A Father v A Mother & Ors

Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles: Introduction

1. The court is concerned with a girl called J who is 11 years and 9 months old. She is the subject of an interim care order and is in foster care. On 27 January 2026, her father issued an application for an order under the inherent jurisdiction seeking to “restrain any change of school or geographic location of the child, including any preparatory steps, pending further order of the court, in order to preserve the status quo and enable judicial supervision of proposed irreversible steps” . In short, the father seeks an order preventing the local authority moving J from her current secondary school or from a placement which allows her to remain at her school. It is, however, planned that J will move on or about 16 February 2026 with her current foster carers to another property about one and a half hours from her current placement. The distance is such that J will need to change her school and this is strongly opposed by the father.

2. The parties to the care proceedings are the same as the parties to this application. The applicant father appeared in person as did the applicant mother who attended the hearing remotely via video-link with my permission. The local authority was represented by Miss Freeman and the children’s guardian by Mr Rogan. I note that both parents are legally represented in the care proceedings.

3. In coming to my decision, I have read the material in the court bundle as well as the skeleton arguments/position statements on behalf of the parties. I also had the benefit of oral submissions from the father, the local authority and the children’s guardian.

4. I have not given details in this judgment which might identify the parties and have changed names, where necessary, to prevent this occurring. The Hearing

5. The father’s opposition to J’s proposed change of school has been known for some time, at least since 28 November 2025, when the matter was ventilated at a hearing before HHJ X, the circuit judge to whom the care proceedings have been allocated. At that hearing, HHJ X asked the children’s guardian to visit J and ascertain her wishes about the proposed move. That visit took place on 5 December 2025 when J expressed a strong wish to move with her current foster carers, understanding that this would mean a change of school. At a hearing on 10 December 2025 and in the absence of any application by the father for injunctive relief, HHJ X declined to hear any submissions or make any order with respect to the proposed change of school. The local authority asserted that the issue fell within the exercise of its parental responsibility pursuant to s.33(3) (b) and 33(4) of the Children Act 1989 . The mother supported the move as did the children’s guardian.

6. On 22 December 2025, the father issued an application for relief pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction in London. This was returned to him and he was told to liaise with the court administration in Y. On 15 January 2026 at a hearing before HHJ X, the father once more confirmed his opposition to the move from J’s current school. By that hearing, the date for the proposed move had crystallised and was confirmed to be during the February half-term.

7. Following the issue of the father’s application, the parties appeared before HHJ X on 30 January 2025 when directions to facilitate this hearing were given. The father confirmed that he did not pursue injunctive relief pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998 .

8. At the hearing before me, the father presented his own case politely and with dignity. The exchange of questions between both of us was very useful in clarifying some of points he sought to make and I gave him ample opportunity over the luncheon adjournment to respond to the submissions made by the local authority and the children’s guardian. The mother made no oral submissions but I had a position statement which confirmed her agreement to J moving and changing school. Background and Evidence

9. What follows is a summary of the factual background pertinent to the issue before the court. I have not been provided with the extremely extensive bundle of material generated by the care proceedings but I am satisfied that this was unnecessary for me to determine the father’s application. No party suggested that I needed to read that bundle or look at any specific documents within it.

10. The care proceedings in respect of J began on 20 June 2024 when she was removed from the care of her father. She became the subject of an interim care order on 21 June 2024 and has lived with her current foster carers since that date. There is one other foster child living in that placement who is placed there long-term. Both J’s parents have regular contact with her, her father’s contact currently taking place twice a week and being supervised. The care proceedings are now in their 84 th week. A final hearing has been listed before HHJ X in June 2026.

