Chia Hevedi v Havin Hevedi

: The Parties and The Claims

1. The claimant and the defendant were in a personal relationship between around 2010 and 2021, when they split up in acrimonious circumstances. At an early stage in the relationship the defendant took the claimant’s surname, but they never married. They have two children together, born in 2012 and 2013.

2. By a Part 7 claim form issued on 30 January 2023 the claimant claimed against the defendant declarations as to his full beneficial ownership of: (i) 53 East Road Sheffield S2 3PP ( 53ER ); (ii) 3 Endcliffe Grove Avenue Sheffield S10 3EJ ( 3EGA ) ( the Sheffield Properties ); and (iii) 4 Echo Heights , London E4 7JZ ( Echo Heights ) as well as damages of £6 million for transferring trust funds into her personal bank account. The claim in relation to Echo Heights was abandoned some time before trial.

3. The proceedings were stayed soon after they were issued as the rights to make the claims had vested in the claimant’s trustees in bankruptcy when he was adjudged bankrupt on 6 February 2020. The claimant was only able to have the stay lifted on 29 March 2023, after he obtained an assignment of those rights at a price of some £117,000.

4. By his re-amended particulars of claim dated 3 November 2023 the claimant’s claim is said to be for : (i) damages of £6 million for breach of trust or fraud; and (ii) a declaration of his entitlement to full beneficial ownership of the Sheffield Properties.

5. The monetary claim as set out in the pleading is for recompense in respect of substantial sums withdrawn from what was described in the pleading as: “ a Turkish bank account, namely Ziraat bankasi (the “Turkish trust account”) primary account number XXXX9535-5003.” It is pleaded that the monies in this account are held by the defendant on trust for the claimant. It is pleaded that the defendant caused or procured loss of at least £6 million including by transfers to herself of for her benefit from the account. Particulars of the purpose of withdrawals totalling around £1.5m are pleaded.

6. In the claimant’s witness statement for trial dated 28 March 2025 he explains that what he refers to as the Turkish Trust Account was in fact Ziraat Bankasi account number YYYY2079840 with sub accounts 67353971-5009, 5049, 5029, 5028, 5003, 5016, 5033, 5005.

7. Mr Quereshi appeared at trial for the claimant. In his skeleton argument he referred to the existence of two Turkish bank accounts in the name of the defendant with Ziraat Bankasi with numbers YYYY2079840 and ZZZZ3971-5009. He described them as “Coldco Group bank accounts”.

8. Only when the claimant was giving evidence did it become apparent that account XXXX9535-5003 was in fact an account of Coldco Group Inşaat Limited, a Turkish company, and that the pleaded unauthorised withdrawals and loss of £6m caused by the defendant were referable to that account, in relation to which the claimant has no standing to make any claim.

9. Such bank statements as are contained in the trial bundle confirm that there is or was an account with Ziraat Bankasi in Turkey in the name of Coldco Group Inşaat Limited numbered XXXX9535-5003 ( the Turkish Coldco Account ) and that there is or was an account in the name of the defendant with Ziraat Bankasi numbered YYYY2079840 with sub accounts beginning ZZZZ3971 and ending with various 4 number suffixes ( the Turkish Trust Account ).

10. Following the completion of the claimant’s evidence on the first day of trial the case was adjourned until the next morning for closing submissions. I asked Mr Qureshi to produce a schedule derived from the material in the trial bundle and the claimant’s evidence to demonstrate what the claimant’s position was as to the source of funds in the Turkish Trust Account. Mr Qureshi produced a schedule as asked, but in endeavouring to explain it to me in closing submissions, it became clear that the claimant would need to provide further explanations of various documents and the claimant was recalled to the witness box.

11. Even after the claimant had been questioned further by me and after Mr Qureshi’s submissions the position was not clear and I asked fr Qureshi to produce an up-dated schedule.

12. The final version of Mr Qureshi’s schedule appears to show that the Turkish Trust Account had a balance in the region of £4.5m in May 2017 and that this balance decreased to less than £0.5m by March 2021. The schedule shows that the claimant says that three cash payments totalling 11,000 TRY, 16 cash payments totalling £1,169,890 sterling, further payments of £1,500,000 in sterling and £125,000 from the claimant’s own Santander account were paid into the Turkish Trust Account, mostly between 2019 and 2022. However, apart from one cash sum of £453,000 shown in the available bank statements as credited to that account which matched in date and amount a cash deposit made by the defendant’s sister for the benefit of the defendant, Mr Qureshi was unable to reconcile those payments in to receipts into the Turkish Trust Account.

13. 53ER comprises commercial premises. It was purchased for £200,000 on 15 October 2013 and registered in the sole name of the defendant. 14 3EGA is a residential property. It was purchased for £880,000 and was registered in the sole name of the defendant on 23 December 2014. The claimant, the defendant and their children occupied 3EGA as their family home from about 2015 to October 2021 when the defendant left with the children. More recently the claimant has lived there with the children and other members of his family.

