A & B (Children), Re

1. In this Judgment I refer to the applicant as “the mother” or “M”, and the respondent as “the father” or “F”. By her application dated as long ago as 17.7.23, the mother sought child arrangements orders (CAO) and prohibited steps orders (PSO) in respect of A (aged 13) and B (aged 9), who are the children of both parties.

2. The mother’s 2023 application also sought orders in respect of two of the parties’ other children: C (aged 20) and D (aged 17). Because of their ages, the mother does not pursue her applications in respect of C or D.

3. The mother has been represented by Ms Charlotte McDonald of Counsel (instructed by Cartwright King Solicitors, previously Glaisyers Solicitors) for the hearings on 9.7.25, 15-16.12.25, 30.1.26 and 3.3.26. The father was represented by Ms Crystal Stewart, solicitor, for the hearing on 9.7.25, privately funded. He was unable to afford to continue to pay for representation, but managed to obtain legal aid by the time of the next hearing. For the hearings on 15-16.12.25, 30.1.26 and 3.3.26 he was represented by Mr Henry Pargeter of Counsel (instructed by Anthony Louca Solicitors).

4. Both Counsel presented their cases with care and professionalism. Their written and oral advocacy was of a very good standard, and they both provided significant assistance to the court in considering this case, for which I am grateful. Orders sought

5. For the reasons set out below, this final hearing has taken place over several months, with 1 day on 9.7.25, 2 days on 15-16.12.25 and 1 day on 30.1.26. The orders sought by the mother have varied between the commencement of the final hearing on 9.7.25 and closing submissions on 30.1.26.

6. On 9.7.25 the mother accepted that A and B should continue to live with their father. She sought orders for: 6.1. Indirect contact by way of letters/cards twice monthly and gifts on special occasions; 6.2. When letters go well, Facetime calls once monthly; 6.3. If that continues well for 4 months, progression to an initial face-to-face visit, using a contact centre or professional so that both the mother and the girls feel relaxed, once a month; 6.4. If this goes well, contact should move to the community; 6.5. Eventually, overnight staying contact.

7. By the 30.1.26 hearing, the mother was seeking as her primary position that A and B immediately move to live with her. If the court did not support that, her secondary position was that they should continue to live with their father, but with the progression of indirect contact to direct contact as follows: 7.1. The mother shall have indirect contact with A and B by way of letters/cards twice monthly and gifts on special occasions. The father must make these available to the girls and encourage them to respond; 7.2. After four months, the father shall make the girls available for Facetime calls once per month for four months. This should take place in a contact centre so that the girls are able to speak freely. They must be able to talk to the mother openly and without anyone else present; 7.3. After four months, an initial face-to-face visit shall take place between the mother and A and B in a contact centre or professionally supervised once a month; 7.4. After four months, if this goes well, contact should move to the community (unsupervised); 7.5. On the children’s wishes and feelings, if this goes well, overnight staying contact with the mother in Birmingham at weekends.

8. The mother sought the continuation of a PSO for neither party to remove the children from England/Wales, but did not agree to the continuation of a PSO for her not to remove the children from the father’s care. She objected to a s.91(14) order (sought by the father). She agreed to continue the non-molestation cross undertakings which are currently in place until 11.9.26, but not any extension beyond that.

9. The father’s position is that he does not consider it is appropriate for A and B to have direct contact with their mother. He seeks an order that the girls continue to live with him. He agrees with them having indirect contact with their mother as follows: 9.1. The mother shall continue to send cards, letters, photographs and/or small gifts directly to the father’s address, no more than once per month; 9.2. The mother may additionally send gifts on special occasions; 9.3. The father shall provide the cards, letters, photographs and/or small gifts to the girls, and shall ensure that they are in a place where they can independently access them; 9.4. He would continue to send the mother a photograph of the girls every month, (through AppClose), but only if she maintains the indirect contact as set out above.

10. He seeks the continuation of the PSO in respect of the mother (not to take the children abroad, and not to remove them from his care) but seeks that the prohibition on him taking the children abroad be removed so that he can take them on holiday. In closing, he asked that the PSO in respect of the mother remain in place for 5 years.

11. He seeks a s.91(14) order for 5 years. He also wanted the NMO undertakings to continue for 5 years.

12. An order for a mother only to have indirect contact with her daughters would be draconian and highly restrictive of their relationship, and could only be justified if there were serious safeguarding concerns relating to the mother. It is for this reason that I did not agree with a previous case management decision to reduce the time estimate of the final hearing from 3 days to 1 day, not to have a fact-finding hearing, and to base the final decision effectively on a CAFCASS report and recommendations which dealt with the children’s wishes and feelings (not to have direct contact with their mother), but not any safeguarding issues.

13. In my judgment it was clearly necessary for some of the serious cross allegations which the parties have made against each other - all of which are fully contested - to be carefully considered by the court on the available evidence, in order to seek to determine if there are safeguarding issues relating to either parent, which impact on the children’s future care. These allegations include alleged multiple rapes by the father of the mother, alleged coercive and controlling behaviour by the father of the mother, and serious safeguarding issues relating to the mother, including that she exposed their then 2 year old daughter B to sexual assault by an Imam with whom she herself was having a sexual relationship, that the mother was emotionally, verbally and physically abusive towards the children and the father, and that the mother made malicious allegations to numerous authorities (police, local authority, school, NSPCC) in respect of the father’s care of the children, causing the children’s home life to be seriously destabilised as the allegations were investigated. Written evidence

14. I have received and read a bundle running to 841 pages. The key evidence includes: 14.1. The mother’s statements dated 4.8.23, 22.2.24, 26.3.25 and 13.5.25; 14.2. The father’s statements dated 25.3.24, 22.10.24, 30.4.25 and 15.8.25; 14.3. Statements from their adult children C dated 17.8.25 and E dated 17.8.25 (preceded by signed letters dated 14/15.3.24 in similar terms); 14.4. CAFCASS section 7 report dated 15.4.25; 14.5. Local authority disclosure; 14.6. Police disclosure; 14.7. Medical evidence relating to the mother; 14.8. Video evidence (3 clips of the mother) and voice recordings (3 conversations between the mother and the father). Background

15. The background is complicated and what is set out below is by way of summary only.

16. The parties met in 2000, married in July 2001 and their marriage ended with separation in January 2019 (although there were some periods of cohabitation which post-dated this). They are now aged 45 (mother) and 55 (father).

17. They have five children: E (aged 24), C (age 20), D (age 17), A (age 13) and B (age 9). E has graduated from university; at the time of the December hearing, he was working abroad. C is at university. D is studying for his A levels at school and wants to go to university. A is at secondary school, and B is at primary school.

18. Since separation in January 2019, the children have been cared for by their father in the family home in NW London. This caring arrangement reflected the position for much of the marriage. The mother suffered mental health difficulties during the marriage, commencing with the birth of E, which led to serious post-natal depression and attempted suicide. She also suffered depression after the birth of the other children, of varying degrees of severity. The father did not work outside the home for about 10 years of their marriage, while he supported the mother and took a significant role caring for the children. Disability benefits were claimed for the mother over many years, due to her recurrent depressive disorder.

19. In 2018 the father became physically unwell, and spent periods of time in hospital. While he was unwell, the mother formed a sexual relationship with the Imam from their local Mosque. The mother’s reporting of the nature of the relationship with the Imam has varied over the years since, and remained unclear during the final hearing. She left the marriage for this relationship, and for a period of time moved to live in a flat in North London where she continued her relationship with the Imam. The Imam declared a Sharia divorce in respect of the mother and father’s marriage. The father explained to the court (and the mother also reported this to the police in June 2019) that the Imam initially persuaded the mother to enter into a Nikah Muta’h (“pleasure marriage”), which meant that it was a sexual relationship on demand, but not a Sharia/religious marriage, with any protections for the mother. The mother wished to continue her relationship with the Imam. The father says that at the mother’s request, and to protect her reputation, he persuaded the Imam to enter into a Sharia/religious marriage with the mother in 2019, at which he was present, and the mother and Imam continued their relationship thereafter.

20. In 2019, after leaving the family home, the mother alleged to the police that the father had raped her in December 2018. The father was arrested, but was able to prove that he was in hospital over the period of the allegation, and no further action was taken.

21. In June 2019 the mother reported to the police that the Imam had “groomed” her, and raped her on various occasions. She also reported that the Imam had sexually abused B (then aged 2) on 4.3.19.

22. The mother gave specific details to the police of the alleged sexual abuse of B, which are not included in this anonymised Judgment.

23. The police records indicated that the father was told about this allegation by the police in June 2019, after the mother had reported it, not by the mother herself. The father confirmed this in his evidence. The father was very distressed at the allegation about B; he still does not know whether this incident happened or not.

24. B underwent a Child Protection medical examination on 2.8.19. The medical did not provide evidence of her being sexually assaulted, but the report indicated that the absence of findings did not refute the allegations, as injuries can heal quickly, and the allegation was made several months after the alleged assault.

25. The Imam was arrested and interviewed; his passport was taken so he could not leave the country. He was on bail for several months. The Imam also applied for and obtained a non-molestation order against the mother in June 2019. Later in 2019 his passport was returned to him, and he left the country.

26. The mother also reported the Imam to the Charities Commission in April 2020. The mother maintained these allegations to the police for well over a year, and there are numerous references to rape by the Imam, and sexual assault of B, in the extensive police disclosure.

27. However, at the final hearing, her case was that the Imam had not sexually assaulted B, and that the father had coerced her into making this serious but false allegation. The father wholly disputed this allegation against him. It was not clear at the final hearing whether the mother maintained that the Imam had raped her, or not – on this occasion and/or on other occasions - and the mother gave unclear and evasive answers to questions.