11. HHJ X conducted a fact finding hearing in the summer of 2025 and made findings about the father’s conduct. In summary, she found that (a) the father, who is a teacher, targeted two friends of J’s (girls of the same age as J) and used his position as J’s father to foster and maintain an inappropriately close emotional connection with each girl, with the intention of carrying out sexual abuse; (b) the father initiated physical contact with each girl for the purpose of his own gratification and touched them in ways which were sexually motivated; and (c) the father had a sexual interest in young girls. The father applied for permission to appeal HHJ X’s fact-finding judgment but this was refused on 26 January 2026 by Baker LJ. The father’s application for permission to appeal was also certified as being totally without merit. J has not yet been told about the findings made by Judge X because, until very recently, the father’s application for permission to appeal had not been determined.

12. J started secondary school in September 2025. She did not start it accompanied by friends from her primary school but, despite this, she has settled well and made new friendships. She is making good educational progress and appears to be a child who wants to do well at school and is interested in the educational opportunities available to her. Her secondary school is widely acknowledged to be an excellent school with an outstanding grading from Ofsted.

13. In late October 2025, the local authority informed the parties that the foster carers had purchased a new home but, for the present time, intended to maintain both their existing property and their newly purchased home. In the future, it was said that they may move to the new property. However, within a month, the foster carers’ plans had changed and, on 21 November 2025, the local authority informed the parties’ legal representatives by email that the foster carers were in fact planning to move to their newly purchased property in the New Year and that J would move to a new secondary school closer to their home (School A). A document was attached to that email giving details of the proposed new school and of the new arrangements for parental contact following J’s move.

14. At the hearing on 28 November 2025, the father voiced his opposition to the move because J would have to leave her current school. By the time of hearing before Judge X on 10 December 2025, the foster carers had agreed to delay their move to the February half-term. If a move was inevitable, the father was in favour of J attending a different school – School B – in the area where the foster carers were to reside. The local authority maintained the preference for School A, stating that the difference in the performance of School A and School B was minimal and that School A was a better fit for J, given the foster carers’ travel time to take both J and the other foster child to school. In its statement dated 2 December 2025, the local authority explained that J’s continued attendance at her present school was not feasible as this would involve a round trip of about three hours each day. This would impact J’s homework time, other after-school activities, and her placement. The option of J boarding at her current school and returning to her foster home at weekends had been considered but was rejected as having a likely negative impact on her stability in her foster home. If J was required to still attend her current secondary school, this would mean a change of placement for her in circumstances where there were no in-house fostering placements available. Further, J’s current foster carers were committed to providing J with a long-term home if she was not able to return to the care of either of her parents.

15. The children’s guardian spoke with J on 5 December 2025. She presented her with five possible options, including boarding at her current school and returning to the foster home at weekends and changing her foster home. J was very clear indeed that she wanted to stay with her current foster carers, knowing this meant a change of school and that it might mean a further change of school and placement if the court decided she should live with one of her parents. J talked with enthusiasm about the foster carers’ new home and the guardian assessed her attachment to her present carers as strong. J’s wishes and feelings on this issue have also been expressed to the social worker in similar terms on a number of occasions.

16. For his part, the father’s statement reiterated his strong opposition to J’s move from her present school. He was especially concerned that the data on the Government’s school performance website appeared to show School A had poor performance in respect of those achieving Grade 5 or above in GCSE English and Maths. He much preferred School B which, though not as good as J’s present school, was said to be better than School A.

17. The local authority’s Virtual School which has responsibility for the education of looked after children liaised with the Virtual School for the local authority in which Schools A and B are situated. Representatives from both Schools met on 6 January 2026 to look in detail at the educational options for J if she were to move with her foster carers. The schools were compared in terms of exam performance as well as on other measures such as pastoral care. The consensus was that School A was a better fit for J than School B. This decision was ratified by the relevant decision maker in the local authority on 7 January 2026. J visited School A on 16 January 2026 and that visit was described as positive.