15. The first defendant as sole legal proprietor of 3EGA charged it by way of legal mortgage to MTF (NH) Limited ( MTF ) to secure a loan to her on 23 September 2022. She defaulted on the loan and MTF brought possession proceedings to which the claimant was joined as a party. At a preliminary issue trial earlier this year I concluded that any interest of the claimant in 3EGA was postponed to that of MTF and made an order for possession against the claimant (MTF (NH) Ltd v Hevedi [2025] EWHC 1013 (Ch) ).

16. Echo Heights was purchased in the name of the claimant in 2004 and was transferred into the sole name of the defendant in 2019. Originally the claimant lived there with his former partner Debbie Brown. Debbie Brown brought proceedings against the defendant for a declaration that she was the sole beneficial owner of Echo Heights. The defendant abandoned her defence and it was agreed that Echo Heights belonged beneficially to Debbie Brown.

17. The claimant’s pleaded case as to the Sheffield Properties is that there was an agreement that they would be acquired in the name of the defendant and that on his discharge from bankruptcy the defendant would transfer them back to the claimant and that this was a sham for the purpose of avoiding liability to HMRC.

18. Alternatively it is pleaded that statutory declarations signed by the defendant on 11 August 2023 in relation to 3EGA and on 23 August 2023 in relation to 3ER and a witness statement signed by her in September 2023 mean the claimant is entitled to the entire beneficial interest in each of the Sheffield Properties.

19. When I clarified with Mr Qureshi at the conclusion of submissions what his client was seeking by way of relief he confirmed that it was declarations as to his full beneficial ownership of the Sheffield Properties and a declaration that the defendant holds the Turkish Trust Account (i.e. 41962079840 and the sub-accounts) on trust for the claimant. He confirmed that no claim for any form of compensation or restitution of trust property was pursued.

20. I made an order striking out the defendant’s defence and counterclaim and debarring her from defending on 9 May 2025 as a result of a failure to comply with directions for the filing of witness evidence and against a background of prior procedural default. She made no appearance at the trial.

21. The Interested Parties ( the IPs ) are judgment creditors of the defendant. They have a final charging order over the defendant’s beneficial interest in 3EGA dated 12 January 2024. Their interim charging order was dated 29 November 2022 and was registered against the title to 3EGA on 20 January 2023. I made an order that they be joined as interested parties on 6 June 2025 and gave permission for them to attend and be represented at trial and cross-examine the witnesses and make submissions as to the issue of the ownership of 3EGA. Ms Powers represented the Ips. Legal framework Express Trusts

22. Trusts of land can be created orally, but they must be evidenced in writing: section 53(1) (b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 ( ). LPA 1925

23. An oral declaration of trust may be supported by some signed acknowledgement or declaration by the owner of the beneficial interest, even if made subsequent to the declaration of trust provided it was made before action is begun: see Megarry & Wade at [10-041 to 10-042].

24. An oral declaration of trust which is not manifested and proved in writing is not invalid or void, but is unenforceable by the beneficiary unless and until section 53(1) (b) LPA 1925 is complied with. Common Intention Constructive Trust

25. The relevant legal principles are set out in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 and Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776 , and were helpfully recently summarised by Deputy Master Hansen in Fattal v Fattal [2022] EWHC 950 (Ch) at [81]: “(i) Where there is sole legal ownership the starting point is sole beneficial ownership. The onus is upon the person seeking to show that the beneficial ownership is different from the legal ownership. So in sole ownership cases it is upon the non-owner to show that he has any interest at all: Stack v Dowden at §56; (ii) The conclusion that equity follows the law can, however, be displaced by showing that the parties had a different common intention when the property was first acquired or that they formed a different common intention at a later date, providing of course there is detrimental reliance; (iii) This displacing common intention may be express or inferred (" deduced objectively from their conduct "): Jones v Kernott at §51 per Lord Walker and Baroness Hale; (iv) The relevant intention of each party is the intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that person's words or conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his own mind or even acted with some different intention which he did not communicate to the other party: Jones v Kernott at §51(3); (v) Each case will turn on its own facts. The search is to ascertain the parties' shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it; (vi) Many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant to divining the parties' true intentions, including any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their intentions then; the reasons why the home was acquired in one of their sole names; the purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties' relationship; how the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently; how the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both; how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household expenses; (vii) The express or inferred common intention usually will also determine the size of the shares of the co-owners. The court should give effect to the intention thus discovered. If, however, there is no evidence to this effect, the court may impute an intention so as to ensure that the co-owners obtain that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them and the property.”

26. So far as concerns detriment or detrimental reliance, in Hudson v Hathway [2022] EWCA Civ 1648 Lewison LJ emphasised the importance of establishing detrimental reliance even in cases where there has been an express agreement: “in the absence of signed writing, detrimental reliance remains a key component in establishing a common intention constructive trust.” See at [76], [128] and [153].

27. As explained in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 at p232, (cited with approval in Hudson v. Hathaway at [154]), detrimental reliance: (i) it is not a narrow or technical concept; (ii) it need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment; but (iii) it must be something substantial; (iv) the requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances. Resulting trust

28. Where property is purchased and transferred into the name of someone other than the purchaser: (i) A resulting trust arises in favour of the purchaser if he establishes that his actual intention was that the legal owner was not to be the beneficial owner; or (ii) In the absence of evidence of actual intention, it is presumed that a resulting trust arises. See Lewin on Trusts , 20th Ed., [10-019 to 10-020], and [10-021 to 10-022].

