AW v Ofsted

The Application

1. AW (“the Appellant”) appeals against the decision of Ofsted, (“the Respondent”) on 17 November 2025 to suspend her registration as a childminder on the Early Years Register, the compulsory part of the Childcare Register and the voluntary part of the Childcare Register, for a period of six weeks from 17 November 2025 until 28 December 2025. AW has two registered addresses. Her correspondence with the Respondent in page H51 of the bundle makes it clear that she is only operating from her current home address, and the second address relates to a previous home. Attendance

2. Having reviewed the written evidence and noted the parties’ consent, the Tribunal concluded pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (FtT)(HESC) Rules 2008 (as amended) that it is able to decide the matter without a hearing. No hearing was held, and the Tribunal considered the appeal on the basis of the written evidence alone. Restricted reporting order

3. Neither party applied for such an order, but considering the facts of this appeal we regard it as appropriate to make a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the children or their parents in this case so as to protect their private lives. We have taken the unusual step of anonymising the Appellant as “AW”. This is to ensure the effectiveness of this order and in particular to avoid the identification of AW’s daughter who is the child complainant in an investigation into alleged sexual offences. Late Evidence

4. There were no applications from either party to admit late evidence. The evidence we considered was contained in a bundle of 160 pages. Background Relevant regulatory history

5. The Appellant is a registered childminder with the Respondent. She has been registered since 2012. She is registered on the Early Years Register and both the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register.

6. Since her registration the Appellant has been inspected on various occasions by Ofsted. Initial inspections judged her to require improvement, to be inadequate and to be satisfactory. Ofsted has previously held concerns over her service, in particular in 2013 relating to the suitability of the Appellant, the supervision of children, her assistant not having a first aid qualification and her adherence to the standards of confidentiality. In 2019 the Appellant referred herself to Ofsted in relation to a parental complaint she received, in October 2021 the Appellant told Ofsted that one of the minded children went missing, briefly. In January 2023 Ofsted were informed, not by the Appellant, of concerns about the Appellant’s dog, safety, her ability to meet the needs of children with special educational needs and/or disability, and the appropriate use of funding. In respect of these 2023 matters, Ofsted found no breaches.

7. The Appellant’s last two inspections found her to be good. These were in January 2022 and before that in August 2016. We were not provided with any more details of the above matters. Events leading to the issue of the current notice of statutory suspension

8. On 5 October 2025 the Appellant contacted Ofsted to advise them that her partner had been caught sending indecent message by telephone to a minor. In this decision we refer to him as DM.

9. At this time, DM was living at the registered address where the Appellant conducted a childminding business. He was also registered with the Respondent as an assistant. The Appellant has 2 children, CJ (14 years) and MM (10 years). MM is DM’s natural daughter; CJ has a different father. The allegation detailed in paragraph 8 above relates to CJ.

10. On 6 October 2025 the Appellant closed her business for the day, telling parents it was for “family reasons”. Ofsted informed the local authority designated Officer (LADO) of the allegation and spoke to the Appellant by telephone.

11. Ofsted were initially content with the action which the Appellant took. This included removing DM from her registration as an assistant, confirming that he was no longer resident at the address, and drafting a risk assessment which was submitted to Ofsted. We do not reproduce this document in full but of particular relevance to the issues in this appeal is that the Appellant said that she would not have contact with DM except by telephone, had asked him “not to visit the property or be close by”, and that she would not meet him at any time with either her own children or those she minded.

12. An “allegations management” meeting between Ofsted and the LADO took place on 14 November 2025. At this meeting the decision was taken to suspend the appellant’s registration, and a notice was sent to her on 17 November 2025 confirming the contents of a telephone conversation the same day. Legal Framework

13. The statutory framework for the registration of childminders is set out in the Childcare Act 2006 (as amended) (‘ the Act ’). Section 69(1) of the Act provides for regulations to be made dealing with the suspension of a person’s registration. The relevant regulations are 6 to 11 of the Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers) (Common Provision) Regulations 2008 (‘the Regulations). The section also provides that the Regulations must provide a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

14. When deciding whether to suspend a registered provider’s registration, the test to be applied by the Respondent and this Tribunal, on an appeal, is set out at Regulation 9 of the Regulations. It is: ‘that the Chief Inspector reasonably believes that the continued provision of childcare by the registered person to any child may expose such a child to a risk of harm’. ‘Harm’ is defined in Regulation 13 as having the same definition as in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 : ‘ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another’.

15. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to be satisfied that there has been actual harm or even a likelihood of harm, but merely that a child may be exposed to a risk of harm.

16. The immediate duration of a suspension under Regulation 7 is for six weeks. However, it may be extended to 12 weeks. Pursuant to Regulation 8, suspension may be lifted at any time if the circumstances described in Regulation 9 cease to exist. This imposes an ongoing duty on the Respondent to monitor whether the suspension remains necessary.

17. The Tribunal stands in the shoes of Ofsted at the date of the hearing. The first issue to be addressed by the Tribunal is whether, as at the date of the hearing, the Tribunal has reasonable cause to believe that the continued provision of childcare by the Appellant to any child may expose such a child to risk of harm (the threshold test). If it concludes that it does, it must consider whether suspension is a necessary and proportionate response.

18. The burden of satisfying the Tribunal that the threshold test at Regulation 9 is met rests with the Respondent. The standard of proof is ‘reasonable cause to believe’ and that falls somewhere between the balance of probabilities test and the ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ test. The belief is to be judged by whether a reasonable person, assumed to know the law and possessed of the information would believe that a child may be exposed to a risk of harm. In appeals against a suspension the Tribunal will make no finding of fact about the allegations which are the basis of the suspension. The positions of the parties

19. The Appellant’s case is that the suspension threshold is not met as she does not pose a risk to children. The Appellant believes that the risk has been removed given that her partner has moved out of the property and has not attended there since, thus complying with his bail conditions. She regards what has happened as a personal matter which has no impact on her professional life, and she has not exposed the children she cares for to any risk by exposing them to her partner.

20. The Respondent, Ofsted, argues that the threshold for suspension is met, and that the suspension remains both necessary and proportionate. Their case summary contained some errors as to dates, stating the suspension was imposed on 6 October 2025 when it was in fact 17 November, and that the allegation related to the Appellant’s 10-year-old daughter, when it was her 14-year-old. These errors occurred only in the summary and the evidence was clear. Ofsted referred to the fact that DM had been arrested and an investigation into him was ongoing. They referred to the fact that DM has been released on bail, and the Respondent is aware that whilst he is complying with his bail conditions, he has parked around the street from the Appellant’s premises on more than one occasion. Ofsted’s position is that if the suspension was lifted, there is risk of harm to children because the Appellant is demonstrating a clear lack of insight into the gravity of the allegations. They note that concerns are being investigated by relevant safeguarding agencies. The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons

21. We carefully considered all of the evidence in the appeal. This included the hearing bundle of 160 pages. There was a witness statement from the Respondent and four on behalf of the Appellant including witness statements from AW and three parents who provided testimonials in support of the Appellant’s childminding service. We also considered carefully AW’s previous regulatory history from 2012 onwards.

22. The Tribunal took into account the Respondent’s skeleton argument, dated 3 December 2025.

23. The initial suspension notice was sent on 17 November 2025 and specified the start date as 14 November 2025, the preceding Friday. The Respondent issued a new notice specifying the start date as 17 November 2025. We make no finding on the correct end date of the suspension period, as this is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is sufficient that a suspension notice has been issued and remains in force. The threshold for suspension

24. We consider that the test for suspension at Regulation 9 has been met by the Respondent. The Respondent presented sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that the continued provision of childcare by AW may expose children she cares for to risk of harm.

25. The risk of harm comes from the possibility of her partner DM having contact with children under her care, and the fact that she does not appreciate the risk that he poses to children. Although he is subject to conditions of bail to manage that risk, as AW argued, she has not kept to her initial risk assessment (which Ofsted regarded as sensible and acceptable) and had had in-person contact with DM contrary to that risk assessment, and had made a statement in support of a variation of his bail conditions to have contact with her youngest daughter, his daughter, who lives at the registered address.

26. In reaching this conclusion we were persuaded by the evidence of William Good, Early Years Senior Officer (‘EYSO’) for Ofsted. Mr Good outlined the action, which we have summarised above, which the Appellant took on 5 and 6 October, and that Ofsted was content not to take any further action at that stage. He went on to state that as at 21 October, the LADO informed Ofsted they felt the Appellant had acted appropriately once she became aware of the allegation against DM and that the LADO “had no concerns about her at that point”.