18. During the hearing, I was informed by the local authority that J’s present school would not be entirely closed to her if she were to return to the care of either of her parents. This is because she would be (a) a former pupil and (b) either a former child in care or a child in care. Whilst not guaranteed re-entry, any future application was likely to receive a more favourable response than that of a child with no previous connection to the school. Positions of the Parties

19. What follows summarises the parties’ positions on the issue of injunctive relief before the court.

20. At the hearing, the father confirmed that he invited the court to make an order that J should not be moved from her present school to School A. He said such a move was not in her best interests and would also significantly reduce his contact time with her. Such a move would pre-empt the outcome of the final hearing and was not driven by any welfare need. Further, J’s views had been contaminated throughout the proceedings and were not authentically her own. Finally, there had been no meaningful consultation between the father and the local authority about the move or J’s proposed change of school.

21. The local authority, supported by the mother and the children’s guardian, invited me to dismiss the application for an injunction on the basis that the decision to move J from her current school was in her best interests. Balancing the positives against the negatives, the positives eclipsed the negative factors as set out in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the local authority’s skeleton argument. The children’s guardian was firmly of the view that J was clear and decisive about her wishes. She wanted to move with her current carers and said she wanted to remain with them, irrespective of any decisions made by the court in relation to her return to the care of either her mother or her father. The Legal Framework

22. The legal framework set out in the local authority’s skeleton argument was agreed by all the parties as the skeleton arguments filed for the hearing before HHJ X on 30 January 2026 made clear. No party sought to suggest otherwise at the hearing before me.

23. Section 33 of the Children Act 1989 provides as follows: “33. — Effect of care order. (1) Where a care order is made with respect to a child it shall be the duty of the local authority designated by the order to receive the child into their care and to keep him in their care while the order remains in force. (2) … (3) While a care order is in force with respect to a child, the local authority designated by the order shall— (a) have parental responsibility for the child; and (b) have the power (subject to the following provisions of this section) to determine the extent to which (i) a parent, guardian or special guardian of the child; or (ii) a person who by virtue of section 4A has parental responsibility for the child, may meet his parental responsibility for him. (4) The authority may not exercise the power in subsection (3)(b) unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child's welfare. (5) Nothing in subsection (3)(b) shall prevent [a person mentioned in that provision who has care of the child] 2 from doing what is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting his welfare. (6) While a care order is in force with respect to a child, the local authority designated by the order shall not— (a) cause the child to be brought up in any religious persuasion other than that in which he would have been brought up if the order had not been made; or (b) have the right—[...] 3 (ii) to agree or refuse to agree to the making of an adoption order, or an order under [ section 84 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 ] 4 , with respect to the child; or (iii) to appoint a guardian for the child. (7) While a care order is in force with respect to a child, no person may— (a) cause the child to be known by a new surname; or (b) remove him from the United Kingdom, without either the written consent of every person who has parental responsibility for the child or the leave of the court. (8) Subsection (7)(b) does not— (a) prevent the removal of such a child, for a period of less than one month, by the authority in whose care he is; or (b) apply to arrangements for such a child to live outside England and Wales (which are governed by paragraph 19 of Schedule 2 [ in England, and section 124 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 in Wales] 5 ). (9) The power in subsection (3)(b) is subject (in addition to being subject to the provisions of this section) to any right, duty, power, responsibility or authority which [a person mentioned in that provision] 6 has in relation to the child and his property by virtue of any other enactment.

24. Thus, there are specific restrictions on the power and/or authority of the local authority to take steps in respect of religion, adoption and the use of a new surname. In other respects, the general principle set out in s.33(3) (b) remains good, namely that, when either an interim or final care order is in force, the local authority shares parental responsibility with a child’s parents. If the local authority considers it necessary, having consulted with the child’s parents, it has the power to determine the extent to which a parent may exercise parental responsibility. This includes decisions about where a child in care goes to school.

25. In Herefordshire Council v M, F, Child A, Child B YY, Child D YY v Mrs XX, Mr XX , Keehan J stated as follows: [2021] EWHC 749 (Fam) “128. The issue of the exercise of parental responsibility by local authority which had a care order in respect of a child was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re C (Children) [2016] EWCA 374, where King LJ said the following at paragraphs 57-62 of the judgment:

57. It is common ground that the effect of the making of a care order or interim care order by virtue of section 33(3) CA 1989 grants a local authority parental responsibility. Section 33(3) (b) goes further, as it not only allows a local authority to share parental responsibility with a parent, but gives it the power to: “determine the extent to which a parent may meet his parental responsibility for the child.”

