Florin Iordache v Dambovita Court, Romania

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PEPPERALL:

1. On 10 May 2024, District Judge Daniel Sternberg sitting at Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordered the extradition of Florin Iordache to Romania pursuant to a warrant issued by the Dambovita Court in order to serve a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment. Mr Iordache now appeals with permission granted by Thornton J. There is a single ground of appeal, namely that the judge was wrong to conclude that extradition would be compatible with Mr Iordache’s rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms such that he should now be discharged pursuant to s.21 of the Extradition Act 2003 .

2. This is yet another case in which the extradition of a convicted offender is resisted on the grounds that it would be incompatible with his human rights. While s.21 requires the court to decide whether extradition would be compatible with a convicted offender’s Convention rights, it must be recognised that any sentence of imprisonment – whether imposed domestically by our courts or internationally by the courts of a foreign sovereign state – necessarily restricts the offender’s ability to enjoy his or her private and family life. Indeed, the restriction of liberty inherent in the sentence is the very point since prison sentences are intended to punish criminals and to deter others from crime. Extradition often involves some dislocation to family life and impacts harshly on dependants. Article 8 is, however, a qualified right which expressly recognises the legitimacy of the interference with an offender’s private and family life where it is in accordance with the law and is necessary for, among other things, the prevention of disorder or crime. Further, there is a very real public interest in effective and reciprocal arrangements for the extradition of criminals, and in ensuring that England & Wales is not a safe haven for those seeking to evade justice.

3. Accordingly, extradition to serve a prison sentence abroad will almost inevitably interfere drastically with private and family life, but the courts are very slow to find that extradition is incompatible with a convicted offender’s Article 8 rights: 3.1 In Norris v. USA (No. 2) [2010] UKSC 9 , [2010] 2 A.C. 487 , Lord Phillips said, at [56]: “The reality is that it is only if some quite exceptionally compelling feature, or combination of features, is present that interference with family life consequent upon extradition will be other than proportionate to the objective that extradition serves … Instead of saying that interference with Article 8 rights can only outweigh the importance of extradition in exceptional circumstances it is more accurate and more helpful to say that the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition.” 3.2 In H(H) v. Italy [2012] UKSC 25 , [2013] 1 A.C. 338 , Baroness Hale summarised the key principles at [8]: “(1) There may be a closer analogy between extradition and the domestic criminal process than between extradition and deportation or expulsion, but the court has still to examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with family life. (2) There is no test of exceptionality in either context. (3) The question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members of his family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. (4) There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition: that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the United Kingdom should honour its treaty obligations to other countries; and that there should be no ‘safe havens’ to which either can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back. (5) That public interest will always carry great weight, but the weight to be attached to it in the particular case does vary according to the nature and seriousness of the crime or crimes involved. (6) The delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and family life. (7) Hence it is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the Article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe.” 3.3 In Celinski v. Poland [2015] EWHC 1272 (Admin) , [2016] 1 W.L.R. 551 , Lord Thomas CJ stressed the “very high” public interest in honouring extradition arrangements and that decisions of the judicial authority of a member state making a request should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect. He added, at [39]: “The important public interests in upholding extradition arrangements, and in preventing the UK being a safe haven for a fugitive ... would require very strong counter-balancing factors before extradition could be disproportionate.” 3.4 Bringing matters right up to date, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Andrysiewicz v. Poland [2025] UKSC 23 , [2025] 1 W.L.R. 2733 on the very day that this case was heard. The court expressed its concern that, despite these authoritative statements of principle, Article 8 is argued to resist extradition in virtually every case. Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Stephens stressed, at [43]: “Cases in which a submission founded on Article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an Article 8 ECHR ‘defence’ will have any prospect of success.”

4. Thus, Mr Iordache has an uphill task in persuading the court that this is one of those rare cases in which the interference with his private and family life is so exceptionally severe that the judge ought to have ordered his discharge. BACKGROUND

5. Mr Iordache was born on 14 February 1976 and is now 49. He committed an offence of embezzlement in a Romanian casino in September 2012 by which he dishonestly obtained gambling credits in the sum 31,240 lei (approximately £5,500 at the then exchange rate). He attended his trial in person and pleaded guilty to the offence. On 24 June 2014, he was sentenced by the Buzau District Court to a suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment. That sentence became final by the decision of the Ploiesti Court of Appeal on 29 September 2014.