27. Mr Good went on to set out the change in Ofsted’s position and what brought that about. He stated that the police had informed the LADO and Ofsted of the nature of the allegation at a meeting on 14 November 2025: that DM was under arrest on suspicion of engaging in sexual communication with a child and causing or inciting a child to be involved in a sexual act. The details of the allegation were that on Friday 3 October 2025 DM was masturbating in the Appellant’s bedroom at the registered address on the bed knowing that CJ was there and had seen this. DM then sent WhatsApp messages to CJ asking if she saw something and asked her not to tell the Appellant. DM continued to message CJ asking what she saw, had she seen a hard willy before and that DM would not tell CJ’s Mum if she wanted to see one. DM attempted to delete the messages, but CJ took screen shots.

28. We reiterate that we make no finding of fact about these allegations. We are however satisfied that there is at least a credible allegation to be investigated.

29. At that same meeting the representative from Social Care Services informed the LADO and Ofsted that “the Appellant was pushing for DM to have contact with her youngest child and for DM’s bail conditions to be changed to allow this”, and “DM had applied to the county court to change his bail conditions to allow contact, and the Appellant had written a statement giving her support for DM to have contact with her youngest daughter”. This application had been unsuccessful.

30. Mr Good also recounted that the Appellant had met DM outside her home address on 6 November to take him some things from the house, and again on 12 November to take him paperwork and washing, and that CJ, the alleged victim, had taken a photograph of his car and shown it to her social worker. That social worker expressed concern that the Appellant does not recognise the risk DM presents to children and the emotional impact on CJ of him being near the home.

31. Mr Good described that there were ongoing investigations, namely a police investigation into whether DM has breached the conditions of his bail, a new LADO referral which relates specifically to the Appellant and not DM. After these investigations, he stated, Ofsted would review the Appellant’s suitability and whether she can manage the risks that DM presents.

32. We agree with Mr Good’s view that the threshold for suspension was met. The Appellant did not appear to recognise the risk presented to children by DM. She had not adhered to the risk assessment which she very properly and sensibly created when he was first arrested. She had been in personal contact with him in the vicinity of the house, not just by telephone as she had promised. This appeared to have caused concern to CJ; her daughter and DM’s alleged victim.

33. The Appellant’s perception of risk and ability to manage it are relevant factors to her suitability as a registered childminder because they relate to whether she can keep safe the children she minds.

34. There are investigations ongoing, including a child protection conference which was held on 1 December. When completed Ofsted will possess further information to assess the Appellant’s suitability for registration, and to consider whether to take further regulatory action. The Tribunal was reassured to note that the Respondent continues to keep the suspension under review. Proportionality of the suspension

35. Having concluded that the suspension threshold had been met by the evidence presented by the Respondent, we have gone on to consider the proportionality of the suspension. We have taken into account that suspension is a draconian act which has a significant impact on the Appellant’s livelihood.

36. We considered that the imposition of a suspension was a proportionate response to the risk of harm outlined above. We took account of the obvious disruption this will cause to the children and parents who use the Appellant’s childminding service, but considered that this was proportionate in light of the risk of harm to children of which we concluded there was evidence to support a reasonable belief, and which was being assessed by the LADO, Social Services and Ofsted.

37. The risk of harm to children is of sexual offences. This risk of harm is so serious that it makes suspension a proportionate response and outweighs the concerns outlined above and relied upon by the Appellant, of disruption and financial consequences. The action has been calibrated to the risk so far, as Ofsted perceived it and as it developed over time. This is the first 6-week suspension period. At this point the child protection conference has taken place and results of the police investigation and further LADO meeting are awaited, after completion Ofsted will assess the suitability of the Appellant’s registration as a childminder in light of the information provided. We concluded that it was appropriate and proportionate for the suspension to continue whilst this process is completed. From the evidence of Mr Good and Mrs Dave, Ofsted appear to have acted swiftly and there is no undue delay which would make the suspension disproportionate. Decision :

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The decision of Ofsted to suspend the registration as a childcare provider on domestic premises on the Early Years Register and both the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register dated 17 November 2025 is confirmed. Judge GPB Brandon Care Standards & Primary Health Lists Tribunal First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) 10 December 2025