58. That power is however subject always to section 33(4) CA 1989 which states: “(4) The authority may not exercise the power in subsection (3)(b) unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.”

59. A local authority can, by virtue of the power conferred upon it by section 33(3) CA 1989 , therefore limit the power of a parent to make major decisions regarding the child’s life. The local authority effectively holds a ‘trump’ card which it can choose to play, in the decision-making process in relation to a child in care subject to section 33(4) CA 1989. An example of the use to which this power is routinely (and appropriately) put is in deciding where a child in care is to live.

60. In private law cases, some issues are considered so fundamental to a child’s well-being that, even if a parent has child arrangements order stating that the child is to “live with” them (an old terms residence order), that parent cannot make certain decisions without the written consent of every person who has parental responsibility or the leave of the court, including, under section 13 CA 1989 , changing a child surname.

61. Similarly, where there is a care order in place, the power conferred upon a local authority by section 33(3) (b) CA 1989 exclude certain circumstances where Parliament was of the view that the issue in question is too significant to be determined without either consent or a court order. These matters are set out in subsections (6) and (7) of section 33 CA 1989 and include at section 33(7) (a) CA 1989, causing the child to be known by a new surname.

62. Nowhere in the Act is there a similar restriction preventing the local authority from using its powers under section 33(7) CA 1989 to overrule a parent in relation to a forename, whether in relation to the naming of a newborn baby who has been taken into care shortly after his or her birth, or at all”.

129. A little later in the judgment, King LJ made the following observations at paragraphs 90 and 91: “90. Whilst I may not necessarily agree with the precise way that jurisdictional issues have been approached or expressed in these very difficult cases, what is clear is that there is a cohort of cases where the common theme is that a party (whether it be a local authority or, often, an NHS Trust) has sought to bring an issue before the court, believing it to be of too great a magnitude to be determined without the guidance of the court, and without all those with parental responsibility having an opportunity to express their view as a part of the decision-making process.

91. Most commonly, examples are found in the so-called “medical treatment” cases where, either an NHS Trust seeks a declaration from the court that they would not be acting unlawfully in pursuing or desisting from a form of treatment notwithstanding the parent’s refusal to consent, or alternatively, a local authority seeks to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court and thereby to submit to the court’s jurisdiction notwithstanding that care proceedings may have been open to them”.

130. She then noted that in requiring a local authority to invoke jurisdiction of the court in relation to a serious medical issue the court was not conferring power upon a local authority, rather that the High Court was using its inherent jurisdiction to limit, circumscribe or sanction the use of the power which the local authority already has by virtue of s.33(3) (b) of the 1989 Act

97. She concluded in paragraphs 98 and 104 as follows: “In the medical treatment cases the decisions to be made may well be a matter of life and death. In the present case, the limitation on the exercise of parental responsibility proposed by the local authority, whilst not life-threatening, is life affecting. Further such a decision potentially involves such a serious invasion of the Article 8 rights of the mother that I am satisfied that the court should invoke its inherent jurisdiction in order that it may either sanction the local authority’s proposed course of action is in the interests of the children or, alternatively, to refuse to sanction it as for example being in breach of Article 8. “I have reached the conclusion that there is a small category of cases where, notwithstanding the local authority’s powers under section 33(3) (b) CA 1989 , the consequences of the exercise of a particular act of parental responsibility so profound and have such an impact on either the child his or herself, and/or the Article 8 rights of those other parties who share parental responsibility with the local authority, that the matter must come before the court for its consideration and determination.”

