UK case law

Faisal Chaudhry v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

[2026] UKFTT GRC 160 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Transport · 2026

Get your free legal insight →Email to a colleague
Get your free legal insight on this case →

The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. This appeal was listed for oral hearing by CVP on 21 January 2026 at 10.00 The hearing was delayed until 10.09 as the Appellant experienced some technical difficulties and, ultimately, joined by audio only. He gave oral evidence and made oral submissions. Evidence was also called by the Appellant from his son, Aayan Faisal, by CVP, and from his wife, Anilla Raisat (also by audio only), neither of whom were present at the time of the offence (details of which appear below). The Appellant had also intended to call evidence from the pupil he was instructing at the time the motoring offence in question was committed, Hafsa Begum, who provided a written witness statement, but she did not appear either by CVP or by audio. Oral evidence and submissions were heard on behalf of the Respondent from its representative by CVP.

2. The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 15 July 2025 to remove his name from the Register (‘the Register’) of Approved Driving Instructors (‘ADIs’), pursuant to section 128(2) (e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘ the Act ’) on the basis that he was no longer a fit and proper person to have his name remain on the Register due to him having accepted that, on 10 May 2025, he had committed a motoring offence, namely, a breach of legislative requirements concerning control of a motor vehicle, mobile telephones and so on (CU80) for which he receive a fixed penalty of an endorsement of 6 penalty points on his licence and a £200.00 fine.

3. The Appellant submitted a detailed appeal on 4 August 2025, against the Respondent’s said decision, reiterating, essentially, his representations against the stated intention of the Respondent to remove his name from the Register but presenting what he described as a bundle of representations and mitigation that, he stated, had not been considered. The said representations, incorporated into his grounds of appeal, included, in terms: - a number of character references, including one each from his wife and son, respectively, and a mobile telephone bill showing that he had not made or receive telephone calls or text messages to or from his mobile phone on the date and time of the offence; - that his mobile phone had been mounted on an air vent on his vehicle and was being used by the pupil he was supervising at the time as a SatNav device, but which had become dislodged and fell into the footwell of the front passenger seat where the vehicle’s dual controls were located, as his pupil had made a sharp turn, on a dual carriageway, requiring the Appellant to take evasive safety action to avoid a collision with a kerb or railings; - that he instinctively retrieved his mobile phone to clear the footwell ‘in case he needed to brake’ [but, as stated by him in his oral evidence, he had braked in taking the said evasive action] and was actively seeking a safe place to pull over when he was signalled by a police vehicle to pull over, an instruction with which he complied and explained to the police officer what had happened, but was still issued with a FPN, accepted by him, that attracted an endorsement on his driving licence of 6 penalty points and a monetary fine; - that he recognised the importance of a driving instructor to demonstrate a high regard for all aspects of road safety; - that he could not excuse himself for having committed the offence, for which he sincerely apologised, accepting full responsibility, attributing it to a lapse of judgement, it being a natural instinct to pick up the mobile phone; - that he was engaging in Continuing Professional Development; - that the sanction, in view of the mitigating circumstances asserted by him, was disproportionate; - that the removal of his name from the Register offended Section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 [right to private and family life], as he would be unable to provide for his family; - that the offence could not be compared with, for example, a sexual offence or an assault offence or a drugs offence.

4. In his oral evidence, the Appellant essentially repeated and reiterated the contents of his grounds of appeal; that he did not take lightly what had occurred; that it was not an act of carelessness, as he had to intervene due to his pupil making an error on a dangerous stretch of road, in case his dual controls were obstructed, and there was no safe place to pull in and park. He pointed out that he had reported the matter to the Registrar and never attempted to hide anything. He stated that what had happened was a learning opportunity for him, that he had changed his system and used the incident to advise pupils. He emphasised that he had a clear driving record, with no complaints and constant, positive feedback. He again referred to losing his income and profession should his appeal not be allowed, and to his good character and his account being supported by independent evidence, including that of his pupil.