28. As part of the police enquiries, in April 2020, the mother attended at the local police station to give a full interview about her allegations of rape, and sexual assault of B, against the Imam. The father drove her to the police station, but did not wait to collect her, as they had agreed. After the interview, the mother went missing. This was one of the children’s birthdays. Instead of returning home to celebrate the birthday with cake, the mother got into a taxi and was driven away. She messaged the father to say she was not coming home, but not where she was going. The father was very worried and notified the police, who triggered a full missing person enquiry. The police traced her mobile phone (until it was turned off), phoned numerous hospitals to see if she had been admitted, tried to find out if she had been in touch with friends, and scanned CCTV cameras. After 2 days she was located in Wolverhampton, in a flat above commercial premises, with a taxi driver, Mr A. This was in the early days of the nationwide Covid-lockdown.

29. The mother’s version of what happened in April 2020 has varied. She told the police at one point that the taxi driver was unknown to her, but at another point acknowledged that she had connected with him on a dating app called “Plenty of Fish” and had arranged for him to collect her from the police station after her interview.

30. After spending 9 days with Mr A, she asked the police to drive her back from Wolverhampton to the family home in London. The father was very worried about the mother’s mental health, and on 17.4.20 she was admitted to a hospital mental health ward for observation and treatment. After leaving Mr A, the mother alleged that he had raped her.

31. The lengthy hospital notes from the mother’s April 2020 admission record that: “[M’s] presentation is complex. She described intertwined symptoms consistent with Depression, anxiety and PTSD. The impression is that personality difficulties are underlying and perpetuating her difficulties. There is the possibility that her risk-ridden impulsive and out of character behaviour are possible dissociating episodes (the recent event when she went with a stranger who in her description resembles the imam who abused her) and escape from reality, disconnections between identity and memory. As such they might have a purpose of maintaining the situation when she is “victimised and groomed” and her maladaptive way of dealing with the unacceptable situation when she and her daughter have been abused.” Elsewhere the notes state: “[M] describes “two [Ms]: “a good [M] – mother and wife..” and “a bad [M], irresponsible, reckless, indifferent to her family’s needs”” , and “she thinks that her diagnosis of depression, anxiety and PTSD doesn’t fully explain her problems”.

32. The hospital notes further record that “She described her husband as her “best friend” who is extremely supportive”. The father is recorded as saying to the doctor: “He reiterated that he “has lost his wife” and that they as a family have been failed by the services as his concerns haven’t been understood and dealt with in a timely fashion”.

33. By 20.4.20, the hospital notes states: “having more time to reflect on [M’s] presentation, I am of the opinion that we have to consider that when exposed to and overwhelmed by stressful situations (such as the recent court case) [M] tips over to a psychotic state and that her presentation could be of Depression with psychotic sy of Acute psychosis”. She was treated in hospital with her usual anti-depressants Mirtazapine, but also Quetiapine as an antipsychotic drug.

34. The mother was discharged home on 23.4.20, with continuing support from a community mental health team. The medical records on 29.4.20 refer to her having been “sexually abused by imams from a local Iranian Mosque in 2018” and that “the abuser also sexually abused her 2 years old daughter last year”, and then to her disappearing with “a Pakistani taxi driver – they had sexual relationships and she had fluctuated between calling him ‘the love of my life’ and asking all her friends and husband to come and help her”. The likely diagnosis was considered to be “post traumatic stress disorder with recent episodes of dissociation. ?dissociative fugue. ?Bipolar affective disorder”. The mother spoke positively to the medical professionals about the support she received from the father, and from his extended family. The notes record a plan for the mother and father to heal their marriage and “try to do a house-swap to a new area, and [M] feels upbeat about this as it will potentially give her a fresh start”.

35. However, by 12.5.20, the mother had again been in touch with the taxi driver, Mr A, and left the family home to be with him. The mother remained with Mr A in the Birmingham area, and over time entered into a religious marriage with him. By September 2021, she had changed her name by deed poll to Sara A. The mother’s rape allegations against Mr A led to him losing his taxi driver’s licence. Later the mother sought to help him to get the taxi licence back, by retracting her rape allegations.

36. The police disclosure records that Mr A had “more than 104 returns on PNC” . By June 2021 there is reference in the police notes to there being a “current allegation of rape of a child under 16 against him”.

37. The mother remained in touch with the father, messaging him and at times going back to stay in the family home for days, or sometimes weeks. In their communications, the mother told the father that Mr A possessed inappropriate pornographic videos, and at times referred to Mr A as a “pervert”. In messages on 10.4.22 the mother wrote to the father: “Today I found out on his phone a page open written fucking mother and daughter. I can’t even believe it. I feel so disgusted”. Despite this, the mother continued her relationship with Mr A.

38. During these years, the father agreed to the mother seeing the children approximately every month, but under supervision, given his concerns. They would generally go to Westfield, or a local park, and the father would pay for food and the mother’s travel expenses to London. He did not agree to the children going to Birmingham, or spending time with Mr A.

39. The mother came to see the children for a pre-arranged visit on Sunday 25.6.23. This was supervised by the older children, and she spent time with them in Queen’s Park, near the family home. The mother then came into the family home. The father says that this was not agreed by him, and that he asked the mother to leave, but she refused to. Shortly afterwards the police arrived, having been called by Mr A, who was parked nearby. Mr A alleged that the mother had been abducted by the father and children. The father explained that it was the reverse, and he had been asking the mother to leave but she would not go. In the end, the mother left. The incident, and the police attendance, caused significant upset to the children, who were present.

40. On 26/27 June 2023, the mother contacted the children’s schools, the local authority and the NSPCC, making allegations that the father was neglecting the children, that the home was unclean and there was little food in the house. She also alleged historical domestic abuse and coercive control of her by the father. After investigations, the local authority decided there were no safeguarding issues for the children in the father’s care.

41. On 16.7.23, the mother made an allegation to the West Midlands Police that the father had raped her on 31.12.22. The father was arrested in front of the children and interviewed. As a direct result of this rape allegation, the father lost his licence as an interpreter for the Police and Court service, and thus his main income for supporting the children and their home. The police have still not, over 2½ years later, decided whether to charge him or not, and his income continues to be directly affected by the mother’s allegation. The father believes that his allegation was part of the mother and Mr A’s plan to remove him from the family home, so that they could move in, in his place, and live there with the children.

42. The mother made further allegations about the father’s neglect of the children to the NSPCC in July 2023, who again contacted the local authority, who again concluded that there were no safeguarding concerns relating to the father.

43. On 17.7.23, the mother issued her children application in Form C100. The procedural background is set out below.

44. During the proceedings, the mother has continued to live in the Birmingham area. She says that she is no longer in a relationship with Mr A, or anyone else. She did not want to give specific details about her living arrangements, or her part-time work. She has provided letters from the Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health team, indicating that her primary diagnosis has been “Recurrent depressive disorder, currently in remission”, and on 25.1.25 a letter saying that she had been signed off by the mental health team. These letters do not deal with the additional mental health concerns raised in her much lengthier medical records, some of which are set out above. She has not seen the children since 25.6.23. Although Facetime contact was trialled in August 2024 (see orders below), it was not successful and the children said they no longer wished to take part. She has not spoken to the children since September 2024.

45. The father has continued to live in the family home, looking after the children. Procedural Background

46. The mother’s C100 application was made on 17.7.23, seeking CAOs (lives with orders) and PSOs (preventing the children being taken abroad) for A, B, C and D. The mother flagged in her C100 application domestic abuse, child abduction, child abuse and other safety/welfare concerns. She sought an urgent hearing, and sought an exemption from attending mediation due to domestic violence, urgency and the application being made without notice. The narrative in her C100 application states that: “I am a victim of domestic violence and my ex-partner pushed me away and kept all my children with him 4 years ago. He abused me through the children contact since then and recently he cut-off all the contact with me and I have now no means to contact my children. He is very much abusive and I am concerned about my children that they are being abused by him. Also, he can take them away any time back to [country B] or anywhere else out of my reach without letting me know. I want to get my children back with me and want other arrangements as the court may think best fits for my children.”

47. She sought a without notice hearing on the basis that: “If the Respondent is notified about the hearing, he might get violent with the children, or may try to stop the proceeding, or may get quick tickets to run away”.

48. The mother filed a C1A form with her C100, alleging physical, emotional, psychological, sexual and financial abuse of herself by the father, and physical, emotional and psychological abuse of the children. The allegations go back to 2001, and include coercive control of various forms, serious physical abuse and forceful sex. She also alleged that: “My children are being brainwashed, controlled, abused and used by their father. He brainwashes them against me and my relationship with them is suffering as a result. There is poor hygiene in the house and little food. The older children look after the younger children. They are not allowed to contact me. I have no access to information about them including school and others.”

49. The father responded to the allegations on the C1A form, denying each of them. His narrative included: “I have extensive evidence to disprove the above allegations, including my contact with the Police and Social Services, bank statements and evidence of written communication between the parties. The Mother has had continuous professional involvement and received treatment for her mental health, depression and suicide attempts in 2002 and 2023, meaning she was not isolated from others and had ongoing support. Our older children are able to attest to their experiences.”