131. I was helpfully referred by Ms Meyer QC and Ms O’Malley to two later decisions of the Court of Appeal which approved and reinforce the observations of King LJ in Re C (above), namely: (i) Re E (A Child) [2018] EWCA Civ 550 , [2019] 1 WLR 594 ; and (ii) Re H (A Child) (Parents Responsibility: Vaccination) [2020] EWCA Civ 664 .

132. I have taken account of all three cases and respectfully agree with the observations of the Court of Appeal on the proper and bits and use of powers granted to a local authority under a care order by virtue of the provisions of s.33(3) of the 1989 Act .”

26. What is clear from the case law, following the decision in Re C (Children) , is that the powers vested in the local authority by the making of a care order, whether interim or full, are subject to [2016] EWCA Civ 374 section 33(4) of the 1989 Act . Thus, a local authority may not override parental responsibility unless it is satisfied that doing so is necessary to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. Therefore, ultimately, if the local authority is so satisfied it is for the local authority and not the parent or any other person who has held parental responsibility to decide where a child in care should go to school, even if, as in this case, it flows from the decision of the foster carers to move.

27. Though not mentioned in the skeleton arguments prepared by the parties’ leading counsel in the care proceedings, I have also had regard to the following when coming to my decision. Section 22(4) of the Children Act 1989 entitled “General duty of local authorities in relation to children looked after by them” states clearly that: “Before making any decision with respect to a child whom they are looking after, or proposing to look after, a local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, ascertain the wishes and feelings of (a) the child; (b) his parents (c) any person who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him; and (d) any other person whose wishes and feelings the authority consider to be relevant, regarding the matter to be decided.” Thus, a local authority is expected to consult with parents where reasonably practicable. In my view, and in accordance with public law principles, that consultation is not simply for the local authority to pay lip service to parental views before making decision about a child in care. However and no doubt recognising that children’s lives in the care system are subject to frequent change, consultation with parents must be what is reasonably practicable . That will vary from case to case – in some cases, there may be the luxury of time to hold meetings with parents about a particular issue but, in other cases, events might dictate that parents are told about significant proposed changes at a court hearing without any prior notice. However, engagement with parents is necessary even if the circumstances are not ideal. Analysis

28. In coming to my decision on this matter, I have had in mind the legal analysis set out above and thought very carefully about the written and oral submissions before me. I make it very clear that the nature and frequency of contact between J and her parents is not a matter for me but will be determined by HHJ X at a hearing on 13 February 2026.

29. Dealing with two matters of process first, the case law makes plain that parental decision-making can be overridden by a local authority where a child is subject to an interim care order. The father suggested that the change to J’s school place pre-determined any decision which the HHJ X might make at the final welfare hearing in June 2026. I find that an unpersuasive submission because HHJ X will – as all judges should when coming to a decision about a child’s welfare in public law proceedings – undertake a holistic analysis of the realistic options for J’s care. That requires a careful scrutiny of the advantages and disadvantages of each option, alongside judicial findings about the welfare checklist as it applies to J. J’s schooling will be but one part of the matters which the court will need to consider at that stage and, in the circumstances of this case, I doubt very much it will be determinative of the final welfare decision reached by HHJ X.

30. Second, the father asserted that there had been inadequate consultation with him about the change of school. I found it necessary to ask a number of searching questions of the local authority to establish the chronology of the decision making process as this was poorly addressed in its written material. This resulted in additional material being sent to me via email during the hearing which shed light on events.

31. The local authority had alerted the parties to a possible move by the foster carers in late October 2025 but very shortly before the hearing on 28 November 2025, the foster carers’ plans changed and it became clear that, if J was to stay with them, she would likely need to move school. That issue was notified to the parties, all of whom were legally represented, a week before the hearing together with information about School A. The court then embarked on the process of obtaining information about the proposed move and J was spoken to by the children’s guardian. That process also allowed the father to express a preference for School B over School A. Though the local authority appeared committed to School A, it nevertheless sought advice via the relevant Virtual Schools about each option once it became clear that the foster carers were prepared to delay their move to the February 2026 half-term holiday. That consultation resulted in School A being affirmed as the educational provisions which best met J’s needs as a child in the interim care of the local authority. Whilst it might have been ideal if the local authority had held a meeting with the parents away from the court setting to discuss the move and the change of school, it was operating within tight timescales and had done its best to notify the parties and to consider an alternative to School A. I find the local authority consulted with the parents as far as was reasonably practicable.