6. Meanwhile, between March and December 2012, Mr Iordache committed an offence of tax evasion by which tax totalling 1,697,442 lei (some £300,000) was evaded. Mr Iordache was remanded in custody for a period of 15 days in respect of this offence in November 2013, but the indictment was not laid until May 2017. Trial dates in January, February and April 2018 were adjourned in order to secure legal representation for Mr Iordache and his co-accused. The case then came on for trial in May 2018. Mr Iordache was present in person and represented. He requested a rehearing of the witnesses and the case had not been completed by the time that the judge retired in late 2019. The case was then referred to the Dambovita Court. Various trial dates in 2020 were ineffective, first because of the COVID pandemic and subsequently because of Mr Iordache’s repeated failure to appear. Mr Iordache contacted the court in October 2020. He made written representations about his case and served further evidence. He was duly convicted and, on 22 January 2021, sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment. Further, the earlier suspended sentence of imprisonment was activated and ordered to run concurrently such that the total sentence remained 4 years.

7. Mr Iordache appealed. Again, he did not attend appeal hearings but did lodge written submissions in 2021 and 2022. On 27 June 2022, he asked the appeal court to proceed in his absence. On 26 October 2022, the Ploiesti Court of Appeal rejected Mr Iordache’s appeal. From that date the decision of the criminal courts in his case was final and Mr Iordache was required to surrender to custody.

8. Mr Iordache sought to appeal further between October 2022 and May 2023. On 28 June 2023, his final application for a review of the appellate decision was rejected.

9. On 4 August 2023, the conviction warrant was issued in this case. It was certified by the National Crime Agency on 24 August 2023 and Mr Iordache was arrested on 7 September 2023.

10. There is one other conviction of note. On 24 September 2020, Mr Iordache was convicted by the Buzau Court of a further fraud offence. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment although the sentence was suspended on appeal on 5 May 2021.

11. In his evidence, Mr Iordache denied tax evasion and made serious allegations against the investigating police officer. He said that he entered the UK on 23 August 2018 after his bank accounts were frozen by the Romanian prosecutor. He said that this made him believe that the Romanian authorities could “do anything” to convict him.

12. Mr Iordache said that his family followed him to the UK in October 2018. He had variously worked in the UK in recruitment and as a construction worker and delivery driver. At the time of the hearing before the judge, Mr Iordache’s children (then aged 17, 10 and 6) remained in full-time education and his wife worked part time as a hairdresser when not caring for their children. Mr Iordache said that he was involved in the children’s lives. By way of example, he helped with the school run, he attended parents’ evenings at their school, and he supported the children with their studies and outside interests. He said that if he were to be extradited, his family life would be destroyed. He said that his wife could not both look after the children and earn enough to cover the rent and other household expenses. He feared that they would lose their home.

13. Mr Iordache said that while he initially attended the Romanian court to deny the offence, he never attended again after leaving for the UK. He had been back to Romania on three occasions: in June 2021 to sign legal papers in connection with another case and twice in late 2021 to attend family funerals.

14. In cross-examination, Mr Iordache said that he did not leave Romania to hide from proceedings but that he knew that, by leaving, the Romanian court would not be able to send him to prison in the event of a conviction. He said that the reason for coming to the UK was “survival”. He confirmed that his brother, his brother-in-law and two of his cousins were in the UK. He described his family as close to the cousins who they saw weekly. THE JUDGMENT

15. The judge found that Mr Iordache was a fugitive from justice. He said, at paragraph 17 of his judgment: “(vi) He was present at his trial for the first offence and admitted his guilt. He attended the first trial hearings in his case for the second offence. He knew he had been convicted and the sentence imposed. He sought to challenge his conviction unsuccessfully. He knew when he left Romania that the trial proceedings for the second offence were ongoing. He was never told by the Court or any official body in Romania that the case had closed, that nothing further was required of him or that there was no sentence to serve. He engaged with proceedings from the UK by seeking to appeal successively. By leaving Romania whilst the trial was ongoing and in acting in this way, he deliberately placed himself beyond the reach of the Romanian criminal justice system. Applying Wisniewski v. Poland [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin) , [2016] 1 W.L.R. 3750 , I am sure that he is a fugitive. (vii) At no time has the requested person enjoyed any false sense of security. He knew at all relevant times that he had left Romania without complying with the conditions of suspension of his sentence for the first offence, which he knew about, and that in relation to the second offence that he was being tried and would be liable to serve any sentence imposed in the event of his conviction. He was never informed by any official body that the case against him had come to an end or that he did not have to serve the sentence imposed.”