50. The father filed his own C1A form on 7.8.25, alleging physical and emotional abuse of himself by the mother, and emotional and sexual abuse of the children. The form includes extensive cross-allegations, starting in 2002 and through until July 2023. The allegations include physical abuse of the father (including an alleged assault in 2006 when she was arrested by the police), emotional abuse of the children (including false allegations to the police, and erratic behaviours/frequent disappearances), sexual abuse of their youngest daughter by the Imam in 2019, and false rape allegations against the father. The police had been contacted on numerous occasions. He refers to the mother suffering from “several mental illnesses, including chronic depression, anxiety, dissociative disorder, personality disorder and bipolar” and alleges that inter alia : “The Mother’s poor mental health means that she places herself within dangerous relationships with men that subject her to abuse and coercive control. She claimed rape and abuse against each and every one of her partners. She has frequently left the children without explanation to be with new partners. The Mother has an inability to protect herself from abuse including sexual abuse and…is unable to safeguard her children from sexual abuse… The Mother has inability to care and protect for herself and her health let alone caring and providing for the children’s basic needs… The Mother has continuously perpetrated physical and emotional abuse including made false allegations about me (and all of lovers and partners) to different authorities across the UK. Both the Police and Social Services agree that the children are safe, stable, healthy and thriving in my care. The Mother’s continued attempts to create turmoil and instability in myself and the children’s life is distressing and damaging for all of us…”

51. The first hearing took place at West London Family Court on 8.8.23 before DDJ Hecht. The mother was represented by Counsel and the father by his solicitor. The court orders included: 51.1. PSO preventing the mother from removing the children from the father’s care, and both parties from removing the children from the UK; 51.2. Medical disclosure by the mother; 51.3. Police disclosure; 51.4. Transfer of the proceedings to the Central Family Court, with a hearing to be listed on the first available date after 24.8.23.

52. The next hearing took place at the Central Family Court on 25.1.24 before DDJ O’Leary. Again the mother was represented by Counsel, and the father by his solicitor. The court orders included: 52.1. Continuation of the PSO; 52.2. Indirect contact between the mother and the children by letters, cards, small gifts and/or photos not more than twice a month; the court declined to order direct contact; 52.3. The decision that a Fact-Finding Hearing was required, and directions for schedules of allegations and witness statements; 52.4. Police disclosure; 52.5. Local authority disclosure; 52.6. CAFCASS safeguarding checks; 52.7. The next hearing was listed on 6.8.24.

53. At the hearing on 6.8.24 before DDJ Kumar, the mother was represented by Counsel and the father by his solicitor. The court recited that non-molestation cross undertakings given on 11.9.23 in FLA proceedings, and which were due to expire on 11.9.24, would continue by consent until 11.9.25. The court ordered: 53.1. Continuation of the PSO; 53.2. Weekly phone contact between the mother, A and B by Facetime, with the father not to be present and to be arranged through D’s mobile phone; 53.3. The mother to continue to send cards/letters/photos/gifts no more than twice a month, and the father to send photographs once a month; 53.4. Directions to PTR, including further witness statements from both parents, and responses to allegations; 53.5. PTR on 3.6.25 and fact-finding hearing on 9-11.7.25 (3 days), both before a Circuit Judge; 53.6. Further police disclosure order.

54. The mother made a C2 application on 23.9.24, after the Facetime contact had broken down, as the children indicated that they no longer wished to speak to their mother. She sought a hearing to consider next steps, prior to the PTR. At the hearing on 5.11.24, the mother was represented by Counsel and the father by his solicitor. DDJ Ellington directed: 54.1. A CAFCASS s.7 report into the children’s wishes/feelings, their views about spending time with the mother, and recommendations for child arrangements; CAFCASS were also to report on the children’s wishes/feelings on interim video-contact with their mother; 54.2. Ongoing indirect contact by cards/letters/photographs/gifts; 54.3. Further witness statements and replies to schedules of allegations; 54.4. An updated letter from the mother’s GP about her mental health; 54.5. A further hearing on 30.4.25, once the CAFCASS report had been received; 54.6. The PTR (3.6.25) and 3 day FFH (9-11.7.25) remained listed.

55. At the next hearing on 30.4.25, the mother was again represented by Counsel and the father by his solicitor. The s.7 report had been received, and recommended only indirect contact, relying on the children’s wishes/feelings, but without any consideration of the parties’ allegations and safeguarding issues. DJ Grant: 55.1. Continued the PSO, and the indirect contact (by cards/letters/photos/gifts); 55.2. Vacated the PTR and 3 day FFH, and instead directed that the matter be dealt with as a 1 day final hearing, without a FFH, which the court considered to be “neither necessary nor proportionate” ; 55.3. There was to be oral evidence from the CAFCASS officer, but only limited evidence from the parties (maximum 1 hour each); 55.4. The schedule to the order recites that the mother wanted there to be a fact-finding hearing (or a contested final hearing) but the father had sought to conclude the proceedings that day.

56. The 1-day final hearing was listed before me on 9.7.25. A 725 page bundle was lodged for that hearing, emphasising the complexity of the issues to be resolved. The CAFCASS officer attended and gave oral evidence during the morning, and into the afternoon. The mother’s position was that the recommendations of CAFCASS (indirect contact by letters/cards/gifts only) were draconian and wholly unfair, for a mother where there were - on her case - no safeguarding issues. The CAFCASS officer was clear that she had not been asked to consider the truth or otherwise of safeguarding issues raised by the parties, but was reporting on the children’s wishes and feelings, as expressed to her when meeting the children. It was clear to me that it was not realistic for the case to be resolved in only one day, on the basis of indirect contact only, when there were such serious cross allegations, none of which had been considered by the court, and in circumstances where the mother sought direct and increasing contact with the children. I did not agree with the case management decision of DJ Grant, which seemed to me to avoid dealing with the fundamental issues in the case, of whether the parents were (either of them) abusive, as the other alleged, such that the children were unsafe in their care. I made orders including: 56.1. That the PSO continue; 56.2. The children should live with the father until further order; 56.3. Indirect contact should continue between the mother and the children by cards/letters/photos/gifts; 56.4. The adult sons’ letters should be filed as formal witness statements with signed statements of truth; 56.5. The father’s position statement for the 9.7.25 hearing, which was effectively evidence, was to be re-filed as a witness statement with a signed statement of truth; 56.6. The hearing was adjourned to a 2-day combined fact-finding/final hearing on 2-3.10.25; 56.7. The parents would both give oral evidence, together with the adult sons, if their evidence was relied on; 56.8. The court would only consider allegations at the adjourned hearing, which were relevant to the children’s future welfare; 56.9. The mother agreed to self-refer to Talking Therapies (as recommended by the CAFCASS Officer).

57. In the week of the 2-3.10.25 hearing, the father’s solicitor applied for an adjournment. The father had been unable to continue to afford to instruct his previous solicitor on a privately funded basis, but had managed to obtain legal aid. Although his solicitor had instructed Counsel, they had returned the papers, and despite significant efforts by his solicitor, no other Counsel could be located who could take the case at short notice on legal aid. The mother did not object to the adjournment application. Because the mother was legally represented, and the issues were complex, thus making a level playing field of legal representation important, I agreed to the adjournment application, and the hearing was relisted for 15-16.12.25. The mother was represented by the same Counsel at the 15-16.12.25 hearing, but the father was represented by new Counsel.

58. On 15-16.12.25, I first resolved which allegations would be focus of the hearing (as set out below), and then heard oral evidence from the mother and father in person, and from C remotely. The evidence ranged over sensitive issues, and the mother sought breaks as she gave her evidence, which the court permitted on each occasion. The evidence was completed by the end of 16 December, but there was insufficient time to hear oral closing submissions. The hearing was adjourned to the next date when the court and Counsel were available, being 30.1.26, for closing submissions. The mother sought permission to attend the 30.1.26 hearing remotely from her solicitors’ office, which was granted. After closing submissions, this Judgment was reserved and is being handed down in writing, with a short hearing listed on 3.3.26 to deal with any issues on the final order. Law A. Children Act 1989

59. Both parties are asking the Court to make child arrangements orders and prohibited steps orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 . In considering this, Children Act 1989 section 1 sets out that the Court should take into account the following: 1Welfare of the child. (1) When a court determines any question with respect to: (a) the upbringing of a child… (b)…. the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. (2) In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. (2A) A court, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (4)(a)…, is as respects each parent… to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare. (2B) In subsection (2A) “involvement” means involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but not any particular division of a child's time. (3) In the circumstances mentioned in subsection (4), a court shall have regard in particular to: (a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); (b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; (c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; (d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; (e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; (f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; (g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question. (4) The circumstances are that— (a) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge a section 8 order, and the making, variation or discharge of the order is opposed by any party to the proceedings;… (b)…. (5) Where a court is considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Act with respect to a child, it shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all. B. Fact-Finding Hearings

60. The relevant legal principles for dealing with Fact-Finding Hearings are well set out in BY v BX [2022] EWHC 108 Fam, a decision of Mr Justice Cobb, at §26: “I distil the principles below on which I determine the issues in the case as follows: i) The burden of proof lies, throughout, with the person making the allegation. In this case, both the mother and the father make allegations (in some respects overlapping) against each other on which they seek adjudications; ii) In private law cases, the court needs to be vigilant to the possibility that one or other parent may be seeking to gain an advantage in the battle against the other. This does not mean that allegations are false, but it does increase the risk of misinterpretation, exaggeration, or fabrication; iii) It is not for either parent to prove a negative; there is no 'pseudo-burden' on either to establish the probability of explanations for matters which raise suspicion; iv) The standard of proof is the civil standard – the balance of probabilities. The law operates a binary system, so if a fact is shown to be more likely than not to have happened, then it happened, and if it is shown not to cross that threshold, then it is treated as not having happened; this principle must be applied, it is reasonably said, with 'common sense'; v) Sometimes the burden of proof will come to the judge's rescue: the party with the burden of showing that something took place will not have satisfied him that it did. But, generally speaking, a judge ought to be able to make up his/her mind where the truth lies without needing to rely upon the burden of proof; vi) The court can have regard to the inherent probabilities of events or occurrences; the more serious or improbable the allegation the greater the need for evidential 'cogency'; vii) Findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation; it is for the party seeking to prove the allegation to "adduce proper evidence of what it seeks to prove"; viii) The court must consider and take into account all the evidence available. My role here is to survey the evidence on a wide canvas, considering each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. I must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the person making the allegation has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof; ix) The evidence of the parties themselves is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability; x) It is, of course, not uncommon for witnesses to tell lies in the course of a fact-finding investigation and a court hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, and distress. I am conscious that the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 ); I have borne firmly in mind what Lord Lane CJ said in Lucas, namely that: "To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness." xi) That my function in resolving disputes of fact in the family court is fundamentally different from the role of the judge and jury in the Crown Court. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Re R [2018] EWCA Civ 198 : "The primary purpose of the family process is to determine, as best that may be done, what has gone on in the past, so that that knowledge may inform the ultimate welfare evaluation where the court will choose which option is best for a child with the court's eyes open to such risks as the factual determination may have established" ([62] Re R). A point which I myself considered in F v M [2019] EWHC 3177 , in a judgment which was referenced with approval in Re H-N (see §69/70). xii) At all times, I must follow the principles and guidance at PD 12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010.

