George Greenwood v The Information Commissioner & Anor

1. On 24 July 2024 the Appellant requested information from the Second Respondent, the Gambling Commission (GC) in the following terms: “I am sending this request under the Freedom of Information Act. Please provide all email correspondence between Anna Turley (the former and current MP for Redcar) and the -Chief executive -Deputy chief executive -Director of communications -Head of governance -Executive director for policy development Of the Gambling Commission from 1st January 2020 and 3rd July 2024 concerning gambling regulation.”

2. Anna Turley was elected as MP for the Redcar constituency on 7 May 2015 in the general election. On 6 November 2019 Parliament was dissolved and Ms Turley unsuccessfully contested the seat in the subsequent general election. In the general election held on 4 July 2024 she was re-elected as MP for the same constituency. The request therefore seeks information from the GC about possible activities of an individual who at the time was a private citizen not holding a public office.

3. On 12 August the GC responded in the following terms: “The Data Protection Act 2018 requires personal data to be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject. It is the view of the Commission that confirming whether we do or do not hold information falling within the scope of your request would constitute the disclosure of personal data and would contravene this principle. This information is therefore exempt under section 40(5) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 . Section 40 (5B) provides that the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to other information if or to the extent that any of the following applies— (a) giving a member of the public the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with section 1(1)(a)— (i) would (apart from this Act ) contravene any of the data protection principles It is the view of the Commission that confirming whether we do or do not hold information in relation to Anna Turley would constitute the disclosure of personal data and would not be fair and lawful. There is no legitimate public interest in confirming or denying this information and it would not be fair to do so. This information is therefore exempt under section 40(5) of the Freedom of Information Act”

4. In seeking an internal review of the refusal the Appellant argued that s40 was not an absolute bar to disclosure, Ms Turley had worked for a lobbying firm he stated: “There is a longstanding debate about whether it is appropriate for former members of parliament to use the influence, experience, and contacts gained in office to obtain lucrative roles in the private sector after they have left office. This request was intended to inform this debate, which clearly serves a legitimate interest.”

5. He submitted that Ms Turley should expect a high degree of scrutiny and that disclosure would be transparent and fair.

6. On 20 August the GC maintained its position and the Appellant complained to the Information Commissioner (IC) who investigated and on 11 December 2024 issued his decision notice IC-331210-D8F6 in which he upheld the GC’s position that it was entitled to neither confirm nor deny that it held material within the scope of the request. He found that to disclose whether such correspondence existed would be to disclose personal data about Ms Turley and that for such disclosure to be lawful it must meet one of the lawful bases for disclosure, identifying Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR as most relevant: “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child”

7. He then considered whether there was a legitimate interest in disclosure, whether disclosure was necessary to meet that interest and weighed the competing interests. He concluded that there was a legitimate interest in knowing whether a former MP had used her contacts for lobbying, that disclosure would in the circumstances meet the test of necessity. In weighing competing interests the IC concluded: “a third party, before their time in a public facing position, would not expect their private correspondence, if held, to be disclosed to the world at large… … the Commissioner has determined that there is insufficient legitimate interest to outweigh the data subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and that confirming whether or not the requested information is held would not be lawful.”

8. In challenging this decision, the Appellant argued that Ms Turley did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, that there was public debate about lobbying and concern about former MPs being involved in lobbying, the request was for information about Ms Turley’s professional activities and was not sensitive personal information

9. In resisting the appeal the IC argued: • The Commissioner considers that an individual who does not hold public office, would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to any correspondence with a public body in either their private or professional capacity. Private individuals would not expect any correspondence with public bodies to be disclosed by those bodies to the world at large. • There are already strict rules in place in relation to lobbying in the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament, which extends to a six-month period after their departure from the House. In the absence any specific evidence or concerns that Ms Turley may have conducted herself in a manner which constitutes a breach of that Code of Conduct, there is no strong public interest in identifying whether or not she has corresponded with the GC during the period in which she did not hold public office. • The third assertion goes to the question of the contents of any such correspondence and presumes the existence of such correspondence,

10. The GC agreed with the IC and submitted that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal are without merit and the Commissioner’s conclusion in the Decision Notice that any legitimate interest in disclosure was outweighed by Ms Turley’s privacy rights was correct. Consideration .

11. Although the Appellant emphasised various examples of misconduct by various MPs before or after their membership of Parliament as justifying his request, the fundamental weakness of his appeal is that it is entirely speculative, he has no evidence of misconduct on the part of Ms Turley, that she breached her obligations as an MP/former MP and bases his case on correspondence between her and the GC which may or may not exist. The existence or otherwise of such correspondence is personal data relating to Ms Turley which is protected from disclosure.

12. We entirely agree with the IC’s analysis of the balance between the Appellant’s legitimate interests and the rights and freedoms afforded to Ms Turley. There is, in our opinion, a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the alleged correspondence, whilst not in public office. We accept, as did the IC, that there is some public interest in confirming or denying whether relevant information is held. However, this is clearly outweighed given the lack of evidence of misconduct put before us and the safeguards in place through the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament.

13. This appeal is without merit and is dismissed. Signed Date: Hughes 6 January 2026