29. Lewin at [10-085] explains that the doctrine of common intention constructive rather than resulting trust will now determine most disputes as to the beneficial ownership of property: “There is no longer any scope for the application of resulting trust principles alone where one person makes a financial contribution to property purchased in the name of another where the parties intend to live together. As Lord Walker said in Stack v Dowden:435 “In a case about beneficial ownership of a matrimonial or quasi-matrimonial home (whether registered in the names of one or two legal owners) the resulting trust should not in my opinion operate as a legal presumption, although it may (in an updated form which takes account of all significant contributions, direct or indirect, in cash or kind) happen to be reflected in the parties’ common intention.”

30. That paragraph goes on to explain that there is still scope for a presumption of resulting trust in the commercial as opposed to domestic context, and that would apply where parties, although having a familial relationship, brought an investment property together, see Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347 at [17]. In Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [48]–[49], Lord Kerr said that the question whether the resulting trust analysis applies in the context of an investment bought by connected parties in joint names is dependent on the circumstances, in particular whether the acquisition is associated with a mutual commitment of the parties to the future and will depend on the evidence. Bank Accounts

31. Mr Qureshi did not contend that any different approach should be taken to determining the beneficial ownership of money in a bank account. Illegal purpose

32. In a case where a purchaser purchases a property in the name of another for an illegal or wrongful purpose, the Court has to consider the question of illegality of its own motion and volition: Kliers v Schmerler [2018] EWHC 1350 (Ch) per Mr Murray Rosen QC (sitting as a Deputy HCJ) at [80].

33. In addressing illegality, the Court must consider various factors in order to determine whether the public interest will be harmed if the claim is enforced, having regard to: (i) the underlying purpose of the prohibition that has been transgressed, and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim; (ii) any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact; and (iii) whether the denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality. Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 ; [2017] A.C. 467 per Lord Toulson at [120].

34. Denial of a purchaser’s claim to an equitable interest in property has been held to be disproportionate, even where it was purchased in the name of another for an illegal purpose: Patel v Mirza at [112]; Kliers at [86]. Declaratory relief

35. A declaration by the Court is a judicial act, which ought only to be made if the Court is satisfied by evidence: Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 W.L.R. 991 per Buckley LJ at p. 10291-D.

36. The relevant principles applicable to the granting of declaratory relief were summarised in Rolls-Royce plc v Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 387 ; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 318 per Aikens LJ at [120]: (i) the power of the court to grant declaratory relief is discretionary; (ii) The Court must be satisfied that all sides of the argument will be fully and properly put. It must therefore ensure that all those affected are either before it or will have their arguments put before the Court; (iii) in all cases, assuming that the other tests are satisfied, the Court must ask: is this the most effective way of resolving the issues raised? In answering that question it must consider the other options of resolving this issue.

37. In applying those principles in The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch v Essar Steel India Limited [2018] EWHC 3177 (Ch) , Marcus Smith J held, at [22], that, where a defendant is absent at the trial of a claim, the Court should adopt a conservative mindset against the granting of a declaration, notwithstanding that the absence of the defendant is not the claimant’s fault and may be the fault of the defendant.

38. The Court may grant a declaration as to parties’ rights, the existence of facts, or as to a principle of law, where those rights, facts, or principles have been established to the Court’s satisfaction. The Court should not, however, do so just because such rights, facts or principles have been established; the Court has to consider whether, in all the circumstances it is appropriate to grant the declaratory relief sought: Financial Services Authority v Rourke [2002] C.P. Rep. 14 per Neuberger J. The Claimant’s Case and Written Evidence

39. The particulars of claim refer to an HMRC investigation into the claimant’s company, Coldco Limited (properly Coldco Refrigeration Limited) in the period 2013 to 2015, and its subsequent liquidation. According to the particulars of claim: “19. In the course of the liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings and as a result of discussions with the defendant the claimant accepts he sought to conceal various assets from HMRC by transferring the assets into the defendant’s name namely: a [Echo Heights] b [53ER] c [3EAG] (“the properties”) d cash in the claimant’s possession generated from his various business interests”. …

21. The Claimant accept [sic] these transactions purporting to show that the defendant now owned the properties was in fact a sham and done for the sole purpose of avoiding liability to the HMRC … 23 As to the cash transferred to the Defendant, the monies were deposited into a Turkish bank account, namely Ziraat bankasi (the “Turkish trust account) primary account number 76239535-5083.

24. The Turkish trust account was hled in the sole name of the Defendant, and the account was intended to facilitate the Claimant’s Turkish business interests.

25. The monies in the bank account were held by the Defendant on trust for the Claimant.

26. The parties agreed, upon the Claimant being discharged from his bankruptcy, all assets would be transferred back to the Claimant.”

40. The claimant pleads that the defendant withdrew money from the account for the benefit of herself and others in a total amount of approximately £6m. As I have explained above it became apparent that those withdrawals were not from the Turkish Trust Account but from the Turkish Company Account and that the claim to damages or compensation in this respect could not be pursued.