61. In considering the allegations which each party makes against the other, I bear firmly in mind paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 12J: "Domestic abuse is harmful to children, and/or puts children at risk of harm, whether they are subjected to domestic abuse, or witness one of their parents being violent or abusive to the other parent, or live in a home in which domestic abuse is perpetrated (even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with domestic abuse, and may also suffer harm indirectly where the domestic abuse impairs the parenting capacity of either or both parents." Oral evidence

62. Before making findings about the allegations, I need to consider the parties’ oral evidence.

63. Both parties requested special measures during the final hearing. A screen was provided in the court room, ensuring that neither could see the other during the hearing. Although the mother requested on the morning of 15.12.25 that she give evidence from a separate room, the lack of prior notice of this request meant that it was not logistically possible to arrange it. However, while each party was giving oral evidence, the screen in the courtroom meant that they could not see each other, and each were able to give their evidence without interruption. Breaks were permitted during the evidence, as required.

64. The mother sought to use her oral evidence as an opportunity to explain things from her own perspective. Some of this was unprompted by questions. She described how she was now thriving, away from the father: she is working part-time, has her own home, her own money, and is enjoying her life. She is very sad not to be seeing the children, but otherwise considers that she is in a good place, emotionally. She was keen to explain that she had no current mental health issues, and no longer suffers from depression, which she blamed on the father and what she described as his abuse of her during the marriage. She denied all the allegations made against her, but in her answers, she often avoided giving a clear response. She was evasive and vague. She would not answer some questions, or would ask questions in response, to deflect the question. She was unable or unwilling to give any specificity in respect of several of her allegations, and would repeatedly say that because of the trauma she had suffered, she could not be expected to give dates or details, and did not wish to be re-traumatised by reliving the events. The court dealt with this sensitively, but also reminded the mother that her evidence was important, and the court wanted to receive and understand it. Overall, in numerous aspects, I was not satisfied that the mother was telling the truth, or had any empathy for the impact on the children of the events of the last few years.

65. The father sought to give clear and detailed answers to the questions asked. At times he was distressed, particularly in respect of the mother’s rape allegations against him which he strongly rejects. He explained how the children have been affected by the events of the last few years, and focussed on them rather than on himself. Despite what has happened, it seemed from his evidence that he still cares for the mother and is concerned about her. He believes that she has suffered from serious mental health issues over many years, and explained how these have impacted the children. He believes that the children need to be protected from her - in his view - erratic and reckless behaviour. My impression was that he did not bear the mother ill will, but that he has sought to act to safeguard the children. I found him to be a truthful and careful witness.

66. C gave evidence by video link from his room at university. He was robustly cross-examined by the mother’s Counsel, on the mother’s instructions. It was clear that he found the experience unsettling, but he answered each question carefully and clearly, and stood by of all his allegations. He described the abuse he and his siblings had suffered in the mother’s care, and how difficult it had been when they had received repeated police visits at home following the mother’s allegations in 2023. He accepted that the words he had used in his 2024 letter, and repeated in his 2025 witness statement, were strong but he maintained that this was justified by the impact on him and his siblings of the mother’s behaviour over many years. He maintained that he has no wish to see or speak to his mother. The thrust of the cross examination by the mother’s Counsel was that C was lying and exaggerating his evidence, at the behest of the father. C strongly rejected this. I found him to be an impressive and truthful witness.

67. E had provided a witness statement, but was not able to give oral evidence because he was abroad working, for the adjourned final hearing. That impacts on the weight which I can give to his statement, but does not mean that I should entirely ignore its contents, when it has been put before the court with a statement of truth. In essence, E’s account reflects C’s evidence, about the abuse the children and the father suffered at the hands of their mother over many years.

68. I also heard oral evidence from Ms Caroline Lawes, the CAFCASS officer, on 9.7.25, which focussed on the children’s welfare, and wishes/feelings, and which I will deal with further below. The parties’ allegations

69. Many allegations have been made by each party against the other, going back over most of their c.20 year marriage. At the beginning of the 15.12.25 adjourned final hearing, I indicated which allegations I considered to be relevant to current welfare decisions relating to A and B, bearing in mind the words of Mr Justice Hayden in Re A (Appeal: Findings of Fact) [2025] EWHC 1279 (Fam):

41. It follows, to my mind, that when the Court has decided that domestic abuse allegations are relevant to determining the welfare of the child, it must then consider and sift out which of the allegations are likely to be relevant and, it follows, which are not. The question is a specific, not a generic one. The decision to conduct a fact-finding hearing, in respect of domestic abuse, does not automatically open a floodgate to a litany of allegations which may be years old. That is simply not the purpose of the Children Act proceedings. The investigations require to be linked, inextricably and exclusively, to those matters which are required to determine the children’s welfare….

42. In summary and, I recognise, at risk of repetition, the decision as to what findings are sought needs to be taken with reference to the key criteria, namely how the findings are “likely to be relevant to any decision of the court relating to the welfare of the child”. The process of identifying those findings is therefore a selective one. Perhaps counterintuitively to Family practitioners, this process may result in a conclusion that a serious allegation by one of the parties does not need to be tried because it is simply not going to have a bearing on the ultimate welfare outcome. Further, the case law shows that litigating allegations which have become uncoupled from any link with the welfare of the child, can sometimes be both counterproductive and contrary to the child’s best interests.

70. I also note the approach which Mr Justice Hayden stated (in the above case) should be taken when there are rape allegations, including at §25: “Whilst the cross-contamination of criminal and family law in a fact-finding hearing is “fundamentally wrong”, this cannot mean that a judge in a Family case is not required to consider whether a victim was “forced” into sexual intercourse or whether they “submitted”, or indeed whether they were “raped”. Whilst the word rape is a word defined by law, it must be remembered that it has a separate life in ordinary language where it exists as an everyday word. These are not “concepts from the criminal law” as the Recorder termed it, but facts which required determination. Whether the sexual act is “consensual” is an important finding of fact (i.e. not law) which cannot logically be avoided, and which has significant consequences one way or the other. Indeed, it is central to the evidence on this particular allegation.”

71. I indicated that I would focus on allegations 6—10 and 12-13 of the mother’s schedule, and the father’s allegations 1 & 2 (each with 3 sub-allegations), giving a total of 7 allegations for the mother and 6 allegations for the father. These included allegations of rape, coercive and controlling behaviour (of various forms), physical abuse (of the mother), physical abuse (of the father and children), exposing B to sexual abuse by a third party, and malicious communications with third party authorities. They are serious allegations and need careful consideration. Both parties agreed with this approach, and the oral evidence and closing submissions focussed on these allegations. Mother’s allegations - findings

72. The burden of proof is on the mother in respect of her allegations, with the Court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities. In considering the allegations, I take into account all the written evidence, and the oral evidence, although I will not recite all of this below, but just summarise it.

73. The respondent has repeatedly raped me during the relationship. On one occasion I think D may have heard this as he was next door in his bedroom. This is a very serious allegation, but the mother’s evidence in support is limited. She sought to deflect questions about dates and times, and gave very little description of how and when these alleged rapes were said to have happened. One allegation made to the police in 2019 related to an alleged rape in December 2018, but when the father had been an inpatient in hospital (he provided a photograph of himself in hospital and medical notes showing the dates). The father was arrested in front of the children, and interviewed, but following this, the police took no further action. Another allegation, made to the police on 16.7.23, related to an alleged rape on 31.12.22. The police notes record that they were told by the mother that this rape happened at about 13:00 that day. On 15.12.25 (at the beginning of the adjourned final hearing), the father provided to the court a Police interpreter form showing that he was working as an interpreter for the British Transport Police from 09:00 to 17:00 on 31.12.22. The mother’s response was to make a generic allegation of multiple rapes, during the marriage and subsequently, but without any specific details or dates. Although I of course accept that trauma of victims can impact on recollection of specific details, and dates, it is in my experience very unusual to have almost no details at all. The father was robustly cross-examined by the mother’s Counsel, but remained clear that he had never raped the mother during their marriage. He also indicated that they did not have sex in December 2022, consensual or otherwise. The mother produced no supporting evidence for her allegations. There was no medical evidence. The police downloaded the messages between the mother and father following the alleged rape on 31.12.22 and the police disclosure states: “I have reviewed the search history, videos, images and chat messages. I have found a chat thread between them both, where the complainant was staying at the address for 7 days after the offence and there is no issues between them. No mention of the alleged offence. Later in the chat, the following month she is asking for spicy selfies of the SUSP [father] who confirms he is busy in court and can’t reply.” Having carefully considered all of the evidence, I am not satisfied that the mother was a truthful witness in respect of these rape allegations. I do not accept that the father has ever raped the mother.

