on this issue.

71. I therefore find that there was a boundary agreement in about July/August 1994 by which the parties agreed that the Rear Section of the boundary would be represented by the line created by the southern face of the blockwork wall. That is the line represented on the New Application Plan as the line between points H to C.

72. As Ms Muir submitted, that is the end of the matter on the question of the Rear Section of the boundary. The boundary agreement of 1994 supersedes whatever line (if different) nay have been defined earlier. The boundary agreement created a new boundary along the line agreed. The Rear Section part of this application is an attempt to give effect to that boundary agreement in the register at HM Land Registry.

73. It is worth pointing out that there was a great deal of evidence and argument about various things alleged to have been said and done by the parties and their representatives when the most recent iteration of this dispute arose from 2021 onwards. None of that material assists me to determine the boundary. I therefore make no findings about any of those matters. Conclusion

74. It follows from all my findings above that the line A-B-H-C on the New Application Plan does represent the true boundary. It also follows that I should allow the Applicants’ application.

75. I will therefore direct HMLR to give effect to the Applicant’s application based on the New Application Plan. Costs

76. According to paragraph 9 of the Practice Direction made under the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, costs normally follow the event. That means that the party who loses the case pays the costs of the party who wins the case In this case, I am minded to make a costs order in favour of the Applicants. I am also minded to carry out a summary assessment of those costs on the standard basis.

77. If the Applicants wish to make a costs application, then they must file at the Tribunal and serve on the Respondents by 4 pm on 24 November 2025 a schedule of the costs they have incurred since the date when this matter was referred to the Tribunal.

78. If either party has grounds to submit that I should make a different order on costs, then they should file at the Tribunal and serve on the other party, by the same date, submissions explaining what costs order (if any) should be made and why. Dated this 31 st day of October 2025 Judge Timothy Cowen By Order of The Tribunal Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Tribunal within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).