5. In response to questions of clarification from the Tribunal, the Appellant, again confirmed that, at the time of the offence, he was conducting a driving lesson; that there was a danger of a collusion on a sharp bend and ‘had to brake’ and grab the steering wheel; that the incident happened in a split second; that he picked up the phone from the footwell for safety reasons; that the SatNav was still on when he picked up the phone; that the phone, when it fell into the footwell, was obstructing the brake pedal; that it had been mounted on a magnetic mount and had never before become dislodged; that the police vehicle had pulled up in the right-hand land beside his vehicle and instructed his pupil, who was still driving, to follow him to Latimer Road where both vehicles parked. The Appellant confirmed that he had taken his eyes off the road while picking up the phone and admitted the offence to the police officer but explained what had happened. The Appellant confirmed he understood the concept of an Approved Driving Instructor (‘ADI’) needing to be a Fit and Proper Person by reference to his character, conduct and behaviour, in additional to instructional ability, and that those standards were expected to be higher than those expected of an ordinary motorist. The Appellant was rather vague when asked for clarification that he had relied on DVSA Guidance in support his appeal.

6. In response to questions from the Respondent’s representative, the Appellant confirmed that his reference to a ‘dangerous stretch of road’ referred to there being a sharp bend on a dual carriageway and that the location was dangerous if it was approached too quickly or there were steering issues.

7. The Appellant’s son, in his oral evidence, reiterated what he had stated in his Witness Statement and knew that his father, the Appellant, was a responsible driver, particularly in conducting checks, maintaining focus and offering advice. He confirmed that he, himself, was not a driving instructor.

8. The Appellant’s wife, too, reiterated the contents of her Witness Statement and that her husband, the Appellant, was a very responsible driver and a very passionate driving instructor who had helped so many pupils. She confirmed that the phone in question was her husband’s phone and, in her oral evidence, made no reference to the phone billing records that were in her name.

9. The Respondent’s representative, in oral submissions, maintained that the Appellant was not a Fit and Proper Person to have his name remain on the ADI Register having had his driving licence endorsed with 6 penalty points and fined £200.00 for committing a motoring offence involving control of motor vehicle. He summarised the representations made by the Appellant in response to him being advised of the Respondent’s intention to remove his name from the Register, representations that had been taken into account by the Respondent before making his decision – the decision under appeal. He submitted that the Appellant had not demonstrated sufficient regard to the standards of character, conduct and standard of behaviour expected of an ADI, that were higher than those expected of an ordinary motorist.

10. In response to questions of clarification from the Tribunal, the Respondent’s representative confirmed that, should his appeal fail, the Appellant could start the ADI registration process again, but that the Respondent would not consider the penalty points spent until, in this case, May 2028, by reference to the 3-year totting-up period. He submitted that, while not illegal, use of a mobile phone as a SatNav device was not to be preferred. He pointed out that the Appellant had accepted the Fixed Penalty Notice and did not challenge it in the local Magistrates’ Court. He accepted that, potentially, an emergency situation could arise, but that this was not one of those cases and that a serious motoring offence had been committed, in the context of the high standards expected of an ADI, that gave poor example and would distract a pupil. He confirmed that the Respondent, in making his decision, considered the offence in question, the particular circumstances and any mitigation. He confirmed that DVSA Guidance referred to by the Respondent did not arise and was not part of the decision-making process.

11. The Appellant had no questions for the Respondent’s representative.

12. The Respondent’s representative had no closing submissions to make.

13. The Appellant, in closing, stated that the phone billing records showed his phone number; that no calls were made on the relevant date and time and showed only one call was received in total for the period of the records. He stated that his wife was the ‘main phone account-holder’. He concluded by stating that he was now an even safer driving instructor and used this experience to better advise pupils.

14. While every piece of evidence and submissions, both written and oral from, and on behalf of the parties, was considered by the Tribunal, it did not alter the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss this appeal as it was not of sufficient persuasive value to do otherwise.

15. The Appellant submitted that there was precedent where ADIs were not removed from the Register despite incurring penalty points for offences. However, while the Tribunal approached its Decision in this appeal, having regard to the question of proportionality, precedents of another First-tier Tribunal that may have gone in favour of some other Appellants(s) were not binding on this Tribunal and, in any event, there are very many other precedents that went the other way where the circumstances and facts were similar to those in this appeal.

16. The basis of the Respondent’s decision was that the Appellant did not fulfil the criteria to be a ‘fit and proper person’, as required by the relevant provisions in the Act .