74. 2002-2019: The Respondent claimed benefits on my behalf and refused to pass the money on to me. This allegation is one of the mother’s allegations which together might indicate coercive and controlling behaviour on the part of the father. The father accepted that he claimed benefits (including disability benefit for the mother’s mental health issues) for many years, but disputed that he refused to pass on any money to her. He stated that some of the money was used to support the family and household costs, but that other money was provided to the mother for her expenses, holidays, purchase of a car etc.. The father also noted that he would pay for the mother to travel to visit the children, after they separated. The mother provided no financial disclosure in support of this allegation at all. I have seen no bank statements, or benefits documentation, nor did she request that the father provide such disclosure. Her oral evidence was vague and unclear. Overall, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this allegation is made out.

75. The respondent forced me to sign a power of attorney for my health affairs. Again, this allegation forms part of the mother’s case of coercive and controlling behaviour on the part of the father. The father accepted that a power of attorney was signed by the mother, in respect of health and welfare. I was not provided with a copy of it by either party, but police records indicate that the power of attorney was registered on 30.1.20. The father explained that the mother willingly signed the document, in the presence of her GP and himself, it having been suggested by the doctor because of her serious mental health issues around that time. He denies that he forced her to sign it. He used it only once, when requested by the police during a mental health crisis of the mother. The mother has provided no evidence of how the father “forced” her to sign it. She does not dispute that she signed in the presence of her GP. She has not provided any evidence from the GP about the circumstances of her signing, or any lack of consent. On the balance of probabilities, the mother has not made out this allegation.

76. 2022: Respondent dragged me down the stairs following a contact session and ripped my clothes in front of the children. The mother elaborated on this allegation in her oral evidence. She talked about “chunks of hair” having been pulled out by the father as he dragged her downstairs. There was no specific date provided. She said that the children just stood by, and did nothing to assist her. She provided no medical evidence in support, no photographic evidence of injuries or torn clothes, or other supporting evidence. She provided no context for how this alleged seriously assault was triggered, other than a generic allegation of a dispute over child arrangements. The father denied the allegation. He denied ever having assaulted the mother. He also denied that the children would ever stand by and watch him assault their mother in this way. Neither C nor E mentioned any such incident in their statements. Having considered the evidence, I am not satisfied that the mother’s allegation is true.

77. 2019: The respondent stole my identification documents such as my passport. These are still in his possession. Again, this forms part of the mother’s allegation of coercive and controlling behaviour. The father accepts that the mother’s passport and other important documents were kept at the family home during their marriage. After they separated, he says that when the mother asked for the documents, he gave the folder to her. He did not accept that he deliberately withheld any documents from her, or that he was controlling in this regard. The mother was unclear in her oral evidence about which documents were withheld, and for which period. There was no evidence provided of any written requests made by her (eg messages sent), with which the father failed to comply. In essence this was a broad allegation, without supporting evidence or specificity. On balance, I do not believe that the mother’s allegation is made out.

78. 2020: The respondent forced me to sign a false statement regarding an Imam assaulting our daughter. This allegation relates to the incident on 4.3.19, where the mother alleged to the police that the Imam sexually abused B. Although the mother maintained her allegation to the police for more than a year – repeating it to the police on numerous occasions throughout that period (as shown in the police disclosure) - and she also reported it to medical professionals and others, her case now in these family proceedings, is that it was the father who made up the allegation and “forced me to sign a false statement”. She says that this was due to the father wanting to get the Imam into trouble, and denies that the Imam ever assaulted B. In her oral evidence at the final hearing, she said she only went to the Imam’s house that day to collect a book, that she did not have sex with him, and that B was not assaulted. The father entirely denies this allegation. He says that he was extremely shocked by the allegation in respect of B, when he was told it by the police (not by the mother) in June 2019. He does not know whether the assault happened or not, but none of this was made up by him. Instead of trying to get the Imam into trouble, he explained that in early 2019, he persuaded the Imam to enter into a Sharia marriage with the mother, in place of the Nikah Muta’h (“pleasure marriage”) to try to protect the mother and her reputation, at the mother’s request, and because he cared about the consequences for the mother of what was happening between her and the Imam. I have thought very carefully about this allegation, and what did or did not happen to B. It is a very serious allegation to have made against the Imam, with serious consequences for him. But it also had consequences for B, who underwent a CP medical as a result of the allegation. Fortunately, it seems that she was too young to remember this, and the father says he has not discussed anything about it with her as she has got older, and B does not seem to have any memories of it. I do not accept that the father “forced” the mother to “sign a false statement” about this event. The mother personally made the allegation about the Imam assaulting B to many people in positions of authority: police, doctors, charity commission etc. The allegation was not just made once by her, but often. It was thoroughly investigated by the police, who in the end decided there was insufficient evidence to charge the Imam. I cannot see any reason why the father would involve his 2-year old daughter in the obvious difficulties of the relationship between the mother and the Imam, or expose his young daughter to police investigations and medical procedures. I do not have sufficient evidence within these proceedings to be able to find on the balance of probabilities that B was sexually abused by the Imam in the way the mother alleged in 2019 and 2020. The mother herself now denies anything happened, and the Imam has always denied the allegation. The father was not present, nor were any other third parties. B was too young to be able to talk about what did or did not happen, and the CP medical did not evidence that she had been caused any injuries. However, I am satisfied that the mother made this allegation to the police herself, unprompted by the father. She did so as her relationship with the Imam was breaking down, in June 2019, rather than shortly after the alleged assault on 4.3.19. I am also satisfied that the mother took B to the Imam’s house, that day, leaving her 2-year-old child unsupervised downstairs while she went upstairs to have sex with the Imam. She did not act to protect her baby daughter from a man with whom she had entered into a “pleasure marriage” – later described by her as “grooming” by the Imam – but took B directly into his home. This incident raises serious safeguarding issues in respect of the mother, as does her subsequent decision to make allegations involving B to the police and other authorities, with its impact on B.

79. 2022-23: The respondent sent the applicant inappropriate naked images of himself. The father accepted that he sent the mother one or more naked images of himself. He says that these were requested by the mother, in a period when he thought she sought to reconcile their marriage, but he regrets sending them. The mother did not provide the messages between them, or these photographs, in support of this allegation. The father’s phone has been taken by the police as a result of the mother’s rape allegation and so he cannot provide them. As already set out above, the police, in investigating the mother’s rape allegation of 31.12.22, downloaded the father’s phone and the police disclosure states: “I have found a chat thread between them both, where the complainant was staying at the address for 7 days after the offence and there is no issues between them. No mention of the alleged offence. Later in the chat, the following month she is asking for spicy selfies of the SUSP [father] who confirms he is busy in court and can’t reply.” This was around the time when the mother alleges that the father sent the photographs, and when the father says that the mother requested them. Having considered the evidence, I do not accept that the father sent the mother “inappropriate” naked images of himself, but rather that he sent photographs which the mother requested. Father’s allegations – findings

80. The burden of proof is on the father in respect of his allegations, with the Court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities. In considering the allegations, I take into account all of the written evidence, and the oral evidence.

81. M has habitually engaged in sexual acts with her lovers within the family home and her lover’s place while the children were present. Although the father believes that the mother engaged in sexual acts with her lovers in the family home, he was unable to provide dates or evidence of this, and the mother denied it. I therefore do not make this finding. I have already made a finding about the mother taking B to the Imam’s house on 4.3.19, and leaving her 2-year-old downstairs unattended while the mother and the Imam had sex upstairs. This was a serious safeguarding risk for B.

82. M has facilitated a sexual encounter between [her] lover and the parties’ daughter B. As already set out above, I do not have sufficient evidence to be able to find on the balance of probabilities that B was sexually assaulted by the Imam on 4.3.19. However, I do find that the mother took B to the Imam’s house, and thereby created a serious safeguarding risk for B, in circumstances where the mother was already well aware of the Imam’s inappropriate sexual behaviour towards herself. As a result of the mother’s allegation (which she now says was untrue), B underwent a CP medical as part of the police investigations.

83. On at least one occasion, the M has diverted money intended for the children’s upbringing to her lover. The mother denied this allegation. The father stood by the allegation but had not provided any specific evidence of how much money was diverted to the mother’s lover, or which lover, or why that money had been intended for the children’s upbringing. I therefore do not have the evidence on which to make this finding.