16. The judge then undertook a conventional balance-sheet analysis in accordance with Celinski . He found that the following factors weighed in favour of extradition: 16.1 The constant and weighty public interest in extraditing those accused of crimes and in the UK honouring its international obligations. 16.2 The need for very strong counter-balancing factors where a fugitive is sought before extradition could be disproportionate. 16.3 The fact that the offences were not trivial and custody would plainly be available had such offences been committed in the UK. 16.4 While there had been delay, much of the delay was because Mr Iordache was not represented and because he exercised his appeal rights. 16.5 In the event of Mr Iordache’s extradition, his wife would be able to receive support from family in the UK and the children would have the support of their mother and each other.

17. On the other side of the balance sheet, the judge identified the following factors that weighed against extradition: 17.1 The criminal conduct was not of the utmost gravity. 17.2 There had been delay (but not culpable delay) in the criminal proceedings and in issuing the warrant. 17.3 Since coming to the UK, Mr Iordache had worked, paid taxes and stayed out of trouble save for one set of driving offences. 17.4 In the event of his extradition, Mr Iordache’s wife would lose his practical, emotional and financial support and become a single parent to their children. 17.5 The interests of the children were a paramount consideration and they would lose their father’s day-to-day care and support. 17.6 Mr Iordache’s pre-settled status would be likely to lapse if he were outside the UK for more than two years.

18. The judge concluded that the factors against extradition in this case, whether viewed individually or cumulatively, were not so weighty or strong as to amount to the very strong counter-balancing factors required to result in Mr Iordache’s discharge. Further, balancing all of the considerations in this case, he found that extradition was a proportionate interference with Mr Iordache’s private and family life regardless of his finding as to fugitive status. THE APPEAL

19. Martin Henley, who appears for Mr Iordache as he did below, argues three grounds of appeal: 19.1 First, that the judge was wrong to find that Mr Iordache was a fugitive. 19.2 Secondly, the judge erred in his analysis of the delay in this case. 19.3 Thirdly, that undertaking the balancing exercise afresh, this was a case where the judge ought to have found that extradition would be a disproportionate interference with Mr Iordache’s human rights. Fugitive status

20. Mr Henley argues that the judge’s reliance on Wisniewski was misconceived because Mr Wisniewski had put himself beyond the reach of legal process by leaving Poland in breach of the conditions of his suspended sentence which required him to keep in touch with his probation officer. Here, Mr Iordache knew that there were legal proceedings against him when he left Romania. He had not, however, been convicted of tax evasion at that time and there were no restrictions on his leaving Romania. Unlike in Wisniewski , Mr Iordache was not in breach of the conditions of his suspended sentence by leaving the country. Further, he argues that it is a strange fugitive who then engages in his criminal case and exercises his appeal rights.

21. Michael McHardy, who appears for the Romanian authorities, urges respect for the judge’s findings of fact. He submits that Mr Iordache left Romania knowing that the suspended sentence was liable to be activated in the event that he had committed another offence and that he was facing further criminal proceedings which involved that risk. Further, he relies on Mr Iordache’s own evidence that he came to the UK to evade Romanian prosecutors.

22. Fugitive status has become something of a term of art: 22.1 It is important in cases where delay in criminal proceedings is relied upon as a bar to extradition. Following Kakis v. Cyprus [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779 and Gomes & Goodyer v. Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 , [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1038 , a fugitive who has deliberately fled another jurisdiction cannot, save in the most exceptional circumstances, rely on the requesting state’s delay in bringing him to justice. The argument on this appeal is not, however, that extradition was barred by reason of delay pursuant to s.14 of the Extradition Act 2003 . 22.2 Fugitivity can also be important in Article 8 cases since it can dilute the weight to be given to the interference with private and family life and fortify the weight given to the public interest considerations in favour of extradition: Ristin v. Romania [2022] EWHC 3153 (Admin) , at [34].

