Jasbinder Weerasekera v Satinder Rait

23. The decision of the FTT’s to treat the appellant’s email of 24 March 2025 was wrong, and it could and should have treated it as a request to reinstate the proceedings under rule 22(5). Albeit it referred to an appeal, the email was unclear and ambiguous about what it meant by that; and, more importantly, about the power of the FTT which it sought to engage. That is not surprising given that it came from a litigant in person. It was the FTT, in its letter of 31 March 2025, which referred unambiguously to an appeal, a suggestion which, not surprisingly, the appellant appears to have adopted. The FTT’s communication did not refer at all to the right to make a request to reinstate the proceedings under rule 22(5). Although the appellant now says that was what she wanted, it is likely that neither she nor the writer of that letter had that power specifically in mind at all. Although the writer referred to an appeal as unusual, given that the withdrawal had followed the appellant’s own request, there would have been nothing unusual about a request to reinstate the proceedings under rule 22(5), since the Rules specifically provide for it.

24. What was clear from the appellant’s email of 24 March 2025, however, was that the appellant wished after all to continue to take an active part in the references before the FTT as if she had not withdrawn from them. That did not require an appeal. An appeal against the grant of permission to withdraw which she herself had sought was inappropriate. What it required was an order for reinstatement. The FTT had that power but did not consider whether it should regard the email in question as seeking an order for reinstatement, or whether it should exercise it, as the only appropriate power which it had. It was open to the FTT to treat the email as seeking such an order because the relief which it effectively sought required such an order. In the view of this Tribunal, the overriding objective required it to do so. Accordingly, the decision of the FTT dated 17 March 2025 will be set aside, and this Tribunal will redetermine the application. It is of course entitled to do so on the information now before it, some of which was not before the FTT.

25. Evidently, the appellant’s reason for wishing to continue to take part in the proceedings is that she made a mistake in withdrawing while overwhelmed by considerable personal and financial pressure, some of which emanated from the opposing members of her family, and some from her own lawyers. Within a week, when the pressures had eased, she realised it, and a week after the order of the giving permission to withdraw she made her application. There is no material to support the submission of the respondent that her conduct was opportunistic. Her application was not an abuse of process.

26. There is no evidence of prejudice to the respondent beyond natural and legitimate disappointment that a matter which he thought had been settled in his favour would be reopened if an order for reinstatement were made. That is to be borne in mind, but is not a factor of overwhelming weight.

27. The public interest in the finality of litigation is also to be considered, but this is a situation for which the 2013 Rules specifically provide, and there is no reason for supposing that the administration of justice would be prejudiced if an order were made.

28. While it certainly appears (on the limited information before this Tribunal) that the ambit of the disputed matters raised by the appellant may well extend beyond the range of matters with which the FTT can deal, and of the references themselves, it also appears that with appropriate case management the dispute can be contained within that range. Such case management would be a matter for the FTT. This is not a good reason to refuse a reinstatement order.

29. Given the nature of the dispute, it is not appropriate to attempt to consider the merits of the proposed appeal, as indeed the order granting permission to appeal contemplated.

30. Taking everything into account and weighing it together, it appears appropriate to substitute for the decision of the FTT an order reinstating the appellant’s case. His Honour Judge Neil Cadwallader 30 October 2025 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.