84. M has perpetrated domestic abuse towards the parties’ children and F, including physical (until 2021), verbal and emotional abuse. This is a very broad umbrella allegation, not broken down into separate allegations. Although the father alleges that the mother was abusive towards him, he does not focus on specific incidents or events in his evidence or schedule. There was one incident in 2006 when the police were called, after he alleges the mother assaulted him. I have no detailed evidence about this incident, and in my view it is too historic to be relevant to the children’s current welfare. He does not otherwise provide any significant detail of abusive incidents towards him, and in his oral evidence he was sympathetic towards the mother’s mental health difficulties over the years, to which I believe he attributed much of her abusive behaviour. However the mother’s alleged abusive behaviour towards the children and to the father is dealt with at some length in the witness statements of C and E. C’s statement makes many allegations including: (a) The mother is “very short-tempered and explosive, which often led to physical abuse, of which her favourite options were spitting, pinching, ear pulling, hair pulling, slapping, scratching/clawing and poking” (§3) (b) “These memories linger like the pair of crescents which she would pinch into my arms and the throbbing of an ear pulled too hard” (§5) (c) “My own mother would also emotionally abuse me by using my weight to bully me at any chance she got…Some examples as to how she would bully me are by singling out what I ate, how I looked, what I wore and by using hurtful nicknames such as pig or whale to describe me” (§10) (d) “She would eventually use those names on my sister [A], and I remember [A] crying all night because of that” (§11) (e) “This bullying greatly impacted me in school as I didn’t have the confidence to make friends and speak up for myself as she made sure that I was as insecure as possible and that my self-worth was as low as possible.” (§12) (f) “One of the most vivid memories I have of her was when she poured over half of a bottle of shampoo on my head, then proceeded to pull my ear with almost enough strength to pull it right off” (§14) (g) “I also remember of her argument she was having with my dad. She picked up his laptop and proceeded to snap it in half in front of everyone watching. My dad put door hinges on it to continue using it” (§15) (h) “Another example…was when she half-flipped table we were eating on during Ramadan, launched plates and bowls of soup into the curtain and windows, leaving us scared and we had to clean up the mess as well. Why did she do this, you ask? We were laughing on the table” (§16) (i) “in one of our visitations where we met her in queens park…she clearly mentioned that there is a battle between her and my dad and that she “cannot let him win”… Just for record, she also used these meetings to continue what she used to do when my dad wasn’t there, to try and convince us our dad is a horrible abusive monster instead of using the time correctly by bonding with her children.” (§18-19) E’s statement recalls: (a) When “she flipped the table and pulled down the curtains while the kids and my father were eating. The food, including hot soup, spilled everywhere and fell on the kids, and she left us to clean up the mess from the carpet and the walls” (§2) (b) Another occasion around May 2019 “she ended up hitting my face and head repeatedly, spitting on my face, and scratched my neck to where it was bleeding. The only reason her attack stopped was when my father heard this from upstairs and came running down to pull her away from me. She then took my phone and smashed it with a hammer, to which it was irreparable. I loved my phone; it was an iPhone 8 that my father bought me not long before this incident as a gift for passing my GCSEs with good grades” (§3) (c) “After this happened, she then kicked me out of the house. She kicked me and my father out of the house on many other occasions after insulting us and abusing us for reasons that I didn’t understand, and sometimes for no reason at all; sometimes even because she didn’t like how my face looked” (§4) (d) “My mother’s physical abuse towards me and my father was immense. It always began with insults, which she shouted and screamed at us and said very hurtful things for all the children to hear. She didn’t care that her behaviour was scaring them. The shouting and verbal abuse almost always then escalated to hitting, scratching and spitting. When it came to me, I would always cover my face or try to hold back her hand, and my father would pull her away from me to where her abuse would then be directed towards him” (§5) (e) “My mother’s abuse towards my father included scratching, pinching, punching him, throwing objects that were around her at him, smashing his laptops, and using demoralising and derogatory and sometimes racist language in an attempt to belittle him in front of my young siblings” (§6) (f) “I vividly remember seeing my father’s leg one day bruised and filled with dried bloody marks. My father always tried to hide the fact that he was upset after these events and told me not to worry, and to be patient with my mother, and always tried to hide the marks of my mother’s physical abuse. Despite all of this, my father never spoke badly about her to me or my siblings, and always told us to be patient with her as she suffered with her own mental battles” (§7) (g) “I remember the first time she had my father arrested under the false allegation of rape…the officers took away my father in cuffs and she stood infront of me in a gloating manner and instructed one of the officers to give me a lecture about respecting women and to not being abusive like my father…She made sure that my younger siblings were listening so that she would defame his character in front of them with the help of police presence” (§9) (h) E also deals in some detail with the incident on 25.6.23, when the mother went into the house without the father’s agreement and refused to leave, and police then attended the house. I bear in mind in considering the weight to be given to E’s evidence, that he was not available to attend the final hearing to give evidence and be cross examined, on the adjourned December dates – although I understand he would have been available had the final hearing taken place as originally listed in October. However, he signed a Statement of Truth at the end of the statement, dated 17.8.25, confirming the truth of its contents, and knowing that it would be put before the court as his formal evidence. Much of what E says is confirmed by C’s statement, and having heard C’s oral evidence, I was satisfied that C was a truthful witness. Although the mother in her written evidence and at the final hearing denied all the allegations of abuse of the children and the father, the father has provided voice recordings of conversations between them in June 2021 which I have listened to, and included the mother saying: (a) “when I criticise someone, when I tell someone off, the shouting, the swearing, the beating, it’s very bad…I find myself a bad person…the tears I extracted from [A] is a crime…I feel that I am hurting them…”; (b) “I am not able to cope with the kids getting teenagers…I love being near them but there are times that I feel I can’t cope, I’d snap just like that….they are not conforming to my limited ability to cope”; and (c) “I am damaging these kids…I find reason for [C] to bully him and [D]…I am struggling to cope…and I cannot stop and I cannot do differently”. I am satisfied on the evidence I have heard and read, that the mother treated the children and the father abusively, physically, verbally and emotionally, on multiple occasions both before and after the parties separated in January 2019.

85. M has harassed F and the children I have already made findings above that the mother has made two false allegations of rape in respect of the father, to the police. This also constitutes harassment of the father. I set out below my findings in respect of what I accept were malicious communications by the mother with various authorities, particularly in June/July 2023, when the police and local authority attended the family home on multiple occasions. C deals with the impact of the mother’s harassment of the children, in his statement: “She also made sure to terrorise use in our own home by calling the police again and again and again and again, turning our house into a police station. This traumatised all of us as we still expect another police officer or two or three at every knock on the door. Time and against it’s clear that to her, the children are viewed as collateral damaging when targeting my dad. But why?” (§13) E also describes the impact of harassment: (a) “Every time we get a knock on the door from police officers, I see the fear and distress in my youngest sister [B’s] eyes, and she goes to hide behind me or my father or my other siblings. This makes me very upset. All this fear and worry isn’t something children should feel in their home, their safespace. That’s all we want. A safe space and peace, and that is anywhere my father is” (§20) (b) “I would like to make clear to the judge that it’s true my mother needs help, but we also need help. Our life is stressful and suspended because of my mother’s harassment and police and court cases. We need someone to stop her abuse of our family. We are always worried about what she will do next” (§22). The father’s written evidence also deals with the impact of the harassment on the family. I am satisfied, on all the evidence, that the mother did harass the father and children by her actions.

86. M has engaged in malicious communications with third parties (police, local authority, schools and NSPCC) Particularly in June/July 2023, the mother made various referrals to the local authority, the children’s school and the NSPCC. This triggered inspections of the home, and local authority investigations, which directly impacted the children. The mother also made multiple allegations to the police then, and previously, including of the father raping her, which on two occasions led to him being arrested at the family home infront of the children. C was clear in his evidence that he and the other children found this traumatising, and that their home stopped being a safe space for them. He remains upset and angry about his mother’s actions. The mother repeatedly said in her oral evidence that local authority, school and NSPCC referrals made by her were for the children’s benefit, because she was concerned about their welfare, and that this came from a place of love and care for her children. However, I do not accept this. By June/July 2023, the mother had lived away for the children for much of the preceding 4½ years (since the initial separation in January 2019). Although there had been some periods when she had stayed in the family home, the majority of the time she had lived elsewhere, with the Imam, Mr A, or in her own accommodation. Had she had genuine concerns about the care the father was giving the children, I do not believe she would have waited over 4 years to raise these. On each occasion, the local authority and police were satisfied that the children were not being neglected or abused by their father. In my judgment, the June/July 2023 allegations made by the mother were prompted by the father refusing to agree to A and B going to stay with the mother in Birmingham, due to his serious concerns about their welfare in the mother’s care (and with Mr A), and refusing to allow the mother and Mr A to move into the family home, with the father to move out. The protective steps which the father had put in place in respect of supervised contact between the children and their mother were entirely necessary given the lengthy and complicated history set out above, and the mother’s erratic and reckless behaviour over many years – but were resented by the mother, and triggered these allegations which were untrue but had a significant impact on all of the children, including A and B, the two youngest. I accept and find that these allegations were made maliciously by the mother, to seek to de-stabilise the father as the children’s primary carer, and so that the mother could move back into the family home and he would have to leave. CAFCASS report and oral evidence

87. I have read a detailed section 7 report written by Ms Caroline Lawes dated 15.4.25, and heard oral evidence from Ms Lawes on 9.7.25. In preparing her report, Ms Lawes spoke to both parents, and talked to A and B separately at their schools. She also received information from the schools about each child, and received an email from D about his lived experiences and wishes in respect of his relationship with his mother. Ms Lawes confirmed in her oral evidence that each girl spoke freely to her, and expressed their wishes and feelings with clarity.

88. B (then aged 8) made handwritten notes about “my life” during her interview including: 88.1. What I like about my life at the moment: “My family. My cats. My dad and my sister and my 3 brothers.” 88.2. What I like about me : “I’m youngest. I’m kind. I love my cats!” 88.3. What upsets me about my life at the moment: “In the situation. I want a normal life”.

89. In respect of her mother, B shared: “Mum doesn’t live with us, I’m OK with mum not living with us. I don’t want anything to do with mum. I last saw her when I was five”. B was clear that she did not want to live with her mother, but to continue living with her father. She was unsure about receiving more letters/cards from her mother, didn’t think she needed any gifts, and would agree to a keepsake box to store the letters from her mother. When asked if she could change anything she said it would be for “Everything to be normal…Not having to speak to professionals like you”. She also said “I don’t have any worries about mum. I don’t want to see her and I don’t know why”. Among her wishes were to go on a plane because she had never travelled and wanted to go to various foreign countries.

90. In B’s “letter to the judge” she wrote “I want to live with my dad and just have a normal life and live with my siblings. I don’t want to live with my mum”.

91. A (aged 13) was asked if she knew the reason for meeting the CAFCASS officer and said “I think it is about who I live with. To be honest I don’t want to have anything to do with her. I feel that living with my dad, brothers and sister is perfect. I have been living with dad since I was 8-10 years old”. A shared that when they had lived together as a family “dad did most of the parenting” and that living with mum “Wasn’t that good, there was lots of arguments and trouble between everyone. Mum hurt dad with the T.V. remote by hitting him, dad didn’t respond to it. I think we spoke to a social worker; they asked what was going on at home. Everything was ok. Life without mum – honestly it has been so peaceful. Mum was always picking on things, she would exaggerate”.