23. I accept that this case is factually different from Wisniewski . Detailed analysis of the facts of earlier cases is not, however, helpful and the ultimate question in determining whether an offender should be regarded as a fugitive from justice is whether he has knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of legal process: Pillar-Neumann v. Austria [2017] EWHC 3371, at [64].

24. As already noted, the judge referred to the fact that Mr Iordache left Romania without complying with the conditions of suspension of his sentence for the embezzlement offence. There was, however, no evidence or finding of any condition preventing his leaving. Rather, I consider that properly understood the judge was referring to the fact that the commission of the offence of tax evasion rendered Mr Iordache liable to serve the suspended sentence.

25. In any event, the judge was entitled to find that Mr Iordache was a fugitive from Romanian justice not because he was in breach of any condition on leaving the country but because his very motivation in leaving Romania during the criminal case and only engaging in proceedings from afar was to escape the clutches of Romanian prosecutors. This was, in my judgment, classic fugitive behaviour; action which was knowingly evasive of the criminal process: see Ristin , at [30]. Delay

26. Mr Henley submits that the judge fundamentally erred in his treatment of delay and in finding that there was no culpable delay. He argues that the delay between 2012 and 2017 had not been fully explained and that overall, there had been substantial delay in this case. Mr McHardy cautions against treating all of the time that criminal proceedings take as delay, and argues that the judge was right to find that there was no culpable delay in this case.

27. In this case, some 3½ years elapsed between Mr Iordache’s original arrest and the indictment being laid in May 2017. Once indicted, the matter came on quickly for trial although successive trial dates in 2018 were adjourned because Mr Iordache had not secured legal representation. He then exercised his right to have a re-hearing. There was subsequently some delay before the judge’s retirement and the appointment of a new trial judge. A number of attempts were made to try the case in 2020 but trial dates were impacted by the COVID crisis and by Mr Iordache’s repeated failure to attend court hearings. Mr Iordache engaged with the court from the UK from October 2020 and the case was concluded by 22 January 2021 when he was convicted and sentenced. Thereafter, Mr Iordache exercised his appeal rights and even asked for a review of the first appeal. Once his appeal rights were exhausted on 28 June 2023, the Romanian authorities moved quickly to issue the warrant on 4 August 2023. Certification followed swiftly on 24 August 2023.

28. On this chronology, I consider that the judge was entitled to find that there was not culpable delay in the criminal proceedings or in seeking to secure Mr Iordache’s extradition. In any event, given the finding that Mr Iordache was a fugitive from Romanian justice, the judge was entitled not to give his complaint of delay the weight that it might otherwise have carried. The judge’s balance-sheet assessment

29. Ultimately, Mr Henley argues that the balance should have come down in favour of discharge.

30. Mr McHardy argues that even if the judge had been wrong to find that Mr Iordache was a fugitive, he expressly found that the balance nevertheless fell in favour of extradition. Mr Henley variously submitted that such finding was obiter and that it was very easy to give an alternative judgment without proper thought. I wholly disagree: 30.1 First, the judge’s alternative finding, lest he was wrong to find Mr Iordache to have been a fugitive from Romanian justice, had nothing to do with the law of precedent. 30.2 Secondly, it is entirely unfair to suggest that the judge did not take proper care in considering his alternative conclusion on the assumption that he had been wrong to find that Mr Iordache was a fugitive.

31. In my judgment, the judge properly and carefully weighed the competing factors. He took the right matters into account. He rightly stressed the impact of extradition on Mr Iordache’s wife and young children and the fact that there had been some delay in this case. Even if the judge had been wrong about fugitivity, I consider that his alternative finding was properly open to him and that the judge was therefore absolutely entitled to conclude that extradition in this case was not a disproportionate interference with Mr Iordache’s Convention rights. OUTCOME

32. For these reasons, I reject the argument that the judge ought to have decided a question before him differently and that, had he done so, he would have been required to order Mr Iordache’s discharge. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.