32. Turning to matters of J’s welfare, the proposed move by the foster carers has some potentially adverse consequences for J. Her present school is an excellent school which offers a high standard of education from which J is likely to benefit. Remaining at her present school provides continuity for J who is settled there and has formed new friendships. A move will disrupt the logistics of contact and most likely reduce the opportunity for J to have the same level of contact with her father. Finally, the care proceedings remain unresolved and this move would be a major change in J’s circumstances.

33. However, there are factors in favour of the proposed move. A change of school would allow J to remain with her current foster carers where she is settled and happy. A change of foster home would be much more harmful to J emotionally than a change of school especially in circumstances where there are no suitable in-house foster placements available. J would thus require an agency placement, potentially out of borough, and would likely have to change school in any event. J’s current carers are committed to her and are willing to care for her long-term if she cannot return to the care of either of her parents. They represent a chance of long-term stability for her if she has to remain a child in care. It is not practical for J to remain with her current carers and stay in her present school. This would require a three hour round trip each day which, in my view, J would find burdensome and which would inhibit her participation in after school activities and impact significantly on her family life with her foster carers. Boarding is not a sensible option for J as this would deprive her of the daily physical and emotional support of her carers. I regard that support as being essential for her especially in circumstances where J has not yet learned of the serious findings about her father’s conduct with friends of hers. She will definitely need her foster carers’ support once those matters are made known to her. Finally, her contact with her father can be managed in the event of a move.

34. School A has been chosen with consultation and advice from the local authority’s Virtual School, a body experienced in giving advice about the education of children in care to the local authority, as the best fit for J’s overall needs. I accept that School A does not have the stellar academic record of J’s present school (it has an Ofsted “good” grading) but it offers suitable education in a location which allows J to live with her current foster carers. J has navigated a move from primary school to secondary school even though she did not move to her present school with friends from primary school. This bodes well for any future change of school because J clearly has the resilience to weather such a move with the support of her present carers. I doubt that same resilience would be present if she had to move both from her present placement and her present school as might be the case if only an out of borough foster home were available. Finally, and depending on the outcome of the care proceedings, there seems to be a reasonable chance that J might be able to return to her present school should the need for this arise.

35. J has stated firmly to her social worker and her children’s guardian that she wishes to move with her foster carers and accepts this means a change of school. She is a child of nearly 12 years whose views have some weight in my decision making. They are not, however, decisive as J will not be aware of many of the factors in these proceedings which bear on the decision I am required to make. I reject the father’s contention that J’s views are not authentically her own. The father took me to some documents which he said showed that J was worried that the foster carers would be upset about something and thus that she was compliant with what they wanted. The document in question was a very old – October 2024 – note of the social worker’s conversation with J which in my view has little relevance to matters some 15 months later. It was also not very clear what precisely J thought the foster carers would be upset by and thus I am not prepared to attach significance now to a passing comment made a long time ago and taken out of context. There was little else to which the father was able to refer which substantiated his submissions about the weight I should attach to J’s wishes. In any event, I have explained that I do not regard these as decisive.

36. My analysis has also taken full account of the Article 8 and 6 rights of J and her parents. Balancing those rights as I have done, my decision falls firmly in favour of J’s interests which are decisive in such an exercise.

37. Thus, standing back, and looking at matters of welfare in the round, the balance sheet is firmly in favour, in my view, of J moving with her foster carers and changing her secondary school. That holistic assessment means that I am satisfied that the local authority’s decision making both safeguards and promotes J’s welfare.

38. I thus refuse the father’s application for an injunction under the inherent jurisdiction. Conclusion

39. That is my decision.