92. In terms of contact with her mother, “I last spoke to mum at the beginning of year 8 or the end of year 7. I was still twelve. I physically saw mum quite some time ago. We used to go to Westfield, it was chaotic and noisy, loud and crowded and mum would get stressed. One time we were nearly out of the door and she started shouting at dad.”

93. When asked if she had any worries, A said “At home I have no worries at all. I speak to my dad about everything, there is nothing I can’t speak to dad about… Mum brings a lot of bad memories. I remember she would insult me before sleeping, calling me dirty and say other things that would make me cry”.

94. A talked about her mixed heritage, knowing her extended family in both country A and country B, and the culture of both countries. She had met her maternal cousin and uncle online and communicated by text, but not seen them in person. She knew she had quite a lot of paternal relatives in country B.

95. A did not want to be in contact with her mother in person or by phone, and found the letters she received from her mother “copy and paste, there is nothing different in our letters, she is not even trying”. She also said “I know as a mother she has rights; updates are fine I don’t really mind but not directly from me. It’s not true dad stopped mum – I don’t feel she put the effort in to be a mother, dad has always helped her”.

96. A did not want to write a letter to the judge, but asked that the following was included in the report: “I want to stay within the family, to stay with my dad. Mum, I don’t really want her in my life. I wish she would just drop it or leave it (Withdraw her application); I don’t think it would go well (Seeing mum).”

97. In terms of the report’s recommendations, Ms Lawes concluded that “a drastic change in arrangements at this stage could be detrimental, unsettling, re-traumatising and disruptive to [A & B’s] good level of resilience. It would also impact on [A & B’s] wellbeing, stability and security, particularly when the children have been consistent and clear in sharing their wishes and feelings about not wishing to have a relationship with their mother.” She would not support a change of the children’s residence to their mother, and recommends a final CAO “lives with” order for the father. She concludes that an ICFA referral would not be suitable in this case, and she also would not support direct supervised contact in a contact centre. She recommends indirect contact by way of letters/cards, small gifts, or video/voice notes. Both daughters should be treated the same: “The sibling relationship is likely to be one of the most important relationships that the children will have growing-up and this would be severely impacted if the spending time arrangements were to take with one child only”.

98. As to possible progression from indirect contact (letters/cards/gifts) to phone/video calls, or direct contact, she recommends shuttle mediation between the parents in the future, with [A and B’s] clear wishes and feelings to be taken into consideration. She recommends the court proceedings reach a conclusion.

99. In her oral evidence, Ms Lawes stood by her report. She was robustly cross examined by Ms McDonald for the mother, on the basis that there were no safeguarding issues, and the mother had no ongoing mental health issues, and so there was no reason why the children should not be spending direct time with their mother, progressing towards overnight contact and living with their mother in the future. Ms Lawes explained how Facetime contact had been tried during the proceedings, but had broken down, and the girls had been clear that they did not want to see or speak to their mother. She described the girls as articulate and clear in their views, but accepted that B had more limited memories than A, given her age.

100. Ms Lawes thought video notes (pre-recorded) might be a good way to progress from letters/cards, so that the girls could watch them at a time of their choosing, and not feel pressurised into Facetime contact that they did not want. She hoped that the children might feel under less pressure with the end of court proceedings, but that their current wishes and feelings were very clear, and as a social worker she did not think it appropriate to override these, in the circumstances of this case. She did not consider it possible at this stage to put in place “stepped arrangements” with specific timeframes for moving through various stages of contact, and was clear that any changes would need to be carefully introduced in the future, to seek to avoid instability for the children. She did not agree to Facetime calls with the mother taking place at the children’s schools, which she thought should be safe spaces for them, away from family worries.

101. Ms Lawes sought to encourage the mother to communicate with the children in a more personalised way through letters, taking on board who the children are, their interests and aspects of her own life, rather than sending fairly generic cards with short messages (I note that there were various examples of these cards in the bundle, and they are indeed short, and fairly generic).

102. She thought the PSO (the mother not to remove the children from the father’s care, or take them abroad)) should remain in place, but that the father should be able to take the children on holiday, and so the PSO relating to him should be removed.

103. Ms Lawes also recommended, in her oral evidence, a s.91(14) order, to seek to prevent further court proceedings for some years. This was not because either party had made vexatious or repeated applications, but because this application had gone on for years, and the children were very aware of it, and needed a break from litigation, and to feel that their living arrangements with their father were stable, rather than under threat from another application. Welfare checklist

104. Having dealt with the background and the parties’ allegations in detail above, I now need to consider the welfare checklist. In making the substantive decisions, A and B’s welfare is my paramount consideration.

105. (a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children concerned (considered in the light of their age and understanding) I have dealt above with the wishes and feelings which both children expressed clearly and articulately to the CAFCASS officer, as set out in her report and confirmed in her oral evidence. The children wish to continue to live with their father, and not to have direct or Facetime contact with their mother at present. The events of the last few years have caused significant instability for the children, and they need stability with their father, and this not to be undermined by their mother’s erratic behaviour. They are content to receive letters/cards from their mother, but not to be required to see her at this time. A is aged 13 and as a teenager, her wishes and feelings should be given significant weight. B is younger, only aged 9, and has fewer (and less negative) memories of her mother. However her wishes were also clearly expressed, and should not be ignored in the balancing exercise.

106. (b) their physical, emotional and educational needs The girls are very settled in their schools and thriving educationally. Their physical and emotional needs are currently well met by their father.

107. (c) the likely effect on them of any change in their circumstances The mother’s primary position now is that she would like the girls to move to live with her in Birmingham. That would mean them moving away from their father, their brothers, their schools and friends, and their family home. It would be a huge change in their circumstances, completely contrary to their wishes, and likely very damaging to them. The girls have said that they do not want to see or speak to their mother for the moment. Facetime was tried in August/September 2024 but stopped when the girls refused to continue. The CAFCASS officer’s view was that forcing the girls to have direct or indirect contact with their mother at this stage, contrary to their clearly expressed wishes and feelings, would be likely to be destabilising for them and thus could cause them emotional harm.

108. (d) their age, sex, background and any characteristics of theirs which the court considers relevant A is 13 and B is 9. They are both girls. Their mother is from country A and their father is from country B. They have extended family living in both countries. Although it is important for their identity to know both their maternal and paternal heritage and cultures, that must be balanced with the harm they may suffer if the current child arrangements are significantly changed.

109. (e) any harm which they have suffered or are at risk of suffering I believe that both A and B have suffered significant harm due to their mother’s abusive behaviour over many years. I have been particularly concerned about the way the mother exposed B to harm on 4.3.19, when the mother was in a relationship with the Imam, prioritising her relationship over B’s safety, and through making the allegation of sexual assault in respect of B, leading to B being medically examined as part of the police investigation. The mother has blamed all of this on the father, falsely alleging that he made up this allegation of sexual assault himself. The mother’s manipulation and erratic behaviour have undoubtedly caused harm to the family, and she shows no remorse or insight into this at all.

110. (f) how capable each of their parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting their needs The father has shown himself capable throughout the children’s lifetimes, and as their sole carer for most of the 4½ years since January 2019, to meet all their needs. There have been multiple local authority assessments/investigations, and all have concluded that he is well able to meet the children’s needs. The mother has not evidenced that she is able to meet the girls’ emotional, physical or educational needs. She has never looked after the girls without the father’s support. Since January 2019, she has spent relatively little time with the girls. I have considered carefully whether the improvement in the mother’s mental health/depression, evidenced by the CMHT letters she has produced from 2024 and 2025, show that there is no longer any risk, but I remain very concerned. The mother did not in her oral evidence show any empathy for the position the children have been exposed to, for several years. She strongly contested C’s evidence, instructing her Counsel to cross examine her son extensively. She does not accept that she has done anything wrong, and showed no remorse at all. She maintained her allegations against the father, including of multiple rapes. She seemed wholly unconcerned about the financial impact her rape allegation has had on the family, and particularly the children, as the father has been unable to work as before. Of course, the fact of the mother’s mental health issues over the years does not, of itself, mean that she should not have contact with her children. But the impact of so many events on the children, and the mother’s lack of acceptance of her erratic and reckless behaviour and how this has impacted the children’s lives, do not support a conclusion that this is the time for her to start to have direct contact with them, let alone that they should move to live with her. Instead, she is still seeking through her approach to this litigation, to undermine the father’s relationship with the children, which would be highly damaging to them, as he has been their stability for so many years.

111. (g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question. The court has the power to make all the orders sought by both parties. Orders

112. During the hearing on 9.7.25 and again on 30.1.26, there were various discussions about possible ways to progress the contact between the mother and the girls over time, but the mother has practically blocked these by her refusal to work with the father, or for him to be involved with the arrangements: 112.1. Shuttle mediation – on 9.7.25 the father said he would be willing to engage with mediation with the mother in the future, taking into account the children’s wishes and feelings; the mother refused to mediate with the father; 112.2. Voice notes/video clips – the father was willing to consider this, as a way to move from letters/cards, towards the possible reinstatement of Facetime calls in the future, but the mother was unwilling for the father to listen to the voice notes or watch the video calls to review their suitability in advance. Understandably the father did not wish for the girls to be distressed by unsuitable or manipulative messages from the mother, and there is no other suitable third party who either party could suggest to assist (they agreed that this was not a responsibility which should be placed on their sons); 112.3. Facetime calls – the mother would not agree to the father having any part in these, or being present in the background, were the girls to agree to take part in the future. She also would not agree to their brothers assisting in the calls, as happened in August/September 2024, when this was organised through D’s phone. The mother’s proposal was that the girls should be taken to a contact centre and an unknown adult facilitate the calls for them, and she could not see how this could be strange or negative for the girls.