41. The particulars of claim plead that the claimant purchased Echo Heights in 2004, 53 ER in 2013 and 3EGA in 2014. The pleading originally contained the sentence “Each of these three properties were purchased with the Claimant’s own funds. But when the pleading was amended that sentence was deleted and replaced by “The Defendant made no financial contribution to any of these properties.” The pleading also referred to the claimant having spent £700,000 towards refurbishing 3EGA.

42. The claimant’s witness statement explains that he came to this country as a teenager as a refugee from his native Turkey. He explains that he studied hard to learn English and to enable himself to graduate from university with a good degree in computer science. Subsequently he says he started a refrigeration business run through a company called Coldco Refrigeration Limited (05129960) ( Coldco ).

43. He says that he and Debbie Brown were involved in the operation of Coldco. The claimant separated from Debbie Brown and began living with the defendant in an apartment owned by him at 306, City Lofts, 7 St Pauls Square, Sheffield ( the Sheffield Flat ) in about 2010.

44. The claimant says that he formed further companies in 2009: You Shop Limited (07002996) and You Shop Properties Limited (070445343) through which he operated a number of retail outlets in London. In 2011 he incorporated Seven Days Stores Limited (07846182) with an equal 50% shareholder, Bakthyar Agha. That company ran a number of retail outlets in Sheffield. 45 The claimant goes on to explain that on 18 July 2013 HMRC wrote to ColdCo explaining that £287,000 was due as a result of non-payment of tax. The claimant sought advice from solicitors who apparently advised that liquidating ColdCo was the answer to the problem. The claimant instructed insolvency practitioners to implement this advice and on 10 September 2013 liquidators were appointed.

46. The claimant’s witness statement says this: “39. I was receiving a lot of correspondence from the liquidators and one evening in 2013 at [the Sheffield Flat] while we stood by the window Havin and I discussed in detail that, because of my situation with HMRC and the liquidators, she would hold my money and assets in trust for me. She agreed to this for the sake of our family and assured me that I could trust her completely. She also suggested that we postpone getting married in order to protect the monies and the assets. We agreed that once the issues with HMRC were concluded she would return all my assets and cash to me. “40. What I predicted was happening and I had already entrusted my assets to Havin Hevedi’s name as a form of temporary protection. I admit I was thinking I had nothing to lose and after one year I would be discharged and put my life back together with return of my assets and monies in trust of Havin Hevedi.”

47. The claimant says that in an attempt to preserve goodwill associated with the Coldco name, he changed ColdCo’s name to Retail Refrigeration Ltd in July 2013. In 2014 he formed a new company called Kenzina Ltd (09075895). He says he later changed that company’s name to Coldco Group Limited ( New Coldco ). The claimant was neither a shareholder nor director of this company.

48. The claimant explains that he sold You Shop (Properties) Limited in 2014. He also says that he sold You Shop Limited’s stores for a total of £1,700,000 of which £900,000 was transferred by bank transfer to his solicitors FW Meggitt & Co, £400,000 was paid to that firm in cash and £400,00 was paid to himself in cash.

49. In addition the Claimant says that he sold his shares in Seven Days Stores Limited to his co-owner in 2012 for cash of £785,000, which was paid between 2012 and 2015 and kept at the Sheffield Flat.

50. The claimant’s written evidence is that he bitterly regrets liquidating Coldco and the consequences that have followed. Among the consequences referred to in his witness statement was his application for bankruptcy and an adjudicator making a bankruptcy order on 6 February 2020.

51. The claimant’s witness statement explains that 53ER was purchased at auction. He says that he gave his solicitor, Mr Meggitt of F W Meggitt & Co, a full bag of cash for the purchase price. He says that he walked with Mr Meggitt to his firm’s branch of Yorkshire Bank and the bank cashiers counted out the cash. He says that he subsequently spent £400,000 on the property such that it increased significantly in value. He complains that it was sold by the defendant after the commencement of these proceedings at a substantial undervalue. He refers to “my agreement” with the defendant that “she was to hold it on trust and that it would be returned to me.”

52. The claimant’s witness statement explains that of the £880,000 purchase price of 3EGA, £690,000 was paid by bank transfer from Mr Meggitt’s firm and that the balance was paid as to £140,000 by the claimant in cash to Mr Meggitt’s firm and £50,000 was transferred from the defendant’s Barclays account to Mr Meggitt’s firm. He says that the source of the defendant’s £50,000 was the Turkish Trust Account and that he was therefore the source of those funds.

53. He goes on to say: “51. Once all necessary legal work was completed I took Havin to FW Meggitt’s office and confirmed, as per my earlier discussion with Havin that this property was to be entrusted to her on a temporary basis due to my circumstances. This was in front of Fred and she agreed that she was aware of my situation plus we had already done the same thing with the commercial property [53 ER].”

54. His witness statement goes on to give some detail of the refurbishment works at 3EGA and claims that he spent in excess of £1.2 million on the property from his personal and business accounts. He says that he engaged Turkish contractors for the purpose. In order to pay the contractors he gave cash to the defendant to take to Turkey pay them. He complains that the defendant misappropriated some of the cash. He complains also about the defendant’s extravagant spending once they moved into 3EGA in 2016.