17. Conditions require that an ADI (the Appellant in this case) to be a ‘fit and proper person’. This requires account to be taken of an Appellant’s character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions for offences including, as in this case, a motoring offence, and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate. The Respondent may take the view that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change in circumstances.

18. An appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision proceeds as an appeal by way of re-hearing, that is, the Tribunal makes a fresh decision on the evidence before it. The Tribunal must give such weight as it considers appropriate to the Respondent’s reasons for its decision as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions. The Tribunal does not conduct a procedural review of the Respondent’s decision-making process.

19. The Appellant, in essence, correctly submitted, in both his written and oral evidence, that all of the circumstances had to examined and that the penalty imposed on him in respect of a motoring offence did not, and should not, result in automatic removal of his name from the Register.

20. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant understood his action in retrieving his dislodged and fallen mobile phone, being used as a SatNav device, that resulted in him committing the said offence was a poor decision on his part; that he acted instinctively from a perceived safety concern; was deeply remorseful and what occurred would not recur. It was accepted that the Appellant loved his career as an ADI; that he was an otherwise diligent ADI and that he had no other qualifications, skills or experience. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant understood the standards expected of an ADI.

21. Th Tribunal found that Section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 was not engaged in this appeal.

22. The Tribunal found that there was a public duty to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register in the circumstances, as not being a fit and proper person to have his name remain on the Register, as the commission of the said offence could not be condoned. To find otherwise would, in effect, amount to the Tribunal sanctioning or approving the Appellant’s behaviour. The reality, that could not be ignored by the Tribunal, is that the consequences of the commission of an offence of this nature contributes to a significant number of road traffic casualties and that it would be offensive to other ADIs and persons trying to qualify as ADIs, who had been scrupulous in observing the law, to ignore the motoring offence committed by the Appellant.

23. As a matter of law, the standing of the Respondent could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence undermined, if it were known that a person whose name was permitted to remain on the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours or been convicted in relation to an offence substantially material to the question of fitness. This can be in respect of behaviour pertaining to motoring matters and other matters of responsibility, trustworthiness and prudence; indeed, it would, indeed, be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observing the law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

24. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 confirmed that - “..... the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor; it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval ..... the maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutiny effectively, including consideration of the implications of any convictions of an applicant or a R egistered Approved Driving Instructor. That is why there are stringent disclosure requirements.”

25. In reaching its Decision, the Tribunal took into account all of the evidence and submissions received, both written and oral, and considered all of the circumstances relevant to this appeal.

25. On the evidence, the Appellant was able to use the dual-control brake when the incident occurred; he lifted the phone from his footwell while instructing a pupil; there was not an emergency that required the Appellant to lift the phone while supervising a driving instruction pupil; if there had been a safety issue, the Appellant should have stopped – not lifted the phone from the footwell; as a professional ADI, the Appellant should have weighed up the risks – something that did not happen here – reacting as an ordinary motorist (not an ADI) might have reacted on instinct and he did commit an illegal act by committing a serious motoring offence (a fact accepted by him).

26. The Tribunal was obliged to bear in mind the significant importance which attaches to the integrity of the Register. For the public to have trust in it, the Respondent must act in a way that encourages belief that those on it have high standards. Allowing those who do not meet those standards would undermine the trust placed in it with serious consequences for those who do maintain the necessary high standards. These are matters of wider, and public interest, which attract significant weight even where, as in this case, having his name removed from the Register potentially may have significant consequences for the Appellant.

27. In this case the Tribunal took into account that the Appellant had accepted having committed a significant motoring offence. The Tribunal was concerned about the Appellant’s lack of care in meeting his responsibilities as a qualified ADI.

28. The Tribunal particularly considered the question of whether it was proportionate to dismiss this appeal. On the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal concluded that in view of the gravity of the particular offence, readily admitted by the Appellant, there being no overriding reason that he should have done what he did, dictated that removal of the Appellant’s name from the Register was entirely proportionate in all the circumstances.

29. Taking all of these factors into account and, noting that the Tribunal needs to maintain public trust in the Register and to prioritise consumer protection and road safety over the interests of the Appellant as an individual driving instructor, the Tribunal concluded that the Appellant, at the time of the decision, was not a fit and proper person to have his name remain on the Register.

30. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.