113. In the end, and after careful consideration, I have decided that it is not appropriate in this case to make the stepped progression order which the mother seeks. The father – despite all of his experiences over the years – remains sympathetic to the mother, and has his children’s best interests at the core of his decision-making. It will be for the father to consider, as the girls grow older, when may be the right time to encourage the girls to speak to or see their mother, including whether to permit video calls/voice notes as a precursor to this (if the mother is willing to engage in this, in the future). Given the serious safeguarding concerns relating to the mother, any phone calls or visits must be supervised by him or a third party who he and girls trust.

114. I have decided to make the following orders, which I am satisfied are in the best interests of A and B: 114.1. A and B shall live with their father. 114.2. The mother may send them letters/cards and small gifts not more than once a month, to their home. The father should make sure that these are passed to the girls, for them to open if they wish. 114.3. The father should send quarterly updates to the mother through AppClose (a short narrative explaining how the girls are doing at school, their interests, any concerns or issues, and a photograph of them). This should start in April 2025, and be sent in July, October and January each year. These updates will assist the mother to include more personalised information in the letters/cards. 114.4. The Prohibited Steps Order relating to the mother (not to remove the children from the father’s care, or the care of any school/third party to whom he has entrusted their care, and not to remove the children from England/Wales) should remain in place for 3 years. This will take A until shortly before her 16 th birthday. In my judgment, the children need the stability and reassurance which this order will bring. 114.5. I do not think it appropriate for the father to be prevented from taking the children abroad, for holidays and to visit his family, and so I will not make a prohibited steps order in respect of the father. 114.6. I will make a s.91(14) order for a period of 3 years. The 5 years which the father sought is too long, but after litigation lasting now for nearly 3 years, it is important that the children have a break from litigation and time to rebuild their sense of stability. 114.7. The parties have given cross-non molestation undertakings which last until 11.9.26. The mother has pointed out that she has not breached these undertakings, and there is no allegation that she has. She does not agree to extend them any longer than 11.9.26. The mother lives in the Birmingham area, not near to the family home. There have been no incidents since 2023. On balance, I believe that these undertakings have served their purpose, in maintaining the status quo during these proceedings and preventing further incidents of abuse or harassment. In the absence of the mother’s agreement to give further undertakings, I would have to make non-molestation orders, but on balance I do not believe these to be necessary. However, if the mother behaves in an abusive or harassing way after the undertakings end on 11.9.26, or attends at the family home without prior agreement, the father should make an application to court for a non-molestation order to protect himself and the children, as necessary. I grant permission to provide a copy of this Judgment to the court dealing with that application, so that the Judge is fully aware of the background, the nature of the mother’s behaviour in the past, and the need for protective measures to be put in place again. Conclusion

115. I understand that the mother will be distressed at this Judgment. However, I do not believe it is appropriate to override the children’s wishes and feelings, and require them to have direct contact (by Facetime or in person) with the mother at this stage, and while she shows no acceptance of her part in the significant disruption caused to their lives over the last few years, her abuse of the children before and since the parties’ separation in January 2019, exposing B to a serious safeguarding risk in March 2019, making false rape allegations against the father, and false and malicious allegations to various authorities. The risk of the mother further de-stabilising the children is too great, when she lacks both empathy and insight into their needs. Dated: 3.3.26 Addendum – 5 March 2026

116. I circulated this Judgment in draft on 24.2.26, asking for any suggested editorial corrections and any requests for clarification to be received by 2.3.26. I received very minor suggested corrections, all of which I have accepted. There were no requests for clarification. At the hearing listed on 3.3.26, the court finalised the terms of the final substantive order, having received a draft order from Counsel.

117. The father made a C2 application on 2.3.26, seeking permission to disclose the Judgment to the Police. This application had been raised orally at the conclusion of the hearing on 30.1.26, and I said that I would deal with it on 3.3.26 if the father wished to pursue it, and made an application. I heard oral submissions from both parties’ Counsel in respect of whether or not the Judgment (or part of it) should be disclosed to the Police.

118. In summary, the parties’ arguments were: 118.1. The father seeks to disclose an anonymised version of the Judgment to the Police (provided he can tell the police that it relates to these parties). The key reason is that the police have still not decided whether to charge him with rape, arising out of mother’s allegation made in July 2023, over 2½ years ago. Because of the outstanding allegation, he has been unable to work as a police and court interpreter, and so has lost most of his earned income. This has directly impacted on the children who he is solely responsible for funding. He argues that it is therefore very much in the children’s welfare interests for the Police now to make a final decision, and hopefully take no further action in respect of the allegation, so he can work again, and support the children. 118.2. In terms of the legal framework, the father’s Counsel relied on Re C [1997] 1 WLR 322 , and submitted: 118.2.1. It is in the welfare interests of the children for the Judgment to be disclosed to the Police (as above); 118.2.2. There should be no barrier between two branches of the judicature (criminal/family) and the Police will be assisted by receiving this Judgment; 118.2.3. It is in the public interest when there is currently an open investigation for a serious offence, for the Police to make a charging decision; 118.2.4. In terms of the mother’s article 8 rights to private and family life, he is only seeking disclosure to the Police; the potential harm to the mother is limited, but the benefit to the father and children outweighs this; 118.2.5. The father is not wishing to bring any claims himself against the mother, but to protect himself from her false allegations; 118.2.6. The Police should have the full Judgment, rather than just excerpts, so they can see the full context of the court’s decision. 118.3. The mother objected to disclosure of the Judgment to the Police. Alternatively she sought for only parts of the Judgment to be released. She was concerned about the impact on herself of disclosure of the full Judgment, particularly those elements which relate to findings that she has made false or malicious allegations in respect of the father. The point was also made that the Police have carried out their own investigation in respect of the rape allegation, and have no need of a Family Court Judgment. If the Judgment were to be disclosed, it was argued that there should be complete redactions of various paragraphs (including where I have made findings about the mother making false or malicious allegations). It was also argued that it was not in the interests of justice for those taking part in family proceedings, then to have material used against them in the criminal sphere. However, I note that this is not a case whether the mother made any material or incriminating concessions in the course of her evidence. These are the court’s findings in the face of her evidence to the contrary.

119. I raised with both parties the provisions of PD12G of the FPR 2010, which states in paragraph 2.1 that a party may disclose to a Police officer, “the text or summary of the whole or part of a judgment given in the proceedings…For the purpose of a criminal investigation”. Paragraph 1.2 states that this is “Subject to any direction of the court”.

120. I have ensured that the Judgment is fully anonymised, removing the children’s names and dates of birth, the countries where each of the parents were born and where members of their families still live, and other potentially identifying feature. I have also removed details of the alleged sexual assault of B by the Imam, and some of the details of the allegation made by the father in respect of the mother’s own sexual behaviour (§81 above). In my Judgment these parts are not relevant to the rape allegation. Otherwise, I am satisfied that the whole anonymised Judgment should be disclosed to the Police. The Police have been involved with this family over an extended period (the police disclosure was lengthy) and I have relied in this Judgment on disclosure received from the Police, as well as additional evidence from the parties and their adult children. I am also satisfied that it is in the welfare interests of the children, that the Police make a decision about the mother’s rape allegation, and that this does not hang over the family any longer. I am satisfied that the Police should receive all of this Judgment, not just short passages from it, having carefully balanced all of the relevant factors. I note that the civil standard of proof which I have applied to findings in respect of false or malicious allegations is lower than the criminal standard of proof in any event.

121. In accordance with the President of the Family Division’s Practice Guidance: Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments dated 19.6.24, I also asked Counsel on 3.3.26 for oral submissions on whether or not the Judgment should be published (in anonymised form) by release to the National Archives. The father supported this; the mother objected.

122. I am satisfied that it is appropriate for this anonymised version of the Judgment to be published, including for the following reasons: 122.1. As a matter of public policy, it is important that there is transparency in respect of court proceedings including those relating to children; 122.2. Paragraph 3.6 (iii) of the President’s Guidance states: “Judges should always consider publishing a judgment in any case where…a written judgment already exists in publishable form”, as in this case; 122.3. Paragraph 3.8 of the President’s Guidance sets out the categories of case where the Judgment may be particularly suitable for publication, and include categories relevant to this case (“i. contested fact-finding hearings; ii. final hearings on applications for orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 ; and iv the making or refusal of an order under section 91(14)…of the Children Act 1989 ); 122.4. Clearly the children’s identities must be protected, which is achieved by the anonymised Judgment. I have removed other identifying features, so that jigsaw identification should not be possible; 122.5. I have also removed details of the alleged sexual assault of B and part of the father’s allegation (§81); 122.6. Having carried out the "balancing exercise" in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication ) [2005] 1 AC 593 (and summarised in Re J (A Child) [2014] 1 FLR 523 per Sir James Munby P) which has regard to the interests of the parties and the public, as protected by ECHR Articles 6, 8 and 10, considered in the particular circumstances of this individual case, the Judgment will be published on a fully anonymised basis. Dated: 5.3.26 SUMMARY SCHEDULE OF FINDINGS

1. The mother has made false allegations of rape against the father.

2. The mother has perpetrated domestic abuse towards the children and the father, including physical, verbal and emotional abuse.

3. The mother exposed her 2-year-old daughter to a serious safeguarding risk, by taking her to the house of an Imam with whom the mother was having a sexual relationship (which the mother later described as “grooming”) and then leaving her daughter unattended while the mother had sex with the Imam. The mother’s subsequent allegation to the police of the Imam sexually assaulting her daughter (which she now states was untrue) resulted in her daughter undergoing a CP medical as part of the investigations.

4. The mother has harassed the father and the children since the parties separated in January 2019.

5. The mother has engaged in malicious communications with third parties (police, local authority, schools and NSPCC) since the parties separated in January 2019.