55. He explains also that the defendant went to Turkey after the discussion about property and money in 2013 and opened the Turkish Trust Account. He says that he paid in over £4.5 million representing money from his businesses and that this money belonged to him. I have explained the limited extent to which this claim can be substantiated by reference to the documentary evidence.

56. He explains that he formed a Turkish company, Coldco Group Insaat Limited ( Coldco Insaat ), on 12 October 2016 for the purpose of conducting business in Turkey. He says that the defendant was a director of Coldco Insaat and that he used the monies in the Turkish Trust Account to support or guarantee Coldco Insaat’s obligations and thereby obtain favourable credit terms with suppliers.

57. He says that he told the defendant that he wished to transfer all his assets from her name to “the bare trust in our children names but she refused.” It appears from the reference in the statement to the claimant’s discharge from bankruptcy that at least one of these occasions was after the claimant’s discharge.

58. He goes on to explain that the defendant provided him with false information about the Turkish Trust Account and that because that false information matched with his own calculation, which was not documented in the hearing bundle, he did not question the position until after he and the defendant separated in 2021. Other Evidence

59. No other witnesses were called by the claimant. He served hearsay notices in relation to statements made by the defendant’s sister and her father in the family proceedings that took place between the claimant and defendant concerning their children. The relevant thrust of these family members’ evidence was that the defendant had no possible source of money with which to effect property purchases.

60. Mr Meggitt was not called to give evidence and his files were not obtained. The claimant’s solicitors contacted Mr Meggitt in early 2023 asking about the Sheffield Properties. In his initial response, written without access to any documents, Mr Meggitt explained that he had acted for the claimant in relation to the Sheffield Properties. He wrote a more formal letter on the 14 April 2023 addressed “to whom it may concern” under the heading “53 East Bank Road”. That confirmed that Mr Meggitt had represented the claimant in connection with various property transactions and that he acted in the purchase of 53ER at auction and, although he did not have his original file, he said that he remembered the case because it was the only time in his career that a client had come to his office with significant funds to complete in cash. He explained that: “Because of the money laundering requirements at the time I decided to take [the claimant] to my Bank which was Yorkshire Bank, Fargate, Sheffield. We got a private room and [the claimant] described to the Bank representatives how the funds had been taken out of his various businesses. When the Bank officials were satisfied with his explanation they took his money and credited it into my clients account from where it was used to complete the purchase of the property which was in the name of [the defendant].” The claimant says that he has been unable to obtain the file from Mr Meggitt’s firm because he was not their client.

61. In August 2023 the defendant apparently signed the statutory declarations pleaded in the claimant’s particulars of claim.

62. Unsurprisingly Ms Powers raised the question of the authenticity of the statutory declarations. An application was made for the claimant’s solicitor, Mr Raheel Khan, to put in evidence explaining the provenance of them. That evidence, to which was exhibited the relevant correspondence, demonstrated that the defendant had contacted Mr Khan in August 2023 stating in a series of emails that she would like to transfer or return ownership of 3EGA to the claimant. Mr Khan responded by inviting the claimant to sign a statutory declaration confirming that 3EGA “was purchased with monies provided by [the claimant] with the intention that I hold the same on trust for him and that at all times he retained 100% beneficial ownership in that property” in front of a solicitor and take such legal advice as she felt in need of.

63. The defendant returned the 3EGA statutory declaration duly signed.. At Mr Khan’s request the defendant signed a declaration in like terms concerning 53ER.

64. Unprompted by Mr Khan, the claimant sent him on 21 September 2023 a signed witness statement and a document headed “withdrawal of defence” in which the defendant conceded the claimant’s claim in respect of 53ER and 3EGA.

65. This sequence of events caused the claimant to bring a summary judgment application. The day before the hearing of that application the defendant instructed solicitors who indicated at the hearing that their client intended to defend and would provide an explanation for how the statutory declarations had come about. The amended defence and counterclaim dated 1 December 2023, which was filed following that hearing contains no such explanation. That pleading has since been struck out and the defendant has not filed any evidence in the proceedings, but it was her case in that pleading that the Sheffield Properties were purchased using her own funds and that they were wholly legally and beneficially owned by her.

66. In due course, at a time when the defendant was still legally represented, the issues for disclosure that were agreed included: “6. How and why were the statutory declarations dated 11 August and 23 August 2023 signed by the Defendant.”

67. Included in the bundle were copies of a series of WhatsApp messages between the claimant and the defendant in October 2021 and a transcript and a translation of a telephone call between them in January 2022. Issues

68. The issues are as follows: 53 ER (i) When 53ER was purchased was there any oral declaration of trust; (ii) If not, when 53ER was purchased did the claimant and the defendant have a common intention that the claimant would be the 100% beneficial owner; (iii) If so, did the claimant act in detrimental reliance on the common intention; (iv) What effect if any does the statutory declaration dated 11 August 2023 have. 3EGA (i) When 3EGA was purchased was there any oral declaration of trust; (ii) If not, when 3EGA was purchased did the claimant and the defendant have a common intention that the claimant would be the 100% beneficial owner; (iii) If so, whether the claimant acted in detrimental reliance on the common intention; (iv) What effect, if any, does the statutory declaration dated 23 August 2023 have. The Turkish Bank Account (i) Is the claimant entitled to a declaration as to the ownership of the Ziraat Bankasi bank account 41962079840 in the name of the defendant. Assessment of the Claimant’s Evidence

69. In the witness box the claimant was evasive. He repeatedly failed to answer questions and did little to dispel the confusion, both chronological and as to what he was claiming in relation to the Turkish Bank Accounts, to which the material in his pleaded case and witness statement give rise.

70. Ms Powers asked the claimant to identify the date he claimed to have reached an agreement with the defendant about the beneficial ownership of assets in her name. He eventually suggested that the date was 2021, but then said that there was no specific date rather there was a series on ongoing discussions. I asked a similar question about the agreement so far as it concerned the Turkish Trust Account and the defendant referred to there being several conversations. That evidence simply does not accord with his witness statement where he relies on a conversation with the defendant on a particular evening at a particular place in 2013, which is inconsistent with the arrangement being made after he was made bankrupt.

71. The defendant was also asked about the occasion on which the defendant attended Mr Meggitt’s office in relation to the purchase of 3EGA at which he says in his witness statement that she agreed that this property was to be entrusted to her on a temporary basis. He refused to accept that that occasion should be called a meeting, which seemed to be a refusal to make an uncontroversial terminological concession where he perceived it might amount to an admission against him. At one point the claimant said that the defendant said nothing on the occasion of that meeting and at another point that she smiled and answered “yes, but did not explain to what the smile or affirmative answer were responses.

72. It also became apparent that a number of significant events in the chronology, which he had to accept had occurred when they were put to him, were not mentioned in his witness statement. For example the claimant did not mention the disqualification undertaking he gave in May 2015 following Coldco’s liquidation or explain that would have prevented him being a director of New Coldco. Nor did he mention the claim that the liquidators of ColdCo brought against him personally for some £900,000 and the collapse of the trial of those proceedings in January 2020. Nor did he acknowledge that his application for bankruptcy must have, at least in some part, been prompted by the impending retrial of that claim. Another matter omitted from his written evidence was the fact that he forged the defendant’s signature in a Form TR1 in February 2022 in an attempt to have 3EGA registered in his sole name.

73. The claimant’s answer to the lack of any documented source of funds for the purchases of the Sheffield Properties was that cash had been used either from the sale of You Shop Properties Limited or You Shop Limited’s assets, from the sale of his Seven Days shares or generated from his businesses. He said that Coldco’s small “corner shop” customers preferred paying by cash. According to the claimant it was these cash sources that also funded his transfers to the Turkish Trust Account. The claimant appeared to have no clear appreciation of the difference between cash that might have belonged to him or which might have belonged to one of his companies. Although he acknowledged in answer to a question from me that the cash belonged to the business; there was no evidence of any proper accounting for that cash. When I enquired how he thought the defendant was paying for the extravagant lifestyle about which he complained, he said that it was from a salary from Coldco, or from the cash generated by his businesses which he left at her disposal.

74. The claimant was unable to explain orally how any agreement to the effect that he remained beneficial owner of 53ER or 3EGA would have prevented HMRC or any other creditor making a claim to the Sheffield Properties if he retained beneficial ownership of them.

75. Unless it is inherently probable or supported by some documentary material I am not prepared to accept the claimant’s evidence, which had every hallmark of being constructed as the claim proceeded for the purpose of best serving his case that he should be entitled to the beneficial ownership of the Sheffield Properties and the Turkish Bank Account. 53ER and 3EGA

76. 3ER was a commercial property bought in October 2013 at a time when the claimant and defendant were living together in the Sheffield Flat with their two young children. A deliberate choice was made that it be registered in the sole name of the defendant. 3EGA was a residential property bought in December 2014 in the defendant’s sole name at a time when the claimant and the defendant were living together in the Sheffield Flat, and bought with the intention that the claimant, the defendant and their children would move to live there as a family. The Turkish Trust Account was opened in the defendant’s sole name in 2014.

77. I consider that the claimant’s evidence that he and the defendant reached an agreement or formed a common intention that the claimant would be the beneficial owner or that the defendant would be a trustee of either of the Sheffield Properties at or about the time of their purchase or later is problematic for these reasons: (i) the claimant was unable in the witness box to definitively identify a date at which he reached any agreement with the defendant as to the ownership of either of the Sheffield Properties. Although at one stage he identified the date as 2021 he then claimed that the agreement was reached in ongoing discussions; (ii) that evidence was in contrast to the specific conversation in 2013 that was identified in his witness statement, the background to which was said to be “a lot of” correspondence with the liquidators and his “situation with HMRC”. The liquidators were only appointed in September 2013 and cannot plausibly have sent a lot of correspondence before the mid-October 2013 purchase of 53ER. The defendant had no personal liability to HMRC in 2013 and the liability that precipitated his bankruptcy was an impending liability to the liquidators not HMRC; (iii) at no stage in his pleading or evidence did the claimant suggest that there was any distinction between the agreement or arrangement applicable to each of the Sheffield Properties, to Echo Heights or to the Turkish Trust Account; (iv) any alleged agreement reached in 2013 was reached at a time before the purchase of 3EGA or the opening of the Turkish Trust Account was even in contemplation and long before the claimant’s bankruptcy which was, in some versions of his evidence, the motivating factor for the making of an arrangement; (v) the reference in the defendant’s witness statement to having “already entrusted my assets to [the defendant] as a form of temporary protection” and “I was thinking I had nothing to lose and after one year I would be discharged and put my life back together with return of my assets and monies in trust of [the defendant]” can only refer to what the claimant was thinking after he had been made bankrupt and not to any arrangement made in 2013; (vi) the claimant’s reference to a wish to transfer all his assets from the defendant’s name to “the bare trust in our children names but she refused” suggested that the children, not he, were beneficiaries of any trust that might exist, inconsistently with what appeared to be his primary case; (vii) an agreement of the sort alleged by the claimant, whereby the defendant would hold his assets and return them to him after he was discharged from bankruptcy, could not have been one under which he remained a beneficial owner; such a trust arrangement would not work to defeat any claims of HMRC or any other creditor. To be effective the beneficial ownership would have to have been transferred; (viii) the claimant’s evidence was that he was in receipt of significant cash sums from You Shop Limited’s assets and You Shop Properties Limited share sales and the refrigeration business was generating very substantial cash sums. It is unclear how or when it could have been intended that any trust agreement would bite on these cash payments and therefore implausible that any such arrangement would have been reached about them; (ix) there is no documentary support for the claimant’s claim to be the source of the funds for the £50,000 contribution the defendant made from her own Barclays account to the purchase of 3EGA; (x) the claimant’s written evidence and pleaded case is that the arrangement with the defendant extended to Echo Heights which was only transferred into the defendant’s name in 2019. No sensible explanation why Echo Heights was only transferred to the defendant in 2019 was given nor was any explanation given why Echo Heights, to which Debbie Brown had a claim to beneficial ownership which was vindicated in the proceedings against the defendant, should be subject to any arrangement at all; (xi) there was no rational explanation why the claimant did not transfer his various company shareholdings into the defendant’s name in 2013 if the plan was to divest himself of legal ownership of his assets; (xii) to the extent any reliance was placed on the meeting with Mr Meggitt concerning the purchase of 3EGA, the defendant’s evidence was either that the defendant said nothing or smiled and said “yes” neither of which would be sufficient to constitute an oral declaration of trust or an agreement to hold on trust; (xiii) as the claimant eventually accepted, there was no reference in any document including the WhatsApps and the transcription of telephone conversation with the defendant to the existence of any agreement having been reached with the defendant; (xiv) the claimant’s evidence of cash contributions to the purchase price of 3EGA was not accompanied by any explanation why the £690,000 which appeared to represent funds from the disposal of You Shop Limited’s assets did not belong to the company rather than the claimant; (xv) the defendant’s pleaded case was never to the effect that she denied any agreement and rather she asserted that she was the sole provider of funds for the purchases. Even though the suggestion that she provided the purchase monies was implausible, that is not enough in the context of the purchase of the Sheffield Properties to mean that the claimant does not have to establish his case as to a common intention constructive trust on the balance of probabilities; (xvi) it is very surprising that the claimant did not obtain a witness statement from Mr Meggitt or obtain Mr Meggitt’s files. Consistently with the claimant’s case that he was at all times the beneficial owner of the properties and the defendant was merely a trustee the claimant would have been Mr Meggitt’s client, which is what Mr Meggitt says was the position; (xvii) the content of Mr Meggitt’s letter stating that he recalled the 53ER matter because it was the only time in his career that a client had provided completion monies in cash undermines the claimant’s evidence that 3EGA was paid for by even larger cash sums being paid to Mr Meggitt’s firm; (xviii) the claimant’s claim that the substantial sums of money listed in Mr Qureshi’s schedule as paid into the Turkish Trust Account were cash sums from his refrigeration business is difficult to reconcile with the claimant having given a disqualification undertaking in 2015 and saying that he was not a director or shareholder of New Coldco, in the absence of clear documentary evidence of the claimant being paid a salary by that business; (xix) the claimant’s evidence that he made cash available to the defendant for her own spending and the manner in which the defendant drew on the Turkish Trust Account for some years without being stopped by the defendant, although now said to be in breach of trust, undermines the credibility of there being any agreement or arrangement as to the beneficial ownership of the cash or the cash funds paid into that account as is now asserted by the claimant.

78. I do not accept that the claimant has demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that there was an oral declaration of trust or an arrangement or agreement or that any common intention was formed that 53ER or 3EGA or the Turkish Trust Account would be held by the defendant for the claimant as sole beneficial owner. Even if I were satisfied that the claimant had the relevant intention at any stage, I do not consider that the claimant’s evidence enables me to conclude that the claimant could have reasonably understood from anything the defendant did or said that she had such an intention.

79. Insofar as the claimant might seek to distinguish the case of 53ER, because it was not a domestic property, and rely on a resulting trust analysis, I do not consider that, having regard to his evidence which made no distinction between the Sheffield Properties so far as any agreement or arrangement went, I should accept that 53ER was distinguishable in that way.

80. The evidence of any detrimental reliance in the form of payment for refurbishment of 3EGA is extremely sparse. There is an invoice for some £31,000 for installation of windows at 3EGA addressed to the claimant in the bundle. There is also an email from the contractor who claims to have done work at 3EGA dated 20 December 2022. It is clear from its content the terms of the email were influenced by the claimant as there are various reference in it to matters which the author must have been told by the claimant.. No mention is made of an amount paid for the works. The claimant’s witness statement refers to a refurbishment cost of £1.2m, whereas the pleading refers to £700,000. The claimant’s explanation in cross examination that the larger figure includes the smaller is sophistry. Even if monies were expended, the source of those monies as between the claimant and companies from which the monies were derived is far from clear.

81. The evidence of detrimental reliance in connection with 53ER is limited to the claimant’s bare assertion that he spent £400,000 on it thus increasing its value. His answer to my question why there was no evidence of this expenditure was that he did not keep records.

82. I have explained my reservations about the reliability of the claimant’s evidence. There is no documentary evidence of expenditure on 53ER and the single invoice relating to 3EGA totals only some £31,000. The provenance of any funds used to pay for refurbishment of either of the Sheffield Properties is obscure. Were it necessary to my decision to decide whether the claimant had shown detrimental reliance on an agreement that he was the beneficial owner, I would be unable to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the claimant had established any relevant detrimental reliance in relation to 3EGA and 53ER.

83. Accordingly the claimant has failed to displace the presumption that the defendant who was the sole legal owner was also the sole beneficial owner of 53ER and 3EGA. That remained the position until at least the dates of the statutory declarations.

84. So far as concerns the Turkish Trust Account I understand that the detrimental reliance the claimant relies on is the continuing funding of the account with cash sums. Given the difficulties with the evidence about the source of the cash I am doubtful that any such detrimental reliance can be established. The Statutory Declarations

85. Ms Powers submitted that the statutory declarations drafted by Mr Khan went rather further than was necessarily consistent with the defendant’s letters written in August 2023. which said nothing about the past and were only about a present intention to transfer or return ownership of property to the claimant. She said that the court could not know the circumstances of the transfers and should reject them as unreliable.

86. The evidence of Mr Khan about the statutory declarations was not challenged. At the summary judgment hearing in October 2023 the defendant contended through her solicitors that the statutory declarations were in some way open to challenge, but she never pleaded her case to that effect. Again, although the defendant agreed an issue for disclosure about how the statutory declarations came into being, no disclosure was ever given which would have cast doubt on Mr Khan’s account.

87. By their terms the statutory declarations comprise declarations that the Sheffield Properties were purchased with money provided by the claimant and that the defendant holds them on trust for him and that he at all times retained 100% beneficial ownership of each property. For the present and the future it seems to me that the statutory declaration in respect of 3EGA is effective as a declaration of trust.

88. I would have been minded to reach a similar declaration in the case of 53ER. However, following circulation of my draft judgment counsel drew my attention to the OCE for 53ER in the supplemental trial bundle which showed that it was sold by the defendant on 13 June 2023. My attention had not been drawn to the date of the sale or that it was before the date of the statutory declaration in respect of 53ER during the course of the trial.

89. In my judgment neither statutory declaration can be construed to have retrospective effect. It would only be if I had found that there was an earlier oral declaration of trust or common intention constructive trust, which I have not, that the statutory declarations might have been prayed in aid as evidence of such earlier oral declaration of trust.

90. By the time, therefore, that the statutory declaration in respect of 53ER was signed the defendant no longer had any entitlement to declare a trust of any interest in that property. Illegality

91. No positive case of illegality was advanced by the IPs. In circumstances where the claimant is, on his case, seeking to undo and remedy what might be termed the illegal activities and where he has purchased the rights to his claims from his trustees in bankruptcy it would not be appropriate for the court to allow any illegality to disentitle him to any remedy to which he might otherwise be entitled. Consequences

92. The claimant has failed to satisfy the burden of proof that is on him in relation to the ownership of the Turkish Trust Account. It would not, in any event, be appropriate in the absence of the defendant to make such a declaration that the Turkish Trust Account belonged to him in circumstances where the claimant’s pleaded case seeks relief in relation to the Turkish Company Account and where the relief sought is damages for breach of trust or fraud. Accordingly I will make no declaration in relation to the Turkish Trust Account.

93. The claimant has failed to satisfy the burden of proof that is on him in relation to the ownership of 53ER and cannot rely on a statutory declaration made by the defendant after she had sold that property.

94. I will however make a declaration that claimant is and has since 11 August 2023 been the sole beneficial owner of 3EGA. That declaration is not intended to affect the position of MTF as holder of a charge over 3EGA pre-dating its effective date or the position of the IPs whose charge over the defendant’s beneficial interest also pre-dates the effective date.